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PREFACE 
Data for over 5000 indiyidual motor carrier shipments 
were collected for analysis. The shipments originated in 46 
states and were destined for a single destination, Tinker 
Air Force Base, Oklahoma. Information was available for 
state and city of origin, type of equipment used, motor 
carrier company or companies involved. in each shipment, 
shipment weight, shipment charges, and pick-up and delivery 
dates. The shipment data were supplemented with geographic, 
product attribute, and motor carrier attribute data gathered 
from secondary sources. Nine hypotheses about motor carrier 
pricing behavior were developed. These hypotheses were 
tested for statistical significance using the expanded 
' i' ~ ' 
database and a standard statistical analysis package. The 
conclusions reached about motor carrier pricing behavior as 
a result of the an~lysis of the data are reported. 
I wish to thank the members of my dissertation 
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Dr. Stephen Miller, 'my committee chairman,' for the guidance 
he provided during a long and difficult process. My thanks 
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the field of motor carrier pricing and regulation. Dr. Ruth 
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Krieger deserves many thanks for her helpful comments on the 
multiple drafts of this paper and for her personal support. 
I would also like to give special thanks to Dr. Richard 
Germain, a newcomer to my committee, for the interest he has 
shown in this project, his insightful comments, and his 
enthusiasm and encouragement. 
I would also like to recognize the support of the 
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at Tinker Air Force Base also contributed a great deal to 
this research effort. During the data gathering process her 
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Transportation and Industrial Societies 
Transportation is a universal input - perhaps 
the only one in economic terms. As such, 
transportation warrants special attention from 
governments, from private enterprises in both the 
transportation and non-~ransportation sectors of 
the economy, and from all persons interested in 
the welfare of a particular company, city, region, 
nation; in fact, the welfar~ of the world 
(Gellman, 1967, p. 62). 
An efficient logistical system, in which transportation 
plays a vital part, is essential to the economic development 
of a country. Without transportation, mass production as we 
know it could not take place' and the standard of living 
enjoyed in industrialized countries would be significantly 
lower. A primitive transportation system has often been 
identified as a major reason for the lack of economic 
development in many countries. In industrialized countries, 
transportation becomes more important as the logistic 
concept and just-in-time inventory control techniques become 
more widely accepted. 
The logistic concept holds that for a given level of 
customer service, logistical system costs should be 
minimized. Transportation is the major logistical cost; 
therefore, it is vital to know how transportation prices are 
1 
2 
set and what factors affect these prices. In a just-in-time 
inventory control system, efficient transportation is 
usually substituted for inventory. 
Transportation and Marketing 
Despite the importance of transportation, the field ,of 
marketing has largely ignored the subject. Marketers claim 
that channels of distribution, of which physical 
distribution and transportation are parts, fall within their 
domain. Yet the amount of attention paid to transportation 
by those in marketing is extremely limited. To confirm the 
previous statement, one only nas to examine a basic 
marketing text, indices of articles published in leading 
marketing journals, and marketing curriculum structures. 
In most marketing texts, channels of distribution are 
discussed within the context of the institutions involved, 
the relationships between the institutionsi and the 
management of the institutional relationships. Physical 
distribution, which involves transportation, generally 
receives very little attention. Although transportation 
might be mentioned as a distribution facilitating function, 
that is the extent of the coverage. In marketing journals, 
articles which address either practical or theoretical 
problems in the field of transportation rarely appear. 
Perhaps this lack of attention could be justified in 
the past when much of the transportation industry was 
extensively regulated. Most marketing mix elements of 
transportation companies were effectively controlled by the 
regulators. Transportation research, under these 
conditions, was the study of ec'onomic regulation, not 
marketing. At this point it is necessary to point out that 
there are three forms of regulation, economic, safety, and 
financial. This paper is only concerned with economic 
regulation of transportation at the federal and to some 
degree the state government 'levels. 
Transportation has, in the.past, been viewed as being 
closer to the operations management field, rather than the 
field of strategic marketing. However, by 1980 legislation 
was enacted that deregulated most of the transportation 
industry. A deregulated transportation environment has 
enabled firms, both transportation companies and shippers, 
to develop the principal of logistical competitive 
advantage. Deregulation should make the field of 
transportation research more attractive to marketing 
scholars. Significant research activity in this area would 
help strengthen the claim that t~ansportation falls within 
the domain of the marketing discipline. 
Transportation Rates and Research 
3 
Rates are one area of transportation wh~ch should 
attract the marketing researchers' interest. Rates are'the 
prices which transportation companies charge for their 
services, and price is one of the basic elements of a firm's 
marketing mix. Research is needed to describe the present 
4 
rate structure and to determine what factors underlie the 
structure. Rate research would contribute to the 
understanding of pricing behavior in an industry which 
provides a service in an unregulated environment. Rate 
research would benefit individual firms and economic 
development agencies. The amount of post-deregulation 
transportation rate research has been very limited, but the 
research done by marketers has been almost non-existent. 
The lack of transportation rate research by the marketing 
discipline adds credence to the arguments of those who feel 
that transportation has not truly been accepted as part of 
the marketing domain. 
Transportation Rates and Markets 
Transportation rates to and from a particular area have 
a major impact on economic activity within that area. 
Transportation rates basically define the boundaries of the 
area where a firm can look for raw materials. They also 
define the boundaries of the area where a firm can market 
its finished products. If two firms produce identical 
products and have identical production costs, the natural 
market boundary between them could be described by a series 
of points where transportation costs are equal. At these 
points neither firm would have a competitive advantage in 
product landed price. 1 If one firm enjoys a transportation 
l.Most logistic texts point out that the customers of a firm 
are concerned with the landed price of the goods they 
purchase, not the price of the goods at the factory. The 
landed price of the product is its price at its source plus 
rate advantage, its market area will expand. The market 
area served by the firm with the rate disadvantage will 
contract. This expansion and contraction of the market 
, -
areas is not, however, linear. If a firm pays a rate equal 
to 50 percent of that paid by the competition, it can 
transport products twice as far''for the same transportation 
dollar. If the operational radius of a firm doubles, the 
market area served is four times larger. It can be seen 
5 
from the above example that any firm currently located at or 
considering locating at a specific geographic point would be 
interested in transportation rates. 
Transportation Rates and Competition 
As previously discussed, transportation rates are one 
' 
of the major factors which determine feasible market areas 
for firms. Transportation rates also assist firms in 
defining their competition~ 2 It is beneficial to any group 
of firms, located in a specific geographic area, to know the 
rates for both inbound and outbound freight shipments. 
Under regulation, they could, with some effort, acquire this 
information. Under deregulation, rate information is not 
available. The firms know the inbound and outbound shipment 
rates they pay or, if they operate their, own private fleets, 
the transportation charges to wherever the product is 
delivered. 
2.There is an extensive body of literature which deals with 
the relationship between transportation, facility location, 
and regional economic development. For a summary of early 
locational theory development see Melvin L. Greenhut, Plant 
Location in Theory and Practice (Chapel Hill, NC: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1956). 
they know their fleet operating costs. They do not have, 
however, exact knowledge of the rates paid by their 
competitors. 
6 
If a product, produced by a local firm, is being 
imported into the community, it is probable that the local 
firm has a capacity constraint, a production cost 
disadvantage, a marketing disadvantage, 9r is seeking to 
achieve a profit margin which is unrealistic: If the local 
firm considers its profit margin to be competitive, and its 
production assets are being used at less than capacity, 
knowledge of the transportation rates paid by the 
competition would be beneficial. This information could be 
used by the local firm to assess its production or marketing 
disadvantage. 
If a local firm had no significant transportation cost 
in serving a local market, then the local firm should be the 
supplier of preference .in t~e local market. If, however, a 
locally demanded product can be produced elsewhere and 
imported to compete with the locally made product, the 
locational competitive advantage enjoyed by the local firm 
has disappeared. Based on this line of reasoning, local 
firms and economic development agencies should be willing to 
expend considerable effort to develop an understanding of 
freight rates for their community. Interest would naturally 
focus on the rates for products which are imported to 
compete with locally produced products. 
7 
Freight Rate Modeling 
Any research that produces a model of freight rates and 
explores the factors which underlie 'the model should prove 
useful in developing the competitive strategy of a firm. 
The model would also be useful in establishing an area 
economic development program. If such a model could be 
discovered and validated, it would contribute significantly 
to the understanding of transportation services pricing in a 
deregulated environment. Recent studies which take a 
freight rate modeling approach to the problem of deregulated 
transportation pricing are notewo,rthy, but extremely 
limited. One major limitation is that studies do not use 
individual shipment data. From a review of transportation 
literature, it quickly becomes obvious that additional 
research in the area of freight rate modeling is needed to 
develop a deeper understanding of the impact of 
deregulation. Rate research is also needed to meet the 
requirements of local businesses and economic development 
agencies. 
Using modern statistical analysis packages, the 
development of a model of transportation freight rates would 
be an easy task if the proper data were available. A major 
problem which precludes the development of post-deregulation 
freight rate models has been, however, the lack of a 
suitable disaggregated database.3 The Interstate Commerce 
3.Databases in transportation related articles are often 
described as aggregated or disaggregated databases. A 
disaggregated database is one which uses an individual 
8 
Comission (ICC) does draw a one-percent sample from the 
waybills of the railroad industry but no_ similar effort has 
been made for the motor carrier industry. 
For a single firm or a local economic development 
agency, the development of a transportation rate model alone 
might be sufficient. From an academic point of view such 
research would need to be carried beyond model construction 
to contribute significantly to transportation pricing theory 
development. The development of a transportation rate model 
can only be considered the first step in the academic 
research process. Transportation rate model development 
would have to be extended to identifying and analyzing the 
factors underlying the model for the research to have 
academic significance. These underlying factors would have 
to be described and examined for situation specific 
variation and statistical significance. If situation 
specific variation does exist, then the issue of why it 
exists must be examined as well as the stability of the 
variation as situations are altered. 
Deregulation and Freight Rates 
Deregulation of the motor carrier industry in 1980 
changed most aspects of a pricing system which had been 
utilized for the previous 45 years. Before deregulation, 
everyone understood how the motor carrier industry set 
shipment as the unit of observation. An aggregated database 
is one which combines a number of individual shipments into 
a single observation. 
prices. Pricing was completely controlled by a series of 
specific regulations, laws, and court decisions. Exactly 
what the regulated motor carriers could or could not do in 
the area of pricing was a matter of public record. Every 
product regularly involved in commerce was assigned a class 
rating and everyone kne.w exactly what factors were 
considered by the classification board in assigning a 
product classification. Arguments about a product's 
classification occurred frequently, but eventually all 
products recieved classification nu~ers. 
9 
Product class rating, shipment weight and the distance 
between origin/destination points basically determined what 
a regulated motor carrier could charge for its service. 
Other factors did affect the rates charged but the major 
ones are listed above. Under the same or similar con~itions 
every shipper paid exactly the same price for transportation 
services from a common carrier. ·Since everyone paid the 
same price under the same conditions, transportation was not 
considered a competitive factor by firms which depended on 
regulated motor carriers. 
Before deregulation a firm might choose not to operate 
its own motor carrier fleet and depend on common or contract 
carriers to supply transportation services. Under these 
conditions the firm could determine the freight rates paid 
by its competition for comparable transportation services to 
or from a location. These rates were a matter of public 
record, available to everyone who wished to expend the 
10 
energy to seek them out. Firms could determine if they had 
a product landed price advantage on which to make their 
marketing appeal, or if they would have to employ a 
different marketing mix strategy. 
Deregulation resulted in a previously known competitive 
factor, transportation costs, being replaced by a largely 
unknown one. Most firms in today's deregulated 
transportation environment make every effort to hide their 
transportation costs from competitors. These costs are 
treated as proprietary information to conceal any 
competitive advantage a firm might enjoy due to reduced 
transportation rates. An individual firm might make an 
educated guess about transportation rates paid by its 
competition, but the risks associated with guessing wrong 
probably outweigh the rewards associated with guessing 
right. At this time a significant number of transportation 
rate studies, which might reduc~ the risk of guessing wrong, 
have not been compiled• Further research in the unregulated 
transportation rate area is obviously needed. 
Deregulation and Freight Classification 
The pricing behavior of most privately owned, 
unregulated industries in this country is only constrained 
by broad legal guidelines and the forces of market 
competition. Unregulated companies are not required to 
reveal the factors used to make pricing decisions. Now that 
motor carriers have basically become part of the unregulated 
11 
sector, can we, through research, determine how they set the 
price they charge for their services? 
Initially the pricing constraints which had been 
imposed under motor carrier industry regulation were only 
relaxed, not removed. During the two years following its 
passage, the pricing provisions of the Motor Carrier Act of 
1980 became operable. At the end of this ~eriod the pricing 
behavior of the formerly regulated motor carrier industry 
had approached that of an industry which had never been 
regulated. By the end of three yea,rs the ICC had removed 
all product classification criteria, other than those based 
on cost, from the list of product classification criteria. 
The ICC ruled that product demand-oriented factors could be 
used in ratemaking, but not in classification. If product 
demand factors were to be considered in setting a 
transportation rate~ they were to be considered by 
individual motor carriers, not by classification committees 
collectively. 
The ICC also ruled that it was improper 'for different 
class ratings to be assigned to the same product shipped in 
different volumes. This did away with the two-tiered, less-
than-truckload (LTL) and truckload (TL), product 
classification system which had been in effect for years. 
The ICC determined that when rates differed strictly because 
of the volume of the shipment, this was a volume discount. 
Volume discounting was to be the responsibility of the motor 
carrier, not a collective rate-making body. The individual 
12 
motor carrier was also assigned the responsibility of 
determining where the individual minimum shipment and volume 
discount weight breaks would be. 
Recent Motor carrier Pricing Studies 
With deregulation, motor carriers were forced to 
develop their own i~dividual pricing expertise in three 
short years. They could no longer depend on the type of 
group pricing ·which had been practiced under regulation. As 
individual companies they had to determine how much to 
charge for their services in a multitude of different 
circumstances. Would they be market price takers as they 
had been in the highly competitive pre-regulation motor 
carrier industry or would they attempt to differentiate 
their product and be price makers? Presently little is 
known about how the motor c~rriers went about solving th~ir 
individual pricing problems. Very few studies have examined 
deregulated motor carrier pricing behavior. The majority of 
the small number of pricing studies done examined motor 
carrier costs and tried to ~orrelate pricing behavibr with 
cost recovery. 
Most of the published pricing studies are based either 
on case studies or surveys. The number of studies based on 
individual shipment data are extremely limited. Studies 
based on surveys report motor carrier and shipper 
perceptions about the changes that have taken place in motor 
carrier pricing behavior under deregulation. With this type 
13 
of research, feelings or perceptions of the subjects 
surveyed might not represent the feelings of the general 
population. In this case rate study findings would reflect 
the respondent's perceptions about changes in rates and not 
the actual rate changes themselves. 
Feelings and perceptions are very abstract concepts 
that are extremely difficult to measure. They vary from 
person to person, from situation to situation, and from time 
to time. For these reasons it is unlikely ~hat motor 
carrier pricing studies based on surveys will contribute 
significantly to progress toward defining a general theory 
of deregulated motor carrier pricing. Case studies are also 
limited in explanatory and predictive power. They often 
report what has happened to the rates paid by a single firm, 
shipping a single or limited line of products over fixed 
routes. 
Research Methodology 
Both surveys and case studies of deregulated motor 
carrier pricing have produced interesting results which are 
helpful in promoting an understanding of current motor 
carrier pricing behavior. These studies can only be 
classified, however, as descriptive research. Causal 
research in the area of motor carrier pricing is extremely 
rare and causal research studies based on disaggregated data 
are rarer still. Only two studies using extensive 
disaggregated databases to study the impact of deregulation 
14 
on motor carrier pricing behavior have been reported in the 
literature. Both of these studies, dicussed below, were 
excellent, but limited in scope. The databases used in the 
two studies have geographic, product, and motor carrier 
limitations which make the generalizabilty of the study 
results doubtful. 
Blair, Kasserman, and McClave (1986) examined motor 
carrier rates within the state of Florida and restricted' 
their study to six markets, three of which were large and 
three small. They also restricted their study to the 
pricing behavior of 10 motor ·carriers transporting five 
freight classes. Beilock and Freeman (1987) expanded the 
geographic area covered by including data from both Florida 
and Arizona in their study. They examined motor carrier 
pricing behavior in six large markets and seven small ones 
in Arizona. In Florida, th~y included eight large and nine 
small markets in their study. They examined the rates 
charged by four carriers in Florida and 19 in Arizona. Like 
Blair et al., Beilock and Freeman restricted their study to 
only a few of ~he 23 product classes., In Florida they 
included five product classes in their study while in 
Arizona they only studied four classes. 
Research Objectives 
The first general research objective of this paper is 
to make a contribution to the understanding of the pricing 
behavior of the motor carrier industry in a deregulated 
environment. Empirical studies which address the issue of 
deregulated motor carrier pricing are extremely limited. 
Therefore, any studies in this area will enrich our 
understanding of the subject; 
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A second general research objective is to overcome some 
of the limitations of the two previously discussed major 
postderegulation motor carrier rate studies which used 
disaggregated databases. This cari be accomplished by using 
a database which is national' in scope and broader in 
coverage than those previously u~ed. The number of carriers 
involved and products transported need to be expanded 
significantly. 
A third general research objective is to test the 
stability and suitability of a readily available, but seldom 
used, database which is accessible to researchers under the 
Freedom of Information Act. If this database can be used 
successfully, it could well be the initial step leading to 
the first national study of motor carrier pricing. 
A final general research objective is to develop a 
motor carrier rate model which might be useful to individual 
firms and economic development agencies located in the 
Greater Oklahoma City area. The model could assist these 
organizations in the formulating corporate or public policy 
strategy. 
The more specific research objective of this paper is 
to identify the statistically significant variables, in 
addition to weight and distance, which underlie pricing 
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behavior in the unregulated motor carrier industry. It is 
widely reported in the transportation literature that 
shipment distance and weight are the two major variables 
' 
considered when motor carriers establish the price for a 
transporta'tion service. In SOJ:I!.~ studies· these two variables 
alone accounted for a significant amount of the variance in 
motor carrier pricing behavior. 
Prior studies have found that the explanatory powers of 
the rate models we~e improved significantly, by including 
additional factors which have geographic, product, service, 
and carrier attribute dimensions. To explore the idea that 
deregulated motor carriers consider factors other than 
distance and weight when setting rates, nine hypotheses are 
developed and empirically tested. Testing these hypotheses 
for statistical significance will support or refute the idea 
that deregulated motor carrier pricing behavior is 
influenced by more than shipment' weight and the distance 
involved. The hypotheses and the dimensions they are 
associated with are listed below. These hypotheses and 
dimensions are fully defined and discussed in Chapter v. 
The nature of the data and the statistical tests to be used 
are also specified below and discussed fully in Chapter v. 
Product Attributes 
Hypothesis 1· As the product class number increases 
the rate charged increases. The data used to test this 
hypothesis are continuous in nature; therefore, regression 
and correlation analysis are appropriate statistical 
techniques. 
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Hypothesis 1· Variation from the ideal product density 
increases the rate charg~d. The data used to test this 
hypothesis .are also continuou.s in nature; therefore, 
regression and correlation analysis are appropriate 
statistical techniques as they are for testing Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis J. As the val~e of the product increases 
the rate charged will increase. The data used to test this 
hypothesis are again continuous in nature; therefore, 
regression and correlation analysi~ also are appropriate 
statistical techniques as well. 
Hypothesis !· As the need for special product handling 
increases the rate'charged will increase. The data used to 
test this hypothesis are binary in nature; therefore, 
t-tests of means are appiopriate statistical techniques. 
Geographic Attributes 
Hypothesis 2· As the region of shipment origiq varies 
the rate charged will vary. The region of origin data are 
nominal in nature and the rate charged data are interval in 
nature; therefore, an ANOVA model is an appropriate 
statistical technique. 
Hypothesis ~. As the size of the origin area 
population increases the rate charged decreases. The data 
used to test this hypothesis are continuous in nature; 
regression and correlation analysis are, therefore, the 
appropriate statistical techniques to us~. 
Carrier Attributes 
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Hypothesis 1· If multiple carriers are involved in a 
shipment, the rate c~harged will increase beyond that charged 
by a single carrier. The data used to test this hypotheSis 
are binary in,nature; therefore, t-tests of means are 
appropriate statistical techniques. 
Hypothesis ~. As the size of the carrier increases the 
rate charged will decrease. The data used to test this 
hypothesis are continuous in nature; therefore, regression 
and correlation analysis are the appropriate primary 
statistical techniques to use in this case. 
Service Attributes 
Hypothesis i· As the service level increases the rate 
increases. The data used to test this hypothesis are 
continuous in nature; therefore, regression and correlation 
analysis are also appropriate statistical techniques. 
DataBase 
The data that will be used iri examining the hypotheses 
summarized above are secondary data based on the records of 
individual freight shipments, made from 46 of the 48 
contiguous United States, to Tinker Air Force Base (TAFB), 
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located just outside of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. This data 
was obtained from the files of the Military Traffic 
Management Command'(MTMC) which has its headquarters in 
Falls Church, Virginia. Researcher~, under the provisions 
of the Freedom of Information Act·, have access to this 
database. 
The shipments chosen for study include those made from 
July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984. This period was chosen 
for several reasons: First, it represents the first full 
year in which motor carriers had almost complete pricing 
freedom under the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act of 
1980. Second, after July 1, 1983, motor carriers were no 
longer allowed to use product demand factors in assigning a 
product to a class. Third, after this date the volume of 
freight shipped could no ldnger be considered in the 
classification process. Finally, this period was chosen 
because it avoided much of ,the industry turbulence which 
resulted in numerous carrier failures during the middle 
; 
1980's. The basic bill of lading information contained in 
the MTMC database was supplemented by data from three other 
sources: the Rand McNally Commercial Atlas, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Disaggregated File 
of Commodity Attributes, and the National Motor Freight 
Classification Manual (NMFCM). 
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Contributions 
The findings of this research will have both practical 
and theoretical implications. , From a practical point of 
view, a shipper can use the findings as a guide to actions 
which will reduce overall product distribution costs. Cost 
reduction is becoming more important in many industries as 
the limit is reached on production efficien~ies. 
Controlling costs appears to be the key to maintaining or 
increasing profit margins in today's competitive 
environment. A reduction in shipping costs will also make 
it possible for a firm to expand its market area or to 
become more competitive in its present market area. 
From a theoretical point of view, this study should 
enrich the understanding of unregulated motor carrier 
pricing behavior. Specific factors, thought to underlie 
motor carrier pricing behavior,· are examined individually 
for statistical significance. The finding of this portion 
of the study alone should make the effort worthwhile. The 
study's theoretical contribution is constrained somewhat by 
the limits of the database. The study involves multiple 
shipment origin points with only a single destination. The 
findings will be valid for that single destination but it is 
unclear whether they will be valid for other destinations. 
The study will, however, be a first step in expanding the 
scope of postderegulation motor carrier pricing studies. 
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Report Organization 
This report is made up of seven chapters. Chapter I 
outlines briefly what will be studied and why. Chapters II, 
III, and IV examine the literature 6f the motor carrier 
industry in detail. Chapter II explores the development of 
the highway system in the United States, the motor carrier 
industry structure, and the his.tory of the motor· carrier 
industry. Chapter III reviews the literature in the areas 
of motor carrier pricing system development. It also 
examines the impact of regulation on motor carrier pricing 
behavior and outlines the arguments for and against the use 
of railroad type pricing in the motor carrier industry. The 
issue of regulatory cost is examined and the major motor 
carrier pricing studies are discussed. Chapter IV discusses 
the impact of deregulation on motor carrier pricing 
behavior. It also discusse~ motor carrier rate modeling and· 
government freight shipments. ch·apter v discusses in detail . 
the nine hypotheses to be tested, measurement issues, and 
the tests to be used. The chapter also describes and 
discusses the development of the database used in the study. 
Chapter VI describes the empirical results of the study. 
Chapter VII, the final chapter, presents the conclusions 
reached and suggests areas for future research in the area. 
CHAPTER II 
MOTOR CARRIER'INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
AND HISTORY 
The United States Transportation System 
Over the last twenty-five .years there has been a steady 
decline in the per~entage contribution to Gross National 
Product (GNP) made by the industrial sector. As the 
industrial sector becomes less important, the percentage 
contribution of the freight industry to GNP declined. The 
percentage of GNP spent on passenger and freight 
transportation has remained stable at 18 to 20 percent, but 
a smaller percentage of GNP is spent each year on freight 
transportation. Although the percentage of the GNP spent on 
' ' 
freight transportation declined, the total constant dollars 
spent on this vital industry more than doubled. This 
conflict in transportation statistics can be explained by 
the growth of the GNP. The GNP is three times larger today 
than it was 25 years ago. Freight transportation payments 
increased in constant 1969 dollars from $62 billion to $141 
billion, while ton-miles increased from 2145 billion to 4100 
billion, or from 1000 to 1600 ton-miles per capita. 1 This 
1.A ton-mile is a commonly accepted measure of output for 
freight transportation. It reflects the weight of a 
shipment and the distance it is moved. Multiplication of 
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equals a 20 ton truckload of goods carried more than 800 
miles for every person in the U.S. (Hazard, 1977). By the 
year 2000 the total ton-miles should reach 6300 billion 
(Altschiller, 1982). 
The reasons for the increase in freight ton-miles per 
capita are varied. Some of the growth can undoubtedly be 
attributed to concentrated production and universal demand. 
When a product is produced in a single location to meet 
nationwide demand, this leads to an increase in ton-miles 
per capita. Also, many sellers now offer an extremely wide 
assortment of merchandise which would lead, in turn, to more 
transportation ton-miles. 
Roadway Development 
Transportation is not only a necessary factor in any 
organized economy, it is often the limiting factor (Sampson, 
Farris & Shrock, 1985). Goods have no value unless they are 
available when and where they are needed. The United States 
has developed the most extensive roadway network in the 
world to meet its transportation needs (Fair & Williams, 
1981). 2 
The first major federal government roadway development 
project began in 1806 when Congress authorized a survey of a 
the shipment weight in tons by the miles traveled gives the 
ton-miles involved in moving a particular shipment between 
two points. Speed of travel is not considered. This common 
measure of transportation output allows direct comparisons 
of the production of the various modes of transportation. 
2.A way is the medium over which a transportation system 
travels such as a highway, railway, airway, etc. 
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route from Cumberland, Maryland to Vandalia, Illinois. 
Construction began in 1811, and by 1839, $3,000,000 had been 
spent. There were, however, questions about the 
constitutionality of the construction ~unding by the federal 
government. In 1830 President 'Jackson had vetoed the 
Maysville Road Bill because he thought that federal 
involvement in regional roadway construction was 
unconstitutional (Luna, 1971). 
Centralized rqadway development did not re-emerge until 
the late 1800's. Railroads wanted shippers to have easier 
access to rail terminals and farm groups wanted roadways to 
open markets (Luna, 1971). The development of the 
automobile industry made roadway development urgent (Becht, 
1970). New Jersey, in 1891, began to repay local 
governments for one-third of the cost of highway 
construction and maintenance (Locklin, 1972). By 1915, 45 
states had enacted state ai~ to roadways statutes, 40 had 
established highway departme~ts, and 24 had developed plans 
for highway systems (Sampson & Farris, 1966). In 1916, 
Congress passed th~ Federal Aid Road Act which removed 
highway development responsibility from local governments 
and placed it in state hands. 
In the early 1920's hard surfaced road miles exceeded 
the number of railroad miles for the first time (Lowe & 
Morydas, 1975). During the next ten years the hard surfaced 
mileage doubled, then doubled again in the next twenty 
years. The depression of 1929 stimulated highway 
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construction. One study reported that 651,000 miles of 
roadway and 100,000 bridges were built or improved. In 
addition, 135,000 miles of roadway drainage projects were 
completed (Owen, 1964). World War II interrupted highway 
development, but it became clear that- a., system of high speed 
super-highways was needed (Luna, 1971). In 1956, the 42,500 
mile National System of 'Interstate and Defense Highways was 
authorized, and the funds to-start construction were voted 
in 1962. The Interstate Highway System is now completed, 
but about half of it needs ~o be upgraded (Altschiller, 
1982). Today the highway system in the u.s. includes about 
3.9 million miles of roads, which vary a great deal in 
quality (Johnson & Wood, 1986). 
The Motor Carrier Industry 
The highway system allows the motor carrier industry to 
provide transportation to anylocation in the country where 
an economic requirement.exists. Before World War II the 
motor carrier industry expanded at a slow but steady rate, 
but after the war it grew rapidly. In 1939, motor carriers 
produced 53 billion ton-miles. By 1979, the number of ton-
miles produced had increased to 628 billion before falling 
to 565 billion in the recession year of 1980 (Harper, 1982). 
By 1984, the number of ton-miles produced had increased to 
602 billion (Coyle, Bardi & Cavinato, 1986). As a 
percentage of all ton-miles carried by all modes these 
figures represented 9.7 percent in 1939, 24.3 percent in 
1979, 22.6 percent in 1980, and 24.1 percent in 1984 
(Transportation Policy Associates, 1985). 
Industry Structure and Size 
The motor carrier industry is made up of groups of 
heterogeneous carriers having different l~gal, service and 
commodity characteristics (Coyle, Bardi & Cavinato, 1986). 
A single motor carrier can be a member of several sub-
industries (Coyle & Bardi, 1984). The legal structure of 
the motor carrier industry is depicted in Figure 1. 
Private carriers are usually involved in the 
transportation of high value, high rated traffic and 
commodities that require personalized service (Coyle & 
Bardi, 1984). The exact size of the private fleet is 
unknown, but the number of firms involved in private 
transportation activities during 1980 was estimated to be 
about 500,000 (Dun's Review, 1980). 
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An additional sub-industry is made up of firms involved 
in intrastate transportation. This sub-industry has two 
components, intracity and intercity. A for-hire motor 
carrier transporting a commodity locally or intracity might 
be regulated or completely unregulated. There is no 
reliable estimate about the size of this sub-industry. 
The for-hire interstate sub-industry consists of two 
types of carriers. The first transports commodities that 
are exempt from regulation. In 1980, there were slightly 
more than 42,000 individual firms engaged in the 
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transportation of exempt commodities (Taft, 1980). The 
privately owned and exempt carriers combined transport about 
60 percent of the total motor carrier interstate ton-miles 
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Figure 1. Motor Carrier Industry Legal Structure 
Sources: The Economics of the Motor Carrier Industries (p. 
9) by Garland Chow, 1978, Bloomington, Indiana: Division of 
Research, School of Business, Indiana University and 
Transportation USA (p. 301) by Frederick J. Stephenson, Jr., 
1987, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company. 
A second type of for-hire interstate carrier is the 
regulated contractual or common carrier. Contractual and 
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common carriers differ in the extent of their commitment to 
the shipper (Bowersox, 1978). 
The ICC maintains 17 different commodity 
classifications for common carriers, with the largest number 
operating as general freight carriers (Lieb, 1981). 
Interstate common carriers must report specific data to 
regulatory agencies, making them the only sub-industry about 
which exact statements can be made. In 1945, there were 
20,872 interstate common carriers, but by 1974, there were 
only 15,100. By 1979, this downward trend in the number of 
firms had been reversed when the number of interstate motor 
carrier firms exceeded 17,000 (American Trucking 
Association, 1979). By 1981, there were about 21,800 firms; 
and, by 1984, the number had increased to 30,012 (Coyle & 
Bardi, 1984; Johnson & Wood, 1986). In 1987, the number of 
interstate common carriers stood at 37,627 (ICC Annual 
Report, 1987). The large increase in the number of common 
carriers is attributed to the easing of industry entry 
restrictions. 
In 1980, slightly more than 89 percent of the 
interstate common carriers had annual operating revenues of 
less than one million dollars. Six percent of the firms had 
annual operating revenues between one and five million 
dollars while five percent had annual operating revenues of 
more than five million dollars (Coyle, Bardi & Cavinato, 
1986). The largest common carrier had annual operating 
revenues approaching one billion dollars (Harper, 1982). 
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Not depicted in Figure 1 is the owner-operator sub-
industry. Owner-operators are difficult to classify because 
they may lease their vehicles to a private company, haul 
exempt commodities, or sub-contract with. a regulated carrier 
(Lieb, 1981). There may be as many as 100,000 owner-
operators, and the~ transport between 25 and 40 percent of 
the total motor carrier intercity ton-miles (Wyckoff & 
Maister, 1975). 
Motor Carrier Market Competition 
The markets of the motor carrier industry are often 
situation-specific. Many small carriers might compete 
vigorously for any available freight. ·This approaches pure 
competition. When 9nly a few firms are authorized to 
transport a commodity, the market becomes semi-monopolistic. 
This is the case with very specialized carriers such as 
explosive or nuclear material transporters. A monopolistic 
situation occurs when a single motor carrier offers service 
over a route. With regard to shipment size, an 
oligopolistic situation exists in the small shipment area. 
Only a few large firms can afford the necessary investment 
in terminal facilities required to compete in this market. 
The motor carrier industry transports most of the small 
intercity shipments (Harper, 1982). Small shipments are 
important to the common carriers in that they generate more 
than 60 percent of the revenues and account for more than 45 
percent of the tonnage (Bowersox, 1978). Sixty six percent 
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of the small shipments weigh under 500 pounds and 99 percent 
weigh under 10,000 pounds (Johnson & Wood, 1986). One study 
found that the average shipment size was 1600 pounds 
(Wyckoff, 1974). The motor carriers have captured most of 
the shipments made between firms involved ip the 
distributive trades such as wholesaling and retailing. 
These shipments are,usually made over shorter distances 
where intermo.dal competition j.s lacking (Bowersox, 1978). 
Motor Carrier Revenues 
Motor carriers clearly dominate the shipment of certain 
product groups. It is not possible to say specifically, 
however, how much each product group contributes to total 
motor carrier revenues. Only four to five percent of the 
firms must report revenue data to a central agency. Motor 
carriers are thought to receive about 73 percent of the 
total transportation dollars spent, although they handle 
less than 25 percent of the intercity freight tonnage (Coyle 
& Bardi, 1984; Transportation Association of America, 1981). 
Average absolute revenues per ton-mile increased 
incrementally from 4.1 cents in 1945 to 8.5 cents in 1970 
(Transportation Association of America, 1980). This upward 
trend continued, with the 1980 figure reported as 18 cents 
per ton-mile (Transportation Association of America, 1981). 
One large motor carrier was reported to have an average 
revenue per ton-mile of 22.7 cents in 1985 (Johnson & Wood, 
1986). When the figures are adjusted for inflation, 
however, there has been very little change in ton-mile 
revenues. 
Motor Carrier Historical Development 
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The history of the motor carrier industry can be 
divided into three periods. The first period spans the 
years from the turn of the century until the passage of the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1935. This Act placed for-hire motor 
carriers engaged in interstate and international 
transportation of freight and passengers under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. The second motor carrier industry 
historical period covers the years between 1935 and 1980. 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 marked the end of the second 
period of motor carrier history and the beginning of the 
third or current period. 
To understand motor carrier behavior generally, and 
more specifically, motor carrier pricing behavior, it is 
necessary to examine the history of the industry. Before 
the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the motor 
carrier industry suffered through a period of intense 
competition and often practiced survival pricing. This was 
brought on by the depression of 1929 which began about 10 
years after the industry entered the growth phase of its 
lifecycle. Before this intensely competitive industry could 
adjust to the depressed economic environment, it was 
regulated by the federal government. Pricing, under 
regulation, was controlled by a centralized agency and not 
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by the motor carriers themselves. Today, the responsibility 
for pricing has been returned to the motor carriers. How 
they react to this new pricing' freedom will have a 
significant impact on all seg~ents of the economy of the 
' ' 
United States. 
Motor Carrier Industry 1900-1935 
The number of motor vehicles involved in freight 
transportation before 1900 was insi~nificant. Trucks 
appeared in 1896 and by 1898, several manufacturers had 
"motor delivery wagons" for sale'' (Karolevitz, 1966, p.39). 
By 1911, there were about 25,000,trucks in operation, but by 
1920, the number had increased to 1.1 million. In 1925, 
more than 2.5 million trucks were in operation and 155,000 
of them were involved in for-hire transportation (Wood & 
Johnson, 1989). By 1930, there were 3.5 million trucks in 
' ' ' 
operation in this country (Mertins, 1972). The demand for 
motor carrier services grew rapidly and the for-hire 
carriers became intercity as well as intracity carriers 
(Harper, 1982). 
') 
Many motor carriers were unable to provide the service 
expected by the public. They could not serve everyone and 
bankruptcy occurred frequently. The motor c~rriers charged 
rates that were often unreasonable, not because they were 
too high, but rather, because they were too low to allow the 
carriers to make a fair profit (Harper, 1982). The 
individual states tried to regulate the motor carrier 
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industry, but major problems arose because state standards 
were not uniform (Lieb, 1981; Harper, 1982; Sampson, Farris 
& Shrock, 1985). By 1925, 37 states had established some 
form of economic regulatory controls and several other 
states claimed the right to do so (Harper, 1959). By 1932, 
39 states had regulated for-hire motor common carriers 
operating within the states (Moore, 1972). By 1933, this 
number had increased to 42 states and contract carriers were 
subject to economic regulation in 31 states (Harper, 1982). 
Initially the states tried to regulate all motor 
carriers as common carriers (Lieb, 1981). In 1923 Michigan 
enacted legislation that held that any person or company 
engaged in the for-hire transportation was a common carrier 
and could be regulated as such. Common carriers were 
expected to meet very specific service standards because the 
service they provided was 90nsidered to be a public 
necessity. Some carriers, however, were conducting 
operations under contracts. The Supreme Court declared this 
statute to be unconstitutional and ruled that a state could 
not transform a contract carrier into a common carrier 
simply by passing a law.3 Similar statutes in California4 
and Florida5 were also held to be unconstitutional. This 
problem was solved when the Court upheld a Texas law which 
treated common and contract carriers separately.6 This 
3.Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 
(1923). 
4.Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 217 u.s. 507 
(1926). 
5.Smith v. Cahoon, Sheriff, 283 u.s. 553 (1931). 
6.Stephenson v. Binford, 287 u.s. 251 (1932). 
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decision established a precedent which allowed regulatory 
agencies to divide the motor carriers into several different 
classes, each with its own set of rules (Harper, 1982). 
The states assumed that without federal legislation, 
they could regulate interstate as well as intrastate 
carriers. In 1925, however, the Supreme Court upheld the 
doctrine of federal su~remacy irt all areas o+ interstate 
transportation. 7 In Washington8 and Maryland9 cases the 
Court held it unconstitutional for 'the states to require 
motor carriers to secure a state's operating authority 
before starting interstate operations (Harper, 1982). 
During the late 1920's, political pressure to impose 
federal regulation on the motor carrier industry increased. 
The industry was overcrowded, which led to extreme 
intramodal and intermodal competition (Hudson & Constantin, 
1958). The demands for regulatory action came from the 
railroads, the motor carrier industry itself, some shippers, 
the states, and various government agencies (Harper, 1982). 
Much of the higher rated traffic was being taken from 
railroads by unregulated motor carriers. This "cream· 
skimming" left the railroads with low valued commodities, 
able to support only a modest transportation rate. This 
threatened the railroad pricing structure which was based on 
charging high rates for high valued products (OWen & 
Braeutigan, 1978). Therefore, the railroads demanded that 
7.Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railroad v. Illinois, 118 
u.s. 557 (1886). 
8.Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925). 
9.Bush v. Maloy, 267 u.s. 317 (1925). 
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their major competition be regulated (Sampson, Farris & 
Shrock, 1985). The railroads also wanted motor carrier 
regulation to protect what remained of their declining 
market share (Mentzer & Gomes, 1986). Railroad revenue had 
been severely reduced by economic conditions. The growing, 
highly competitive motor carrier industry was seen as a 
major threat (New York Times, 1934). The railroads argued 
that their taxes were being used to build highways which 
effectively subsidized their competition (Harper, 1982). 
The existing motor carriers ~rgued regulation was 
necessary to protect them from the less firmly established 
newcomers (Mentzer & Gomes, 1986),. They hoped federal 
regulation would bar new entrants, help them fix rates, and 
allow them to divide the 'market among themselves (Wright, 
1983). The most important motor carrier lobbying group, the 
American Trucking Associat~ons, switched from a strong anti-
regulatory orientation, to one that strongly supported 
regulation. 
Shippers pointed out that unregulated motor carriers 
often operated with sub-standard equipment and failed to pay 
damage claims. They also ignored contracts and other 
agreements, did not maintain schedules, stopped service 
without notification, and otherwise did not fulfill the 
duties required of _for-hire common carriers (Harper, 1982). 
The states, who supported regulation, were often 
motivated by the desire to protect railroads who were large' 
taxpayers (Harper, 1982). In 1925 the National Association 
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of Railroad and Public Utility Commissioners called for 
federal regulation of motor carriers. They were joined by 
the ICC in 1928 and by the Federal Coordinator of 
Transportation in 1934 (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). 
The public was indifferent about motor carrier 
regulation (Harper, 1981). The agricultu~al sector, 
'•' 
however, did not want motor carrier regulation. 
Agricultural'organizations artd individual farmers used their 
political influence ~o insur~ that carriers of agricultural 
products were excluded from the provisions of any regulatory 
legislation (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985; Lieb, 1981). 
During the early 1930's it became obvious that 
something had to be done in the.area of motor carrier 
regulation. Many railroads were bankrupt while many others 
were on the brink of failure. The gross operating revenues 
of the industry fell drastically. The railroad workforce 
was reduced by a third, and their return on investment 
declined steadily (Phillips, 1969). Cost cutting measures 
and freight rate increases did not improve the profitability 
of the railroads, and by 1933, 75-of the largest were in the 
' ' 
hands of receivers (Harper, 1982). After ten years of 
trying, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. It 
was the thirty-seventh bill that had been introduced to 
impose federal economic regulation on the motor carrier 
industry in the previous ten years (Lieb, 1981). 
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Motor Carrier Industry 1935-1980 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 extended the monopoly 
type of railroad regulation to the motor carrier industry 
(Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). The aim of railroad 
regulation was the prevention of monopoly abuses. The aim 
of motor carrier regulation was to control pervasive, 
intensive competition (Farmer, .1964) . Competition has 
always been looked upon as a superior m~rket regulator, but 
in the motor carrier industry in 1935, competition was not 
working well. Pro-regulatory advocates argued that 
competition was causing poor, unreliable services, 
contributing to unstable financial conditions, and causing 
duplication of effort (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985,). 
Industry entry and exit had been easy and in the 1930's 
excessive capacity and survival price competition was 
common. Competition often resulted in below cost rates and 
the diversion of traffic from the distressed railroads. It 
was hoped that regulation would bring order to a troubled 
industry. 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 contained a ."grandfather" 
clause to protect the operating rights of existing common 
and contract carriers (Harper, 1982; Wood & Johnson, 1989). 
Motor carriers eventually granted operafing·rights under the 
grandfather clause numbered slightly more than 20,000 (Snow, 
1977). The certificates and permits issued to the 
grandfathered carriers at no cost became valuable 
commodities (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). A certificate 
gave a firm the right to provide service over a specified 
route. The ICC was frequently accused of being too 
protective of existing carriers' operating rights at 
certificate and permit hearings. About 80 percent of the 
applications for extended operating rights for existing 
carriers were approved while less than 10 pe~cent of the 
applications of new carriers wer~,considered favorably 
(Lieb, 1985). 
The Act made the regulated motor carriers subject to 
38 
the same rate tests used in the rail industry. Rates had to 
be fair and reasonable and they,could, not offer unjust 
preference to any person, place or commodity. Rates had to 
be published and any deviations could not occur without 
opponents being given the opportunity to challenge them. 
The Act required contract carriers to publish and file 
their minimum rates, but not their actual rates. If the ICC 
decided that a minimum rate was too low, it was empowered to 
prescribe the minimum rate, but it could not set the actual 
rate (Lieb, 1981). Competition from other contract and 
common carriers was relied on to provide control of the 
' ' 
maximum contract rates. To assure that the common carrier 
restraint on contract rates remained intact,the ICC did not 
allow dual operations until the late 1970's (Lieb, 1981). 
It was 1957 before contract carriers had to file and publish 
the actual rates charged for their service (Sampson, Farris 
& Shrock, 1985). The number of contracts that any one 
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contract carrier could have in force at one time was limited 
to eight (Wood & Johnson, 1989). 
The Act also dealt with the operating of private motor 
carriers. It included provisions to prevent the private 
carriers from expanding into for-hire operations (Lieb, 
1981). Private motor carriage was viewed as a specialized 
operation designed to meet the needs of the division of a 
company that controlled it. That division was not allowed 
to transport goods owned by another division of the same 
parent company on a for-hire basis (Coyle, Bardi & Cavinato, 
1986). This provision of the Act was upheld by the courts 
when they ruled that a subsidiary used by a parent company 
for transportation services was not engaged in private motor 
carriage.10 These restrictions often resulted in gross 
inefficiencies because many companies had freight moving in 
only one direction.11 
Private carriers with surplus capacity were allowed to 
lease equipment and drivers to common carriers, but the 
lease had to be for at least 30 days. This prevented the 
use of single trip leasing as a tool to reduce the number of 
empty backhaul miles (Show, 1977). It was estimated that as 
much as 40 percent of the private motor carrier miles 
involved the movement of empty trailers (Coyle, Bardi & 
10.Keller Industries, Inc., 103 MCC 520 (1966). 
1l.Empty backhauls have always been a problem for private 
motor carriers. In 1978 the ICC decided to allow private 
motor carrier to seek and obtain for-hire common carrier 
authority on the backhaul route (Toto Purchasing and Supply 
Company, Inc., 128 MCC873, March 24, 1978). In 1982 the 
private carriers were allowed to trip lease on a single trip 
basis to authorized common carriers. 
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Cavinato, 1986). This figure was confirmed by a survey 
which found that 33.2 percent of all of the non-specialized, 
privately owned motor carriers were traveling empty (Federal 
Highway Administration, 1972). 
A final segment of the industry recognized by the Act 
was the carriers exempt from economic regulation. Free 
entry into this segment was allowed and the rates charged 
depended on demand. Exempted vehicles were prim,arily used 
to move farm production to markets' and sup~lies from the 
markets to farms (Lieb, 1981). The exemption given to 
agricultural commodities was eventually extended to marine 
and horticulture products and newspapers (Sampson, Farris & 
Shrock, 1985). A common, private or contract carrier could 
become an exempt carrier if it was transporting an exempt 
product. 
A second group of exempt carriers was defined by 
geography. Motor vehicles operated wholly within a city, 
between contiguous cities, or within a zone adjacent to and 
commercially contiguous to a city were exempt (Sampson, 
Farris & Shrock, 1985). This provision of the Act 
recognized that most of these vehicles were operating as 
intrastate carriers, and state regulatory procedures were 
quite highly developed. The exemption of a large portion of 
the industry from regulation recognized that the industry 
was extremely complex. It was unlikely that one agency 
could regulate the entire industry efficiently. 
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Under regulation, motor carriers knew what services 
they had to provide at what rates. The shippers knew what 
services were available at what costs. Rapid changes in 
rates and services were not possible due to the regulatory 
process. Among negative aspe-cts of regulation was the 
expense involved. Shippers and carriers suffered the 
expense of keeping abreast of regulatory change. Decision 
making was slow, and even if a change were approved, the 
carrier relinquished income during the regulatory delay. 
Regulation led to operating inefficiencies, excessive energy 
consumption, and made it difficult for motor carriers to 
react to changes in the environment. 
Between 1935 and 1958 the .number of regulated motor 
carriers decreased steadily (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 
1985). Most operating rights were controlled by carriers 
that had been grandfathered. The easiest way for them to 
expand was through merger. As existing certificates were 
combined, restrictions were placed on the surviving carrier. 
The motor carrier buying operating rights or acquiring them 
through merger gained the right to operate over certain 
desirable routes; however, the firm was also compelled to 
operate over some highly undesirable ones. Firms often 
found they could carry freight in only one direction and 
serve certain terminal points, but not intermediate points. 
They could only serve certain cities by following circuitous 
routes and could transport some goods, but not others. Some 
specialized carriers could not legally transport specialized 
freight on the backhaul, even if such freight were readily 
available (ICC, 1965). 
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The railroads, who had strongly supported the 
regulation of the motor carriers, were not satisfied with 
the results. They were concerned about the continued 
improvement of the highways which enhanced the motor 
carriers' ability to compete. The railroads argued that 
motor carriers were not required to pay fees in proportion 
to the benefi~s received. The agricultural exemption also 
caused much difficulty. Judicial interpretation led to a 
growing list of exempt commodities and by 1980 the number 
was more than 100 (Lieb, 1981; Lieb, 1985). Another 
question that proved difficult to answer was, when a motor 
carrier was involved in for-hire and private motor carrier 
operations (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). Motor carriers 
would "buy" goods at their source, transport them to their 
destination, and "sell" them to the user for the purchase 
price plus transportation fees. The motor carriers 
contended they were transporting goods that they owned; 
therefore, they were exempt from regulation. 
Many critics felt that the continued regulation of the 
motor carrier industry was a mistake. In 1961 and 1962 
seven major studies of the transportation system and 
regulation were published (Sampson & Farris, 1975). These 
studies supported the proposition that greater reliance 
should be placed on market forces (Lieb, 1985). In 1962 
President Kennedy criticized the regulatory structure as 
being inconsistent and outdated. President Johnson 
contended that the nation's transportation,system lacked 
coordination and this resulted in many system 
inefficiencies. He proposed that a Department of 
Transportation {DOT) be created to coordinate existing 
federal programs. The DOT, from its start, was a strong 
advocate of regulatory reform. The DOT's position on 
transportation regulation was contained in the following 
statement: 
Carriers, shippers and passengers ~ace a web 
of r~strictive government regulations which stifle 
competition, discourage innovation, and foster 
inefficiency. The present. regulatory structure is 
in many respects, outdated, inequitable, 
inefficient, uneconomical, and frequently 
irrational. It often misplaces incentive and 
disincentive, distorts competitive advantage, 
protects inefficient carriers from efficient 
competition, over restricts market entry, 
artificially inflates rates and misallocates our 
Nation's resources. The inflexibility of these 
outmoded regulations impedes the development of 
lower cost, more efficient national transportation 
(U.S. Department of Transportation, 1975). 
In 1971, the DOT,began to submit annually legislation 
to deregulate the motor carriers (Lieb, 1981). Agencies 
joining the DOT in its call for regulatory reform were the 
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Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the 
President's Council of Economic Advisers (Lieb, 1985). 
Consumer groups, who felt that motor carrier regulation was 
more for the protection of carriers than for the benefit of 
the public, joined the campaign (Snow, 1977). Academicians 
contending that the regulation of a competitive industry led 
to the misallocation of resources, supported regulatory 
reform (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985; Keyes, 1980). 
44 
One study of misallocation in the motor carrier 
industry estimated that the societal cost was $5 billion per 
year (Moore, 1972). Moore's findings were supported by two 
earlier studies, one involving railroads and.the other 
airlines. These studies found that the social costs of 
regulation were underestimated and concluded that it was 
unlikely that the benefits of regulation exceeded its cost 
(Friedlaender, 1969; Jordan, ·1970). 
The public was also becoming interested in conditions 
in the motor carrier industry. They were concerned about 
inflation in the 1970's and were angered when Teamsters 
Union members got large wage and benefit increases. Motor 
carriers simply raised rates to cover these new wage 
agreements (Johnson & Wood, ,1989). The fuel crisis of the 
early 1970's also increased public interest in regulation. 
As motorists waited in lines for gasoline they read about 
airlines and motor carriers operating empty because of 
regulatory restrictions. 
The public was upset with regulation, but the shippers 
were not (Lieb, 1981). Research showed that the shippers 
were basically satisfied with existing services and rates 
(Jones, 1979). The motor carriers and the Teamsters were 
very much against ~eregulation. They argued that changes 
would promote market instability, undermine the financial 
position of existing carriers, promote predatory pricing, 
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and reduce service quality. In addition, they argued that 
deregulation would reduce, or in some cases end, service to 
small communities, decrease fuel efficiency, and increase 
highway safety problems (American Trucking Associations, 
1979). 
The ICC acknowledged the criticism of regulation but 
did not respond, preferring that the legislative or 
executive branch act (Lieb, 1985). President Ford began to 
support deregulation in;all areas including tran~portation; 
and, when President Carter also endorsed regulatory reform, 
the ICC acted (Harper, 1981). It released an internal 
report that contained 39 recommendations for regulatory 
change (ICC 91st Annual Report, .1977). President Carter 
responded by refusing to appoint commissioners to fill ICC 
vacancies unless the candidates were pledged to support 
deregulation (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). The size of 
the ICC shrank from eleven to seven active members, and the 
deregulation forces became more powerful. 
From 1977 to 1979, the ICC took many actions that 
affected motor carrier regulation. Perhaps the most 
significant action it took was to relax industry entry 
requirements (Lieb, 1985). Under this new entry policy, 
there was a large increase in the number of carriers 
applying for certificates and permits. The high approval 
rate of the applications reversed the years long downward 
trend in the number of regulated motor carriers. In 1979 
the approval rate of new carrier applications reached 98 
percent (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). 
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The ICC also increased the number of customers a 
contract carrier could serve and allowed private carriers to 
enter the for-hire transportation market under certain 
circumstances. The ICC allowed regulated carriers to 
operate as both contract and common carriers, and removed 
route restrictions that forced some ,.carriers to follow 
circuitous routes. In May, 1979 a second ICC internal 
report was released. It concluded that regulation should be 
limited to protecting the public from harm (Lieb, 1985). It 
recommended that rate and entry control be abolished for 12 
specialized segments of the motor cqrrier industry, 
including those that hauled lumber, building metal, and 
household goods (ICC, 1979). 
The ICC's administrative changes of long standing 
regulatory policies did not go unnoticed; it was called 
before various congressional committees to justify the 
actions taken. The matter came to a head when Senator 
Cannon and Representative Jonnson wrote to the ICC. They 
formally requested that the Commission cease setting 
national transportation policy through administrative 
actions until Congress acted on pending deregulation 
proposals (Wall Street Journal, Oct.23, 1979). In June, 
1979, President Carter submitted to Congress his proposal to 
deregulate the motor carrier industry. After extensive 
hearings the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was approved.12 
Motor Carrier Industry 1980-Present 
The 1980 Motor Carrier Act is a long and complex 
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statute. Some people wondered if,its passage was necessary 
because the industry was being deregulated administratively 
(Pustay, 1985). The Act amended the Declaration of National 
Transportation Policy to include a section related to the 
motor carriers only (Sampson, Fa,rris ,& Shrock, 1985). A 
goal of the new national transportation policy was to 
promote a competitive, efficient motor carrier iridustry. 13 
The Act liberalized industry entry standards and ended 
many operating restrictions imposed by regulation. 
Specifically, the ICC was directed to remove all gateway and 
circuitous route limitations, to broaden groups of 
commodities a carrier could transport, to authorize service 
to intermediate points on existing routes, and to authorize 
round trip authority where only one way authority existed. 
The ICC was also directed to drop any other restrictions 
that were wasteful of fuel, inefficient, or contrary to the 
public's interest (Sampson,' Farris & Shrock, 1985). 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 also paid extensive 
attention to the ratemaking process. For the first two 
years after the, Act's passage, carriers could raise or lower 
rates ten percent per year over or under the previous year's 
12.Motor Carrier Act, Public Law 96-296 (1980). 
13.Title 49 u.s. Code, Sec.4 Section 1010(a). 
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rates. After two years, the upper rate limit could increase 
or decrease by the percentage change in the Producer Price 
Index, compiled during the proceeding 12 months. There was 
no restriction on minimum rates (Lieb, 1985). The Act 
directed the ICC to authorize rates which were adequate to 
permit a well~managed carrier to cover operating costs and 
to earn a fair rate of return. The ~ct also reduced the 
power of the rate bureaus (Wood & Johnson, 1989). 
Under the provisions of th'e Act, motor carriers with 
dual authority were allowed to transport mixeci loads, and 
private motor carriers could engage in compensated 
intercorporate hauling. The number of exempt commodities 
was expanded and the transportation of regulated and exempt 
commodities was allowed in the same vehicle. The Act 
acknowledged the legitimacy of many of the ICC's previous 
administrative actions and allowed for greater reliance on 
market forces. 
Effects of Deregulation 
The ICC was directed to hold annual hearings to 
determine whether the law was working as intended.. These 
hearings have produced conflicting testimony. Some say that 
deregulation is working very well. Others say that 
deregulation has been a disaster (Davis, 1987). 
Since deregulation, there have been major changes in 
the structure of the industry, the rates charged, and the 
services offered. One startling development has been the 
49 
increase in the number of for-hire motor carriers. In the 
first year alone 2452 new for-hire carriers received 
certificates or permits (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). 
Deregulation has not been accomplished without trauma. 
Between 1980 and 1983, 305 intercity, for-hire motor 
carriers failed. These firms represented $3.2 billion in 
sales and employed 64,000 workers (Traffic World, Dec.26, 
' ' ' 
1983). In 1984 alone the number of failures was 550 
(Traffic Manageme~t, Aug.,1985). 'In 1985 another 714 
carriers failed (Traffic World,'Mar.17, 1986). Not all the 
firms which failed' were small, new entrants into the 
industry. In December, 1985 one of the largest carriers in 
the western United States, System 99, failed (Traffic 
Management, Dec.,1985). It was quickly followed by the 
collapse of McLean Trucking Company which had annual sales 
of $550 million (Monroe, 1986). The American Trucking 
Associations estimated that, in late 1985, 20 percent of the 
interstate, for-hire general freight motor carriers, 
representing about $3.1 biilion in sales, were being 
threatened with failure ·(WQod & Johnson, 1989). 
The number of firms in the motor carrier industry has 
increased, but many of the new motor industry members 'were 
small firms seeking specialized ~iches in the contract 
truckload market. The number of LTL carriers remained 
stable, but their environment became m~re competitive as 
they expanded their service areas (Wood & Johnson, 1989). 
Overnight Transportation, one of the few large non-union LTL 
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carriers, had restricted their service area to the 
southeastern states. Now its service area includes the 
surrounding states plus California, Utah and Colorado. 
Yellow Freight, the largest of the LTL carriers, opened 135 
new terminals during the 1983-1984 period (Johnson & Wood, 
1986). 
From 1980 to 1984., the three larg~st LT~ carriers 
expanded their share of revenues from 13.5 to 22.5 percent. 
By 1986, the ten largest LTL carriers had captured about 60 
percent of the total LTL revenues (Enis & Morash, 1987). 
Many motor carrier industry qnalysts feel that five to ten 
large motor carriers will eventually dominate the LTL 
portion of the industry (Schneider, 1985; Morehouse, 1983; 
Walters, 1987). 
Motor carrier industry changes have not been limited to 
the contract TL and general freight LTL common carriers. 
Before deregulation the ICC had limited the number of 
explosives carriers to four, but they granted 17 additional 
nationwide operating author~ties after 1980 (Wood & Johnson, 
1989). Private carriers also experienced significant 
changes in their operations. In 1981, 719 corporations with 
more than 7,700 subsidiaries told the ICC that they intended 
to engage in compensated intercorporate freight 
transportation (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). 
One of the major concerns of Congress was the impact of 
deregulation on service to small shippers and rural 
communities. Many argued there would be a decline in the 
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quality and availability of service to these shippers 
(American Trucking Associations, 1979). Congress directed 
the ICC to conduct a study of service to small communities 
and to report no later than September 1, 1982 (Lieb, 1985). 
Most of the more than 1,500 small community shippers 
surveyed reported that service levels had increased (Taylor, 
1982). An independent study found ~h~t ,nationwide, small 
community service levels were the same or higher (Beilock & 
Freeman, 1984). A study of small c'ommuni ty shippers in 
Minnesota also found that service levels had increased 
(Harper, 1982). The issue of motor carrier service to small 
shippers was also studied and the findings were similar tb 
those for small communities (Wood & Johnson, 1989; Harper, 
1982; Williamson, Singer & Peterson, 1983). 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 also had a major impact 
on the industry's rate structure. The rates charged to 
perform a transportation service today are significantly 
different from those rates charged to perform the same 
service before July 1, 1980. To understand fully what has 
happened to motor carrier rates, the prederegulation motor 
carrier rate structure must be examined. This will be 
accomplished in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY PRICING, 
REGULATION, AND RATE RESEARCH 
Regulated Motor Carri~r Pricing 
Transportatton rates are prices charged for 
transportation services; price is the mechanism by which 
products and services in limited supply are rationed among 
buyers (Harper, 1966). All major pricing systems are 
complex, but none is more complex than the pricing of 
transportation. The number of variables involved becomes 
overwhelming when an individual item pricing approach is 
taken. Supply and demand, regulation, legal obligations, 
competition, system capacity, and historical precedents are 
a few of the general factors that must be considered in 
transportation pricing. More specific factors are the type 
of carrier, the route over which the service is performed, 
and the item transported (Harper, 1981; Lieb, 1985). 
Transportation is also a service, and Lovelock (1984) feels 
that services, due to their intangible nature, are more 
difficult to price than products. 
In the past motor carrier pricing has been controlled 
by the carriers (1900-1935) and by the government (1935-
1989). Now an era is at hand (1980-present) in which the 
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price will again be controlled by the carriers themselves. 
An examination of the factors that entered into pre-1980 
pricing will provide the background and insight necessary to 
understand today's free-market motor carrier pricing. It is 
' essential to determine how motor carrier prices are now set 
in order to understand fully the i~pact of:deregulation on 
our economy. 
Transportation Pricing Problems 
There are more than 2 million different Qommodities in 
' ' 
commerce in the United States. Every one of them is subject 
to transportation between any two of the 50,000 cities and 
towns which are normally origins and destinations for 
freight shipments (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985; Harper, 
1982). Transportation pricing is made more complex by the 
existence of multiple routes. There are more than 4.7 
million possible rail routes between just ohe origin-
destination pair, Dallas, Texas and Detroit, Michigan 
(Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). A single motor carrier 
serving all origins and destinations and transporting all 
commodities over all routes might have to compute and 
publfsh more than 40 trillion individual rates (Morse, 
1980). 
The pricing policy of the transportation industries 
cannot be one which calls for the setting of individual 
product rates. Pricing has been simplified by establishing 
a few classes and grouping all commodities into these 
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classes (Locklin, 1972). The railroads used this 
classification concept in their pricing and also took steps 
to reduce the number of origin and destination points. The 
country was divided into sectors, and the most important 
shipping point within each sector served as the rate basis 
point for othe~ points in the sector (Coyle & Bardi, 1984). 
Some writers contend that this rate basis point system led 
to discrimination and placed some firms at a competitive 
disadvantage (Snow, 1977; Corsi & Roberts, 1982). 
When the motor carrier industry was regulated, the 
carriers had to file their rates with the ICC. Rather than 
developing their own freight classification and rate basis 
point system they chose to adopt, .with some changes, the 
system used by the rail carriers (Lieb, 1981). A National 
Motor Freight Classification Board was organized to assure 
standardized product descriptions, class assignments, and 
uniformity in packaging requirements. Actual rates were set 
either by ten regional mo'tor' carrier rate bureaus or by 
individual carriers. 
Freight Classification Factors and Freight Classes 
Not all products move under class rates,·but all 
products are assigned to a.class. The class rating is often 
used to determine other rates. Before 1983, the ICC allowed 
15 factors to be considered in assigning ~ ~roduct to a 
class. One author divided the 15 factors into two groups: 
the first, based on cost and, the second, on demand (Harper, 
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1981). The cost factors were divided into two subgroups, 
those associated with the commodity and those associated 
with the route.· Commodity cost factors were loading 
characteristics, susceptibility to loss and damage, the 
volume of traffic moved, regularity of .the movement, and 
whether any, special equipment was required. Route cost 
factors included distance, operating conditions and traffic 
density. 
Demand factors were divided into the' same two 
subgroupings. ·Under commodity demand factors the value of 
the commodity, the economic conditions in the shipper's 
industry, and the rates charged to transport competing 
commodities were listed. Under .route demand factors, 
competition with other carriers, production point 
competition, market competition and traffic density were 
identified. 
In 1983, the factors which classification agencies 
could consider were limited to four (Sampson, Farris & 
Shrock, 1985; Wood & Johnson, 1989). These factors were 
density of the product or weight per cubic foot; stowability 
of the product which considers unusual lengths, widths, and 
shapes; ease or difficulty in handling the product; and the 
potential liability of the ~arrier for handling the product 
caused by theft, perishability, or damage to other goods. 
Cost to the carrier was the underlying concern in these 
factors. 
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A distinction was made between freight tendered in TL 
and LTL quantities. A shipment in LTL quantities might be a 
class 100 shipment while a shipment of the same product in 
TL quantities might be a class 85 shipment. The difference 
in the class number assigned was justified on the basis of 
lower shipping cost per unit £or the larger TL quantities. 
If this volume discount had been consiste~tly applied, it 
would be possible to defend the policy. However, two 
different products, assigned to the same class, often had 
different volume discounts. There were also inconsistencies 
in how much weight it took to make a truckload. One 
shipment of 20,000 pounds might qualify for a TL rating 
while a second shipment of the same class (which could be 
expected to be assigned a similar TL weight) might have to 
be tendered in a quantity of 30,000 pounds or more. The 
extent of these TL weight inconsistencies is wide spread. 
Within each of the 23 recognized LTL classifications there 
are about 10 different T~ weight breaks. 1 
Deviations from class rates are common in current motor 
carrier pricing. The two major deviations from class rates 
are the exception and commodity rates. An exception rate is 
a modified class rate (Wood & J~hnson, 1989). The class 
rate formula is used to calculate the fr.eight charge, but an 
exception to the calculated charge is granted. Exception 
rates were established to recognize the differences in 
1.ICC Ex Parte MC-98, New Procedures in Motor Carrier 
Restructuring Proceedings, April, 1976. 
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competitive conditions between modes or individual carriers 
and unusual local or regional operating conditions. 
A commodity rate applies only to the movement of a 
single commodity or group of related commodities between two 
specific points over well defined routes·. This type of rate 
is usually established for commodities moved regularly in 
large quantities (Coyl~ & Bardi, 1984). Goods moving under 
commodity rates are described as those in which the 
transportation charges represent a significant portion of 
the selling price (Corsi & Roberts, 1982). 
Rate basis and classification systems were developed to 
simplify the ratemaking process. Exception and commodity 
rates, however, made the ratemaking process more 
complicated. Inconsistencies in the application of the 
classification system were criticized. Snow (1976) argued 
that motor carriers charged rates that were too high, the 
rating system was too rigid and too complex, and rates were 
often irrational and discriminatory. Corsi and Roberts 
(1982) felt that the classification system and the rate 
structure were flawed and their misapplication led to 
widespread abuses. 
Railroad Industry Pricing 
To understand motor carrier pricing an understanding of 
railroad pricing is necessary. This relationship exists 
because motor carrier pricing was derived directly from the 
railroad pricing model. The railroads took a coordinated 
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approach to pricing, forming rate bureaus which set 
territorial rates for freight classes. Railroad pricing had 
always been based on the value of the service to the shipper 
(Fruin, 1981). They brought this pricing approach with them 
when they were placed under the control of the ICC. 
Initially the ICC had to depend on the industry it was 
regulating for pricing guidance. The regulation of an 
entire indust_ry by a quasi-judicial commission was an 
undertaking with which the n~tion had no experience. This 
represented a retreat from the laissez faire approach to 
capitalism. The newly formed ICC had to proceed in a slow 
and systematic fashion, laying the basis for regulation and 
pricing as it progressed (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). 
The 1887 Act to Regulate ~ommerce was aimed mainly at 
the prevention of monopoly abuses and the control of 
discrimination (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). The first 
six sections of the Act addressed these issues in broad 
general terms. The Act lacked detail as to exactly what it 
was that Congress was trying to regulate. It also lacked 
details on how the ICC was to go about accomplishing this 
task. Section 1 addressed the issue of rates. This section 
required all rates charged by the railroads to be "just and 
reasonable." Rates that were found to be "unjust and 
unreasonable" were to be considered to be unlawful. 
Congress did not tell the ICC what was meant by the words 
"just and reasonable." Congress also did not tell the ICC 
how it was to go about determining "justness and 
reasonableness." 
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Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Act dealt with the subject 
of discrimination, again in broad terms. Discrimination in 
the railroad industry often took the form of some type of 
rate discrimination. Section 5 made it illegal for 
railroads to pool f~eight and share revenues. Section 6 
required that the raiiroads publish their rates in a timely 
manner and make.them available to the public. This section 
also stipulated that rates could.not be changed without 
prior public notice. 
Adoption of Railroad Pricing gy Motor Carriers 
Before 1935, rates in the motor carrier industry were 
set under conditions approaching pure competition. Under 
regulation market pricing forces were replaced by a quasi-
governmental agency. The regulation of competition was 
something new and the regulators -looked to the railroads for 
pricing guidance. For this reas.on motor carrier and 
railroad rates were often the same (Lieb, 1985). The motor 
carriers also adopted the railroad's use of the rate bureau 
as a centralized method of rate determination. By adopting 
the railroad's freight classification and rate basis point 
schemes along with many of the railroad's rates, the 




Value-of-service pricing, also called differential 
pricing, demand pricing, or charging what the traffic will 
bear, is tpe practice of setting rates according to the 
value of the service to the shipper (Friedlaender, 1969). 
Value-of-service pricing is·based on third-degree price 
discrimination (Corsi & Roberts, 1982; Davis & Combs, 1975). 
This practice entails charg,ing transportation rates for 
expensive or high value goods which greatly exceed the cost 
of providing the service while charging rates for 
inexpensive or low value goods ~hich equals or only slightly 
exceeds the costs of providing the service. 
Before a firm can sucessfully practice third-degree 
price discrimination or value-of-service pricing three 
factors must be present. First, the firm attempting to 
practice this type of pricing must be able to exercise some 
degree of monopoly power. Second, the firm attempting to 
practice value-of-service pricing must be able to identify 
the varying elasticities of demand for the products being 
shipped. Some buyers will not continue to purchase a 
product if the transportation rate goes 'up a very slight 
amount. Their demand for the product in question would be 
price elastic. Other buyers would continue to buy a product 
even if the transportation rate doubled. Their demand for 
the product would be inelastic. Third, the various sub-
markets for the product must be segregated in some manner to 
prevent the reselling of the product between the sub-
markets. 
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There was no question that the unregulated rail 
carriers met all of the criteria necessary to practice 
value-of-s~rvice pricing. The railroads were monopolies in 
areas where there was no competition from other railroads or 
other modes of transportation. While they were not able to 
examine all of the varying product elasticities of demand, 
they assumed that the demand for expensive products was 
inelastic while the demand for inexpensive products was 
elastic. The rail carriers were able to segregate the 
various markets to prevent reselling through the use of a 
comprehensive classification system for freight. The newly 
regulated motor carriers failed~ however, to meet the first 
of the three conditions necessary to practice value-of-
service pricing. 
The Act to Regulate Commerce prohibited rate or service 
discrimination between persons, organizations, places or 
types of traffic (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). The Act 
did not, however, make it illegal to discriminate between 
products, and product discrimination is the key to value-of-
service pricing. Price differentiation is not evidence of 
discrimination if the price is based on costs; however, when 
different rates exist and they cannot be justified by costs, 
discrimination exists. 
There is considerable evidence that freight rates are 
positively related to the value of the commodity transported 
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(McMullen & Schary, 1986; Olsen, 1972). However, it is 
obvious that the market value of the·product alone does not 
determine completely the transportation rate charged to move 
a particular product. Discrimination can frequently be 
practiced even when a product has a relative low market 
value. The lack of competition on one transportation lane 
might allow a transportation-. company to practice value-of-
service pricing while it is unable to do so with the same 
product on a second transportation lane because bf 
competition. Competition is the lack of transportation 
' ' 
supplier control over price and this lack of control is 
reflected in the price elasticity of demand for freight 
service faced by particular transportation firms. DeVany 
and Saving (1977) speculated that carriers charge higher 
rates for higher value products because higher valued 
products cost more to transport. Price differences between 
products in this situation would not be discrimination, but 
simply a reflection of cost. 
If higher rates were offset by higher costs, one could 
expect profits of the motor carrier to remain the same. It 
was discovered, however, that qarriage of higher valued 
commodities was· positively associated with increases in 
average profits (McMullen & Schary, 1986). If the rate for 
a product was higher than the rate for a similar product, 
and costs did not account for this difference, it would be 
plausible to assume that the value of the service to the 
shipper was greater. If the value of the service was high, 
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the shipper would be willing to pay a higher rate 
(Friedlaender & Spady, 1981; McMullen & Schary, 1986). The 
previous statement is only true, however, if the elasticity 
of demand for the product is low. 
In summary, it is safe to say that if rates were set 
too high, a product would not move unl_ess the market demand 
curve was .completely price inelast~'c. If, on the other 
hand, rates were set too low, the carriers would not recover 
their costs. Most authors contend that demand 
considerations set the upper limit on freight rates, and 
that cost considerations set the transportation rate floor 
(Harper, 1982; Lieb, 1985; Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). 
Value-of-Service Pricing Studies 
Most economists believed that the railroads had always 
considered the value-of-service to the user when 
establishing rates. Some of these economists also believed 
that motor carriers used costs as a pricing basis (Levin, 
1978). Other economists, however, felt that value-of-
service pricing might have been used more by regulated motor 
carriers than by rail carriers (Boyer, 1978). 
Opposition to the use of value-of-service pricing by 
the regulated motor carriers was based on the cost structure 
of the industry and economies of scale. The proponents of 
value-of-service pricing argued, that the-value of the 
service was the primary factor to be used in setting rates 
for all modes of transportation. Demand for the product 
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itself was to be considered a strong secondary pricing 
factor. This position was supported by writers dealing with 
non-transportation pricing. They also felt that demand was 
more important than cost in setting price (Lockley, 1949). 
Opponents agreed this would be an acceptable approach 
to pricing, but pointed out that rate bureaus rather than 
market forces set rates. The rate bureaus could only guess 
about the level of actual market demand for a product and 
the value of the service to the shipper. Rate bureaus could 
not determine-the demand for every product. They were 
forced to use the estimated value of the product as a proxy 
for actual demand. Value-of-service pricing opponents felt 
that each transportation situation was unique. Demand, 
competition, market, and product characteristics varied for 
every shipment. The classification system, used to apply 
the value-of-service pricing concept, led to unjust rate 
discrimination between products -(Boyer, 1978; Corsi & 
Roberts, 1982). 
All firms interested in -maximizing their profits would 
practice third degree price discrimination if they could. 
However, all firms cannot meet the three requirements 
necessary.to practice such discrimination. Those firms 
which successfully practiced value-of-service pricing 
generally have the common characteristics of high fixed cost 
and unused capacity (Harper, 1981). Proponents of value-of-
service pricing argued that if fixed costs were high and the 
carrier had excess capacity, it was profitable in the short 
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run for the carrier to charge a rate that would not cover 
the fully distributed costs. Value-of-service pricing was 
justified if the rate was high enough to cover variable 
costs and make a contribution to fixed costs. Value-of-
service pricing was also justified when necessary to attract 
certain freight if there was unused capacity in the system. 
Opponents of value-of-service pricing argued that 
carriers had to charge rates high enough to cover all costs 
and to make a suitable profit. If some commodities were 
transported at rates below fully distributed costs, the 
rates charged would have to be higher than normal for other 
commodities. Opponents of value-of-service pricing in the 
motor carrier industry pointed out that the railroads had 
high fixed costs and considerable excess capacity. In the 
motor carrier industry, fixed costs were low and excess 
capacity could be quickly adjusted.2 
Legal and Legislative Actions Affecting Pricing 
Shortly after the passage of the Act to Regulate 
Commerce, its weaknesses became apparent. Problems were 
noted in the areas of testimony, enforcement of orders, 
2.The controversy between the use of value-of-service 
pricing and pricing based on fully distributed costs is 
covered completely in summary articles by Clamus, 1969 and 
Davis and Combs, 1975. For readers who are interested in 
more detailed coverage of arguments in favor of value-of-
service pricing in transportation see Barrett, 1972; Coyle, 
1965; Coyle, 1966; Edwards, 1969; and Roberts, 1965. For 
readers who are interested in more detailed coverage of 
arguments against value-of-service pricing in transportation 
see Doyle, 1969; Meyer et al., 1959; Nelson, 1971; Sampson, 
1966; and Wilson, 1962. 
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power of the' commission to set rates, and discrimination 
interpretations (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). In two 
cases involving rates the Supreme Court held that the ICC 
did not have the power to set actual rates3 or to set 
maximum rates. 4 These two decisions effectively removed the 
ICC from the ratemaking area. 
The ICC had assumed it had been granted the power to 
set maximum rates or actual rates once it had found a rate 
to be unjust and unreasonable (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 
1985). Now the ICC had to identify an unjust and 
' -
unreasonable rate and try to get the courts to agree. If 
the courts sided with the ICC, the guilty party could change 
the rate slightly and the entire process would start over. 
ICC authority was further eroded when a Supreme Court 
decision effectively gutted the provisions of Section 4. 
The Court held that it was up to the railroad to determine 
whether or not competitive conditions were dissimilar. 
Dissimilar competitive conditions at end points of a 
transportation move, and not at intermediate points, were 
reasons to justify a departure from the provisions of 
Section 4.5 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlin summed 
up the status qf the ICC at this point: 
Taken in connection with other decisions 
defining the powers of ,the' Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the present decision ••..... goes far to 
3.Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Company 
v . Icc I 16 2 u. s . 116 ( 18 9 6 ) • 
4.ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway 
Company, 167 u.s. 479 (1897). 
S.ICC v. Alabama Midland Railway Company, 168 U.S. 144 
(1897). 
make that Commission a useless body, for all 
practical purposes, and to defeat many of the 
important objectives designated to be accomplished 
by the various enactments of Congress relating to 
interstate commerce. The Commission was 
established to protect the public against the 
improper practice of transportation companies 
involved in commerce among the several states. It 
has been left, it is true, with the power to make 
reports and to issue protests. But it has been 
shorn, by judicial interpretation, of authority to 
do anything of an effective character. It is 
denied many of the powers which, in my6 judgment, 
were intended to be con,ferred upon it. 
Congress acted to remedy the situation by passing a 
series of statutes designed to strengthen the ICC. To 
overcome the long delay that'occurred when the ICC went to 
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court to get rate and discrimination findings enforced, the 
Expediting Act of 1903 was passed. It gave ICC cases 
priority over other cases on the court docket. In the same 
year Congress passed the Elkins or the Antirebate Act. Any 
departure from a published rate was considered to be prima 
facie evidence of discrimination. Adherence to the 
published tariffs became enforceable by court injunction. 
In 1906 Congress passed the ,Hepburn Act which required 
a 30 days notice of any rate changes. This gave the ICC, 
shippers, and other carriers time to study the proposal. 
The ICC was also given the power to prescribe the maximum 
rate where it had investigated a rate and found it to be 
unjust and unreasonable. They were not given the power, 
however, to prescribe either actual or minimum rates. The 
last major effort to strengthen ICC ratemaking power 
6.ICC v. Alabama Midland Railway Company, 168 u.s. 144, 
p.176 (1897). 
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occurred in 1910 when Congress passed the Mann-Elkins Act. 
A proposed rate could be delayed for 120 days while the ICC 
investigated the reasonableness of the rate. 
Congress was trying to force the railroads to compete 
vigorously where competition was possible. Where it was not 
possible, control by the ICC was substituted for competition 
(Wilcox, 1966). ~he major concern was for the shipper, with 
little attention being given to the revenue needs of the 
railroads (Lieb, 1981). The ICC, between 1911 and 1920, 
proceeded to suspend, then to d~ny, most rail rate increases 
(Farris & Williams, 1975). The railfoads faced increasing 
costs, but their ability to increase revenues was 
restrained. This resulted in delayed or reduced maintenance 
of equipment and roadbeds, reduced service levels, and many 
bankruptcies (Moore, 1972). 
By the end of ,world War I, the country was facing a 
transportation crisis. The result was the passage of the 
Esch-Cummins Act, also known as the Transportation Act of 
1920. The legislation added section 15(a) to the Act to 
Regulate Commerce and directed the ICC to consider the 
railroad's revenue needs during rate hearings. The 
railroads were to receive a "fair return" on the "fair 
value" of their investments. The wording of this section 
was consistent with the wording in a previous Supreme Court 
case that prescribed the general level of compensation for 
regulated industries. 7 
7.Smyth v. Ames, 169 u.s. 466 (1898). 
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Congress gave the ICC the power to set minimum rates 
for rail services in a competitive situation. The 
Commission had been actively seeking this power since the 
late 1800's (Moore, 1972). The ICC was also given the power 
to prescribe actual rates once a rate was found to be unjust 
or unreasonable, (Lieb, 1981l .. ·. A:t this point the ICC control 
over rail car~ier rates was complete. 
One Congressiqnal action during thi• period had a 
' ' 
significant impact .on the rate structure of the railroads 
and later on that of the regulated motor carrier industry. 
The Hoch-Smith ResolutionS o~ 1925 addressed: economic 
problems of the agricultural sector. It directed the ICC. to 
consider conditions in various.industries when determining 
the minimum rates. , It specifically directed the ICC to 
establish the lowest possible lawful rates for agricultural 
products and livestock~ The lowest lawful rate had been 
defined as a rate that ~!lowed the carrier to recover the 
costs incurred. Exactly which costs were to be recovered 
was not clear. What was clear, however, was that all profit 
would come from non-agricultural freight. This resolution 
was important because Congress effectively gave official 
approval to value-of-service pricing (Lieb, 1985 ), . 
Collective Ratemaking 
The ICC assumed that all freight transportation firms 
sold the same product, ton-miles. This output could be 
a.stat. 801 (1925). 
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differentiated by quality of service, in the short run, but 
it was difficult for a firm to maintain this differentiation 
(Farmer, 1964). Given this homogeneous product, the ICC 
decided that railroad regulatory procedures could be applied 
to the motor carrier i~dustry. Motor carriers were allowed 
to set up rate bureaus and pr.actic;e collective ratemaking as 
the railroad~ ~ad been allowed to do. 
Representative's of, the motor carriers met to set rates 
' ' 
within a rate bureau's boundaries. Shippers could attend 
ratemaking se~sion~·and testify but}they co~ld not vote. 
Protection from pricing abuses lay in the·requirements that 
rates had to be published and_sent to the ICC for approval. 
Anyone could protest a rate and-~ protested a rate could not 
become effective until public-h~arings were held (Taft, 
1961). The chance ·of a prote.st, was very small, with less 
than one percent of the proposed rates drawing opposition 
(Harper, 1981). 
Rate bureau pricing has,always had a questionable legal 
basis. In 1890, the Sherman Act9-had made collective 
ratemaking illegal. The Justice Department, however, 
declined to prosecute th?se, firms engagiJ1g in c~lJ,ective 
ratemaking while the ICC retained the power of fi:nal rate 
approval. The individual rail~oa~s and mo~or carriers 
retained the right to take independent rate action, and this 
was also thought to prevent collective rate~aking abuses 
( Pegrum, 197 3) . 
9.Stat. 209, Chap.647 (1890); 15 u.s.c.A. 1. 
In 1944, the Department of Justice finally challenged 
the legality of collective ratemaking10 and, in 1945, a 
previously filed collective ratemaking case was decided by 
the Supreme Court.11 The Court ruled that railroads were 
subject to the Sherman Act, and that Congress had not 
exempted collective ratemaking,from the provisions of the 
law. Congress held extensive hearin9s and discovered that 
both shippers and carriers strongly supported collective 
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pricing (Chow, 1980b). They then passed, the Reed-Bulwinkle 
Act 12 which specifically exempted collective ratemaking from 
the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
Collective ratemaking continued until 1976 when 
railroad rate bureau members were no longer permitted, as a 
group, to vote on single line rates. Only those carriers 
that could actually participate in a joint line movement 
were allowed to vote (Association of American Railroads, 
1976). Motor carrier ratemaking was also undergoing a 
reevaluation. In 1975 the ICC issued an order that kept 
rate bureaus from opposing independent rate filings (Lieb, 
1985). When the Motor carrier Act of 1980 was passed, it 
stipulated that only motor carriers with a specific route 
operating authority could vote on a rate bureau pricing 
proposal. This provision of the Act applied to both single 
and joint line rates. The Act also stipulated that in 1984, 
10.u.s. v. Association of American Railroads, u.s. District 
Court, Lincoln, Neb. 4 F.R.D. 510 (1944). 
11.State of Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 342 
u.s. 439 (1945). 
12.Stat. 472 (1948). 
the discussion by rate bureau members of single line rates 
would no longer be allowed. 
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The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 established a Motor 
Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission. This group was 
responsible for investigating the collective ratemaking 
exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act. It 
reported that collective ratemaking conflicted with the 
goals of the National Transportation Policy Statement 
because it effectively reduced competition (U.S. Motor 
Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission, 1983). It also 
reported collective ratemaking resulted.in .shipper's paying 
higher prices, inefficient motor carriers were protected, 
and efficient ones over rewarded (Lieb, 1985). The 
Commission recommended that motor carrier collective 
ratemaking activities be removed from the antitrust 
immunity. 
The findings of the Commission were strongly opposed by 
the American Trucking Associations and Congress was slow to 
act on the recommendations. 'The ICC held hearings on a 
proposal to end antitrust collective ratemaking exemptions 
on shipments weighing less than 1000 pounds. It also 
announced it was considering doing away with all collective 
ratemaking (American Trucking Associations, 1983a). The 
regulated motor carriers strongly opposed these actions. 
The Department of Transportation and S~nators Packwood and 
Kennedy, however, continued to urge the ICC to withdraw 
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antitrust immunity from collective motor carrier ratemaking 
(American Trucking Associations, 1983b). 
Impact of Motor Carrier Regulation 
The basic goal of regulation was to provide the public 
with adequate transportation services at· reasonable costs 
(Harper, 1982). The regulation.of ~onopolies could be 
justified because, without regulation, they would enrich 
themselves at the expense of society. Most critics of motor 
carrier regulation ~ade the point that the industry was made 
up of many small firms and it exhibited none of the 
characteristics of natural monopolies. It was not an 
acceptable course of action, they argued, to apply monopoly 
type regulation to the motor carrier industry (Harper, 
1981). Major objections came from academics associated with 
the field of economics. One of the earliest critics was 
James c. Nelson. Nelson (1936, p. 489) noted that: 
there are sound economic grounds for 
questioning the ~sefulness in the public interest 
of attempting to 'control by direct means either 
the supply of motor carrier service, particularly 
truck service, or the rates at which it is offered 
to the public. 
Nelson pointed out that the public had benefited from 
the pre-regulatory growth of motor carriers. He speculated 
that under regulation, overall services would decline due to 
entry control and that the motor carriers would lose one of 
their greatest advantages, their flexibility. Nelson 
predicted that the motor carrier industry would lose its 
"little man" characteristics as the size of firms increased 
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and that motor carrier earnings would increase. He refused 
to speculate about what would happen to motor carrier 
rates. 13 
Studies of the effects of regulation on motor carrier 
rates and services did not begin to appear in the literature 
until the mid-1950's. Some of.the anti-regulatory forces 
had expected regulation to end when the country emerged from 
the economic crisis of the 1930's. When deregulation did 
not occur, a series of studies that supported the earlier 
doubts begin to appear. 
The issue.of regulatory misallocation of traffic 
between modes and between individual carriers was addressed 
by Meyer et al. (1959), who felt that the ICC policy of 
keeping the rates high enough to protect the market share of 
the higher cost mode or carrier led to a misallocation of 
traffic. They contended it was incorrect to allow any 
situation to exist where freight was carried by a carrier or 
mode which had higher costs for similar services than 
others. 
13.During the late 1930's and throughout the 1940's and 
1950's Nelson continued to study the impact of regulation on 
the motor carrier industry and he produced, during this 
period, a series of reports that were highly critical of the 
motor carrier regulatory process (Nelson, 1942; Nelson, 
1945; Nelson, 1959). Over the years he was joined in his 
criticism by other economist such as Clark (1940), Pegrum 
(1952), Williams (1958), Nupp (1963), Cort (1970), and Moore 
(1972) among others. 
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Transportation Cost Studies 
The cost structure of the railroad and motor carrier 
industries generated a significant amount of research. Four 
basic types of costs are recognized (Harper, 1981; Lieb, 
1985; Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). They are fixed, 
'· 
variable, joint and common costs. Fixed costs are those 
which remain the same regardless qf the volume of traffic 
moved. Variable costs are those.that have a direct 
relationship to the volume of traffic. Joint costs are 
those incurred as a result of producing another service. 
Common costs are those which cannot logically be traced to 
the production of any one service. 
The fixed costs of railroads were significantly higher 
than they are for motor carriers, and they account for a 
much larger percentage of total cost. The railroads have a 
larger investment in fixed assets, such as rights-of-way. 
In 1954, the ICC conducted a det~iled analysis and concluded 
that the fixed costs of an average regulated motor carrier 
only accounted for ten percent 6f total costs (Wood & 
Johnson, 1989). In 1969, an independent study reported that 
fixed costs for the regulated motor carriers was 25 percent 
of total costs (Shirley, 1969). These estimates were 
computed before the large fuel cost increases of the 1970's. 
Higher fuel costs undoubtedly caused fixed costs to decrease 
as a percentage of total costs. 
Estimates of recent railroad fixed costs range from 40 
to 65 percent of total cost (Sampson & Farris, 1979; Wood & 
Johnson, 1989). Perhaps one reason that estimates vary 
widely is that, in the long run, all costs are variable 
(Locklin, 1972). This difference in motor carrier and 
railroad fixed costs made it hard to justify the use of a 
common pricing·policy for the two modes. If the cost of 
providing a service is to have any bearing on the price, 
then carriers ~ith different cost structures should have 
different rate structures. 
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If, in the shor~·~un; the fixed costs for rail carriers 
are more than they are for motor carriers, as the volume of 
traffic increases, the average cost per unit will decrease 
for the railroads. This relationship between increasing 
volume and decreasing costs would remain true until a system 
reaches full capacity (Harper, 1981). This would be a 
classic example of an industry that enjoys economies of 
density, not economies of .scale. The general consensus is 
that economies of density do exist in the railroad industry 
(Borts, 1954; Due & Clower, 1966; Healy, 1961). 
Throughout the literature on transportation pricing the 
term economies of.scale is used when the correct term should 
be economies of density. In the long run, all costs for all 
firms are variable in nature. The cos'ts cannot be divided 
into fixed and variable components. In the long run if 
costs per unit produced declines as the size of a firm 
increases, this would be solid evidence that the firm enjoys 
economies of scale. In the short run cost can be divided 
into fixed and variable components. Average unit cost 
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declines caused by spreading fixed costs over more units of 
production would be economies of density. 
The issue of economies of scale in the-motor carrier 
industry has also been studied, but the findings have been 
mixed (Lieb, 1985). Variations in the approach used, 
methodology, and coverage of the various studies make it 
difficult to reconcile the conflicting conclusions. If 
' I 
there is a general consensus about this question, it is that 
economies of scale in the motor carrier industry do not 
exist in all instances. When they do exist, the size of the 
scale economies is less for motor carriers than it is for 
railroads. Chow (1978) reports tha~ some economies ~f scale 
exist in the LTL general freight segment of the industry, 
but all other segments exhibit the characteristic of 
constant return to scale. A later study found that apparent 
economies of scale in the motor carrier industry were due to 
regulatory influence rather than economic factors 
(Friedlaender & Spady, 1981). 
Effects of Motor Carrier Regulation on Pricing 
Opponents of motor carrier regulation argued that entry 
restrictions and the use of railroad classification and rate 
setting techniques resulted in higher transportation rates. 
They produce a series of studies to support their contention . 
that the factors affecting motor carrier rate making under 
regulation differed from those under deregulation. 
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Exempt Carrier_Studies 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 exempted all motor 
carriers from regulation when they were transporting certain 
agricultural commodities~. The Act did not specify the 
agricultural commodities to which this exemp'tion applied. 
The ICC felt that the provisions of the Act were not to be 
interpreted literally. The existence of the agricultural 
exemption provided the opponents of motor carrier regulation 
with several opportunities to quantify the costs of 
regulation. 
The agricultural exemption did not apply to products 
that had been "processed". or "manufactured" from exempt 
commodities (Harper, 1981). The ICC limited the scope of 
the agricultural exemption by narrowly defining the words 
manufactured and processed. This narrow definition was 
overturned by the Supreme Court. In two cases, one 
involving fresh dressed and frozen poultry and the other 
involving frozen fruits and vegetables, the Court ruled an 
exempt commodity did not become a regulated commodity if it 
largely maintained its identity after the processing or 
manufacturing had occurred.14 
The Department of Agriculture saw this as an 
opportunity to measure the effects of motor carrier 
regulation on rates. Before these decisions fresh dressed 
poultry, frozen poultry, frozen fruits, and frozen 
14.East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 
351 u.s. 49 (1956), and Home Transfer and Storage Company v. 
u.s., 141 Fed. Supp. 599 (1956). 
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vegetables were products subject to regulation. The rates 
charged before the Supreme Court decision were compared with 
those charged after the decision. The.rates for fresh 
dressed poultry declined 33 percent while the rate for 
frozen poultry declined 36 1~ercent (Snitzler & Byrne, 1958). 
The rate decline for frozen fruits and vegetables was a 
significant 19 percent (Snitzler & Byrne, 1959). The stop 
off charges of $5 to $15 per stop,. commonly charged before 
the exemption of these commodities, were either dropped or 
significantly reduced by deregulation (Miklius, 1969). 
Cross Sectional Studies 
Another study, trying to measure the impact of 
regulation on motor carrier rates, took a cross-sectional, 
rather than a longitudinal approach (Farmer, 1964). This 
study did not look at rates charged but rather at revenues 
per intercity ton-mile, costs per intercity ton-mile, and 
net revenue per intercity ton-mile of 25 exempt agricultural 
motor carriers and 171 regulated common and contract motor 
carriers. The costs and revenues of the regulated motor 
carriers exceeded the costs and revenues of the exempt motor 
carriers by 60 percent or more on average. No reasons were 
offered as to why the revenues of.the unregulat~d carrier 
were so much lower than those of the regulated carriers; 
but, when costs were subtracted from gross revenues, the 
unregulated motor carriers had the highest net profit per 
ton mile. 
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One reason for this difference was that the average 
number of tons per load for the exempt carrier was 
significantly higher (14.8 tons) than the regulated carriers 
(9.6 tons). Meyer et al. (1959) reported the terminal cost 
for a shipment of 149 pounds or less was $54.32 per ton. A 
shipment of 20,000 pounds had a terminal cost of $1.70 per 
ton. The small~ high terminal cost shipment was one that a 
regulated carrier might have had to accept regardless of its 
costs. The large, low terminal cost shipment was typical of 
the shipments transported by unregulated motor carrier. It 
is difficult to conclude, however, that the entire 
difference in costs was due to the lighter average load and 
terminal costs. 
Canadian Studies 
To support the proposition that regulation increased 
rates, the proponents of deregulation have examined motor 
carriage in countries which had a more relaxed or different 
approach to the regulation. In Canada, there was no 
economic regulation of the motor carrier industry at the 
national level except for grain movements. The differences 
in the regulatory approaches taken by the provinces provided 
researchers with a real-world laboratory in which to study 
motor carrier regulation. Sloss concluded that regulation 
added 6.73 percent to the rates charged (Sloss, 1970). 
This study is widely quoted as an authoritative source 
on the cost of economic regulation, but it is also widely 
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criticized (Chow, 1981; Maister, 1978; Maister, 1979; McRae 
& Prescott, 1979). It was reported that rates in the 
strictly regulated provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba 
were actually lower ~han rates in unregulated Alberta (McRae 
'' & Prescott, 1979). The same study found, however, that 
motor carriers rates in unregulated Alberta were lower than 
those in the partially regulated prqvinces of Ontario, 
British Columbia and Quebec. In these three provinces motor 
carrier industry entry was strictly controlled but rates 
were only nominally regulated. Chow concluded that both 
industry entry and rates would have to be strictly 
controlled to achieve maximum regulatory benefits (Chow, 
1980). 
Felton (1978), another critic of the Sloss study, 
reached a completely different conclusion. He felt two of 
the variables, average length of haul and average net weight 
per loaded vehicle, included in the Sloss regression 
equation may have been adversely affected by regulation. 
Felton believed this relationship caused the Sloss study to 
understate significantly the impact·of regulation on motor 
carrier rates. 
European and Australian Studies 
Europe and Australia also received their share of 
attention from researchers. Moore (1976) reported that the 
charges per ton-mile in West Germany and the U.S. were about 
the same. He concluded that this was reasonable because the 
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countries had a similar approach to regulation. The 
regulatory stringency of the two systems were also about the 
same. Klaus (1981) reported, however, that a gradual 
relaxation of regulation had been underway in West Germany 
since the early 1970's. He estimated that this easing of 
regulation had resulted in a 20 percent reduction in rates 
by 1978. 
Moore also examined motor carrier rates in Great 
Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden where economic 
regulation was less strict than it was in the United States. 
He concluded that rates in these countries were about 43 
percent lower than they were in the United States. Felton 
(1978) speculated that higher labor costs in the United 
States contributed to some of this rate difference. He 
pointed out, however, that higher fuel costs in Europe would 
offset some of the higher United States labor costs. 
Nelson (1978) reported on the impact of transportation 
deregulation in Australia. Deregulation occurred suddenly 
when the Australian High Court invalidated a regulatory 
system very similar to the one in the United States. A 
survey of shippers showed that freight rates were 
significantly lower than they had been when transportation 
was regulated. Tausz (1985) reported that as a result of 
Australian deregulation, competition increased, rates were 
reduced, and the level of motor carrier service was either 
maintained or improved. 
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New Jersey Study 
A study of the impact of regulation on rates was also 
conducted in New Jersey. New Jersey was selected because it 
had never imposed economic regulation on the intrastate 
motor carrier industry. The study found rates charged by 
unregulated intrastate motor carriers to be.9.88% below 
those charged by the r~gulated interstate m~tor carriers 
(Allen, Lonergan & Plane, 1978). Intrastate shippers 
reported they were also receiving service that was equal to 
or better than the service they received on regulated 
interstate shipments (Wright, 1983). 
The New Jersey study was criticized by Chow (1980; 
1981), who pointed out that the regression model only 
explained 51.8% of the variance in the interstate rates and 
54.5% of the variance in the intrastate rates. He noted 
that a study by Manalytics .( 1978) of interstate and 
intrastate rates in seven states produced mixed results. 
The study found intrastate rates to be lower than interstate 
rates in Texas and Georgia. Only California had intrastate 
rates that were consfstentlj.higher than the interstate 
rates. In the remainder of the states mixed results were 
produced. Chow (1981, p.30) pointed out that although 
unregulated New Jersey intrastate rates were lower than the 
regulated interstate rates, this was "not proof" that 
regulation causes higher rates. 
Weaknesses in Rate Level Research 
The effects of regulation on motor carrier rates has 
been the subject of much debate; however, most of the 
evidence comes from surveys, aggregated data studies, or 
studies based on micro-econ?mic theory. Each of these 
approaches bad significant drawbacks. 
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Survey based studies might only reflect the 
respondents' feelings and depend on the ability of the 
respondent to recall information (Dillon, Madden & Fertle, 
1987). Aggregated data smooths out many types of variation 
and the sensitivity ,Produced by disaggregated data studies 
is lost. Aggregated data can also hide discrimination in 
the rate structure (Corsi & Roberts, 1982; Samuelson & 
Lerman, 1977). Rate studies based on micro-economic theory 
have to recognize product heterogeneity to determine rates, 
and this requires the individual matching of supply and 
demand (Hoover, 1985; Harper, 1982; Hunt, Muncy & Ray, 
1981). Existing data sources are unable to provide the 
information necessary to conduct micro-economic rate studies 
on a large scale (Bernstein & Darjani, 1979). Regulatory 
impact studies, based on actual motor carrier rates or the 
factors underlying these rates, are rare. The ones that 
have been conducted are often limited in scope (Beilock & 
Freeman, 1987). 
A reader unfamiliar with the ICC regulated motor 
carrier rate structure would assume that its study would be 
simple because all rates must be published. However, the 
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tariffs are difficult to use and poorly catalogued. 
Commodity descriptions are not standardized and there are no 
logical groupings of origins and destinations. A person 
desiring to discover the lowest rate for a product would 
have to consult many docum~nts, work with complex formulas, 
and interpret footnotes and exceptions ·to rules (Samuelson & 
Lerman, 1977). A 1962 study reported that the ICC had 
205,275 active tariffs on file. A ta~iff might consist of a 
single page, hundreds of pages, or in some cases thousands 
of pages of rates (Sampson & Farris, 1971)~ Stern (1972) 
reported there were 43 billion freight rates on file with 
the ICC. He also noted that 336 million commodity and 
rating numbers existed, and there were 288 trillion possible 
commodity rates. 
The study of the motor carrier rate structure and its 
underlying factors would be a complex research problem. No 
industry wide motor carrier rate study has ever been 
attempted for this reason. In theory such a study could be 
done, but the computer time and manpower necessary for such 
a project makes it impractical. A suitable database would 
also have to be created for the study because, such a 
database does not exist. Unlike the railroad industry, 
where a one percent sample of the freight waybills is 
regularly taken from less than 100 carriers, the creation of 
a database for the study of motor carrier pricing would 
involve the sampling of waybills from thousands of 
individual carriers. Without such studies, however, it is 
not possible to say who is correct about the impact of 
regulation on motor carrier rates and pricing behavior. 
Advocates of regulation argue that it allows motor 
carriers to charge lower rates. They point out that from 
January 1967 through the first quarter of 1979 the rates 
charged by regulated motbr carriers rose 79 percent while 
the Producers' Price Index rose' 123.7 percent. During the 
same period the Consumers' Price Index rose 107 percent 
(McCormick, 1980). 
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This argument was examined by Paxson (1981) who looked 
at the changes in intercity trucking. costs between 1950 and 
1980. He concluded that it was not surprising that motor 
carrier rates increased at a slower rate than the Producers' 
and Consumers' Price Indexes. Paxson argued that motor 
carrier rate increases were lower because the cost per ton-
mile in constant 1980 dollars had decreased by 21 percent 
during the period. In 1980, the cost of a standard heavy 
duty tractor was only 74 percent of what it was in 1950. 
The wages for intercity drivers had b~en rather stable, 
increasing only about nine percent. Although fuel costs 
' ' increased about 37 percent, this was largely offs~t by a 
28.5 percent increase in fuel efficiency. Overall, Paxson 
estimated that the costs per ton-mile increased by two 
cents. Offsetting this minimal increase was the 43 percent 
reduction in transit times made possible by the interstate 
highway system. 
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Advocates of deregulation also claimed that rates would 
go down if the motor carrier industry were deregulated. As 
evidence, they cited the various studies which estimated the 
costs of regulation. They also argued that deregulation 
would allow new firms to enter the"industry freely, thereby 
increasing competition and lowering rates. They felt that 
rates were already high because of collective ratemaking, 
limited entry, and an over restrictive freight 
classification system. Both sides argued. their approach to 
regulation would lead to the more efficient use of fuel 
(Rakowski, 1981). 
Rate Adequacy Measures 
With both sides making claims and counter-claims, 
deregulation of the motor carrier industry was in doubt. 
One piece of evidence, the profitability of the regulated 
motor carrier industry, probably tipped the scales for 
deregulation. One of the. major reasons motor carriers were 
regulated was to assure that a suitable profit level was 
made by members of the industry. Before regulation, 
competition was intense and very few firms made a profit 
large enough to assure their long-term survival. During the 
period when motor carriers were regulated, their profits 
exceeded all expecta:tions. They were not only making a 
profit, they were making excess profit. 
Return on Investment 
The return on investment (ROI) of the regulated motor 
carriers was much higher than that of other modes and 
industry in general. The ICC had established a target ROI 
of eight percent as appropriate for the rather low risk 
motor carrier industry (Miklius & Casavant, 1975; American 
Enterprise Institute, 1980). The ROI for industry in 
general ranged from nine to fourteen percent from 1960 
through 1983 (Lieb, 1981; Lieb, 1985). Also troubling was 
the fact that the operating rights which many of the motor 
carriers recieved at no cost in 1935 were carried on the 
company books as investments worth millions of dollars. 
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The ROI for the largest regulated motor carriers was 
11.53 percent in 1960, but it had increased to 22.56 percent 
by 1965. During the ten year period, 1970 through 1979, it 
only fell slightly below 14 percent twice. In the other 
eight years the ROI ranged from 15.14 to 25.76 percent. 
During 1980, the ROI was 19.32 percent and in 1981, the 
first full year of motor carrier deregulation, it dropped 
slightly to 18.97 percent. In 1982, it dropped drastically 
to 1.81 percent, but by 1983 it recovered to 8.91 percent. 
The suggested reasons for the drop in ROI in 1982 
included rapidly rising fuel cost, rapidly raising labor 
cost, economic recession, and deregulation (Sampson, Farris 
& Shrock, 1985). Rising fuel cost, however, had been a 
factor in motor carrier costs since 1973. The same argument 
can be made about labor costs. As far as economic 
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conditions accounting for the drop, the economic recession 
began in 1978; still, the motor carrier industry average ROI 
remained well above the national average for three years. 
If rising operating costs and economic recession can be 
"-
discounted as causes for' th·e decrease in motor carrier 
industry average ROI, deregulation remains as the most 
likely cause. 
In the past, rate'bureaus could apply for a general 
rate increase for all of their members (Harper, 1981). The 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980 restricted this power and the ICC 
was reluctant to continue to approve.blanket rate increases. 
Without this authority, the rate structure could not be 
adjusted rapidly enough to keep pace with inflation. The 
ROI of the regulated motor carriers was, therefore, 
adversely affected. 
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 gave the individual motor 
carriers considerable pricing freedom. The limit on yearly 
percentage of rate change, however, kept the full impact of 
the new pricing freedom from becoming apparent until the end 
of the second year of deregulation. This could be a 
possible reason why the ROI for the formerly regulated motor 
carriers did not show a significant decline until 1982. 
Evidence of the intent of Congress for ROI to be the 
measure of transportation rate reasonableness is contained 
in the Transportation Act of 1920. The use of ROI to judge 
rate reasonableness was in accord with Smyth v. Ames, which 
held that well managed, regulated companies were entitled to 
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a fair return on investment. The use of an absolute 
measurement of rate reasonableness, such as ROI, led to 
problems. What was a well managed company? Should the ROI 
be computed using all assets of a firm, or should the 
differences in individual firms' ratios of debt to equity be 
recognized? Shocild the inv.stment in productive assets be 
calculated at original costs less depreciation or should 
they be based on replacement costs? Should the motor 
carrier be rewarded because a purchased asset, like 
operating rights, had gone up in value? 
The American Trucking Associations felt the ICC did not 
give sufficient weight to the cost of acquiring operating ' 
rights and their increased value when considering the 
revenue needs of regulated motor carriers (American Trucking 
Associations, 1974). Snow (1977) argued that operating 
rights only had value because the ICC was suppressing 
competition. He pointed out that any rate increase based on 
increased operating right value would reward motor carriers 
for doing nothing. 
Economists were 'critical of the use of an absolute ROI 
figure to test the reasonableness of motor carrier 'rates. 
In 1944, the Supreme Court recognized the validity of their 
arguments and, in the Hope Natural Gas case, held that the 
ROI was not the most crucial rate reasonableness test.l5 
Economists contended that rates had to be high enough to 
permit the firm to maintain financial integrity, but not so 
15.Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 
u.s. 591, 1944. 
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high as to permit the firm to earn excess profits. This 
decision left many questions unanswered in the area of motor 
carrier rates. It did, however, move the issue of rate 
reasonableness from. a narrow legalistic path into the area 
of economics (Sampson, Farris & Shrock, 1985). 
Operating Ratio 
With the loss of ROI as the primary rate evaluation 
tool the ICC turned to the operating ratio (Harper, 1981). 
The operating ratio is defined as th~ r~tio of operating 
expenses, not to include income tax and interest expenses, 
to operating revenues (Wood & Johnson, 1989). The ICC 
contended that the major risk faced by the motor carriers 
lay not in their investment but rather in the large amount 
of expenses they incurred (Harper, 1981). In 1979, the 872 
Class I regulated interstate motor carriers had operating 
revenues of about $30 billion and operating investments of 
more than $6.7 billion. 16 This meant that $1 invested in 
operating assets produced $4.5 in operating revenues (ICC, 
1980). This confirmed an earlie~ st~dy which found that the 
investment required for motor carriers to produce $1 of 
revenue was only $0.22 (Association of American Railroads, 
1973). 
16.The definition of a Class I motor carrier has changed 
several times during the course of motor carrier industry 
history but at this time a Class I motor carrier was defined 
as a motor carrier, subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
which had annual operating revenues of over $3 million. 
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If the average operating ratio was above 93 percent, 
this was considered to be strong evidence that rates were 
too low. Using an average operating ratio concealed, 
however, the fact that some of the carriers were highly 
profitable at the,current rate levels (Harper, 1981). The 
regulated carriers contended that an operating ratio of 95 
percent or more would impair their stability (Lieb, 1985). 
' 
This argument is not supported by the evidence. Operating 
ratio data, published at five year intervals between 1945 
and 1980, show a+l Class I and Class II motor carriers (all 
those regulated motor carriers having annual operating 
revenues of more than $500,000) had an average operating 
ratio below 95 percent only once (American Trucking 
Associations, 1981). An average operating ratio of 95 
percent produces satisfactqry rates of return for most 
carriers. The small investment required to generate the 
revenue necessary to produce a satisfactory rate of return 
is the reason this condition exists (Wood & Johnson, 1989). 
Return on Equity 
The ICC, aware of the shortcomings of previous measures 
of revenue needs, began to require regulated carriers to 
supply the data necessary to compute a return on equity 
(ROE). The ICC had to get th~~ information directly from 
motor carriers. Only 23 of the thousands of regulated motor 
carriers were publicly held corporations, required to 
publish equity data (American Trucking Associations, 1980). 
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The ICC continued to use the operating ratio to measure 
revenue needs, but it used the ROE as a secondary evaluation 
tool (Levine, 1973). By 1978, ROE was the primary evidence 
used in general rate increase hearings.17 
The ICC set 14 percent as a desirable ROE for regulated 
motor carriers; but in 1978, the average ROE for the eight 
largest regulated motor carriers was 28 percent (The 
Economist, 1980). The ROE for the 15 largest regulated 
motor carriers averaged 18.8 percent for the six year period 
from 1973 through 1978 (Burck, 1978). Gatty (1983) reported 
the average ROE to be 15 percent for the entire regulated 
motor carrier industry. The ICC staff, noting that in 1977 
the 100 largest regulated motor carriers had an ROE of just 
under 20 percent, acknowledged "excessive profits are being 
earned by these firms" (American Enterprise Institute, 1980, 
p.20). 
The general consensus among motor carrier deregulation 
advocates was that regardless of the method used to measure 
the revenue needs of the motor carriers, the collective 
system of ratemaking, the rate structure, and the freight 
classification systems protected marginal, poorly managed 
companies and over rewarded well managed ones (Farmer, 1964; 
Burck, 1978; Felton, 1978; Wright, 1983; Nelson, 1987). 
17.ICC, Investigation and Suspension Docket no. M-28772, 
General Increase-Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference 
(April, 1978). 
CHAPTER IV 
DEREGULATION AND MOTOR CARRIER 
PRICING BEHAVIOR 
Rate Studies and the Deregulated Motor Carrier Industry 
Deregulation of the motor carrier industry was an 
emotional issue, but in the end, the deregulation coalition 
proved to be too strong for the regulated carriers and the 
Teamsters Union. The regulation forces claimed that 
continued regulation would result in lower overall rates, 
saved fuel, and continued service to small communities at 
reasonable rates (Rakowski, 1981). The deregulation forces 
claimed that the same benefits would occur under 
deregulation (Ferguson, 1982). Now that the emotion of the 
deregulation debate is past, research is needed to study 
pricing behavior in the deregulated motor carrier industry. 
Deregulation of the motor ca~rier 'industry has caused 
shippers to become increasingly concerned about rates 
(Paden, 1982). Before deregulation, they had limited 
influence over freight rates and they accepted these rates 
as a given and known cost factor (Coyle & Bardi, 1984). 
Deregulation effectively did away with a rate structure that 
was known and stable and replaced it with one that was 
unknown and volatile. Under regulation changing a rate was 
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a long and expensive process (Ballou, 1987). Today carriers 
can change rates almost at will. Tariffs are often simple 
price lists or the results of shipper-carrier bargaining 
(Wright, 1983). The ICC has accepted most of the rates 
filed (Schneider, 1985). 
Surveys, Case Studies, and Empirical Investigations 
There are three sources of information available to a 
researcher studying the current rates of the motor carrier 
industry. First, there are case studies which take the form 
of testimony describing what has happened to freight rates 
paid, services received, and competition for business. The 
second source of rate infor~ation comes from the 
professional transportation journals, government documents, 
and government .funded studies. This source consists of the 
published reports of shipper/carrier surveys. The third 
source of information comes from the limited number of 
empirical studies done in the field. 
Case Studies 
In one case study Richard Warren of Lever Brothers, 
Incorporated, reported that more than 96 percent of the 
company's LTL shipments were being shipped at ,negotiated 
rates rather than ciass rates (Traffic World, 1986). From 
1980 through 1985, Warren stated that transportation costs 
had declined six percent while the consumer price index had 
increased 28 percent. The Vice President for Materials of 
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Sherman-Williams Company stated that, under deregulation, 
his company was receiving better services and was paying a 
rate that was 15 percent lower than the rate previously paid 
(Handling and Shipping Management, 1982). One large 
midwestern meat packer reported that as a result of large 
I < t < 
rate decreases the firm ended its private fleet operation 
(Duncan, 1984). 
A general estimate of the total savings from lower 
rates during 1981 to 1985 was $25 billion (Machalaba, 1985). 
Since 1980, one writer reports, discounts from published 
class rates have ave~aged from 18 to,20 percent with the 
largest shippers occasionally receiving discounts of up to 
40 percent (Labich, 1985). The same writer found "the big 
shippers get the big discounts, but even the smallest ones 
pay less than before deregulation" (Labich, 1985, p.138). 
Case studies are interesting but they relate only what 
the impact of deregulation has been on the rates and 
services received by one particular shipper. This shipper 
is usually involved in the distribution of a single or 
limited line of :~;>roducts over fixed transportation routes at 
regular intervals. 
A second shortcoming of the case study approach to 
transportation rate research is that the results cannot be 
verified. Most.shippers are reluctant to share the 
databases used to reach the conclusions reported. They 
contend that such records are proprietary and that their 
release would harm the company's competitive position. The 
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lack of verifications lends credence to the argument that 
these results could not be generalized to apply to all 
shippers. 
Surveys 
Surveys are the second sou;ce of postderegulation motor 
carrier rate information for researchers. One survey 
. ' 
reported more rate flexibility and competition in the motor 
carrier industry as a result of deregulation (Griffith, 
Daniel, Shrock & Farris, 1983). The same study found that 
discounting from published tariffs was rampant. Harper and 
Johns6n (1987) report th~re has been a large increase in the 
number of interstate carriers and many of the established 
carriers reacted to the increased competition by practicing 
aggressive pricing. 
Harper (1982; 1983) surveyed interstate motor carriers 
and shippers in Minnesota in'an effort to measure the impact 
of deregulation on small quantity and rural shippers. He 
found that carriers had increased sales and marketing 
activities directed at these shippers. ·'Most of the carriers 
surveyed also reported that they had decreased some or all 
of their rates between 1977 and 1982. Rate discounting 
occurred in the small shipper area, but it was less 
prevalent than it was for larger shippers. 
Harper did not investigate rural shippers' rates, but 
two later studies did (Beilock & Freeman, 1984; Glaskowsky, 
1986). These studies reported that rural shippers were 
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paying lower rates, but they were not receiving rate 
reductions as large as those received by similar shippers 
located in urban areas. 
A survey conducted to measure the change in interstate 
' 
motor carrier rates between 1977 and 1982 showed that for 35 
TL1 shippers, the average rate paid had declined 25 percent 
in constant dollars (Moore, 1983). The same study surveyed 
30 LTL shippers and found that their rates had declined by 
an average of 16 percent. A General Accounting Office study 
concluded there had been downward pressure on motor carrier 
rates since 1980 and the size of the decreases had been 
between 12 and 15 percent (Traffic World, 1984). 
A survey of presidents of class I and class II 
regulated route general commodity common carriers was 
conducted in 1983. A large majority of those surveyed 
reported they were offering one or more types of discounts 
(Hoover, 1985). Williamson et al. found motor carriers were 
offering a much greater variety of services and were willing 
to negotiate rate-service packages (Williamson, Singer & 
Peterson, 1983). 
In a survey of 320 interstate carriers, 54 percent 
reported their general rate levels had declined an average 
of 13.5 percent since 1980. Forty six percent reported that 
their gene+al rate level had increased an average of 14.9 
percent (Williamson, Singer & Bloomberg, 1985). The rate of 
1.The ICC defines truckload shipments as those shipments 
greater than 10,000 pounds and less-than-truckload shipments 
as those of 10,000 pounds or less. 
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increase for those reporting higher rates was less than the 
20 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index. The 
contention that rates which increased by less than the 
inflation rate were effectively rate reductions was 
supported by a study which found that interstate rates had 
not kept pace witn inflation by a wide margin (Bowers, 
1986). 
In one survey, more than 90 percent of the respondents 
reported that at least half of their ~TL traffic was shipped 
at rates discounted from the regular rate bureau tariffs -
(Traffic Management, 1985). The average discount was in the 
25 to 40 percent range, but a few respondents, about 15 
percent, reported that they had received discounts of up to 
50 percent. 
Like case studies, surveys have produced interesting 
results but also have serious .limitations. The sampling 
frames used in most carrier/shi~per surveys have been 
limited in their-coverage. ~cover (1985), for example, 
surveyed only Class I and Class II regulated route common 
carriers of general commodities. This survey produced 
significant results, but only addressed the pricing behavior 
of the 732 specific mot~r carriers and ignored thousands of 
others. Harper (1982; 1983) limited his sampling frame to 
those motor carriers and shippers domiciled in the state of 
Minnesota. 
A second major limitation of survey research is that it 
reports on the perceptions and the memory of respondents 
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about what has happened to rates·and services. The survey 
done by Beilock and Freeman (1982) of shippers and motor 
carriers in Florida reported their findings about what motor 
carriers and shippers felt to be the impact of deregulation 
. . 
on rates. This stud¥ was interesting but the results cannot 
be applied universally. Motor carriers and shippers in 
other areas-of the country might have a different feeling 
about what has happened to rates. Questions remain whether 
these feelings are significantly di~ferent and just how 
strongly they are felt. 
Empirical Investigations 
There have been many general rate studies, but 
empirical studies continue to be hampered by the lack of a 
large, disaggregated database (Samuelson & Lerman, 1977; 
Bernstein & Darjani, 1979; Boyer, 1978; Morton, 1971; 
Chiang, Roberts & Ben-Akiva, 1981). Case studies and 
surveys have produced interesting results, but, as 
discussed, both have significant limitations. Both research 
approaches tell us that motor carrier rates have declined 
under deregulation, but they do not identify the.factors 
which underlie this general decline. 
The number of freight rate studies based on actual 
shipment data gathered in a deregulated environment are 
limited. An extensive search of the literature revealed 
only two such studies conducted since the passage of the 
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Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (Blair, Kasserman & McClave, 1986; 
Beilock & Freeman, 1987). 
These studies tried to measure the impact of 
deregulation by comparing freight rates before and after 
deregulation. ,The basic hypothesis was that any changes in 
freight rates could be attributed to deregulation. In both 
studies, actual shipment data consisting of commodity 
classes, origin-destination pairs, distances, and weights 
were used to develop rate models. Both studies recognized 
the linkage between costs and rates ~nd tried to control for 
this by including a cost variable in the rate model. 
Inflation effects were controlled by using constant dollars. 
They were also interested in measuring the impact of 
'-
deregulation on rates charged to serve large and small 
communities; therefore, variables for both those markets 
were included in the models. The databases employed by both 
research teams were impressive in size. 
The Blair, Kasserman, and McClave Study. The study by 
Blair et al. involved motor carriers operating within 
Florida. Florida was chosen because it offered the unique 
opportunity to examine freight rates in both a regulated and 
a deregulated environment. Florida had a regulatory system 
in 1980 which closely paralleled the federal system. The 
regulatory system was abolished suddenly, however, when the 
state legislature unexpectedly failed to extend the 
authority of the Public Service Commission. Overnight, 
intrastate motor carrier regulation ended. 
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The Commission had used its power to limi't the number 
of motor carriers authorized to serve specific routes or 
areas. In return for protection from competition the 
carriers agreed to submit to rate regulation. Intrastate 
freight rates were set collectively and approved by the 
' Commission. The carriers were also restricted in the 
commodities hauled, types of vehicles used, 'and backhaul 
authority. The Florida carriers incurred the common carrier 
obligation, which required them to offer services to all 
customers at approved rates. This service had to be offered 
even if it resulted in the motor carriers' serving 
unprofitable small markets.2 
Blair et al. gathered data on 27,000 individual freight 
shipments from ten motor carriers for their study. The 
shipments originated in Jacksonv~lle, Tampa, and Miami with 
destinations througho~t Florida. Observations were taken 
for June, 1980, the month before deregulation occurred, to 
establish a baseline to measure change over time. 
Postderegulation observations were taken in February, 1981, 
February, -1982, and September, 19.82, respectively. 
Five different classes of freight were represented in 
the data, classes 77.5, 100, 150, 200, and 250. Data were 
also collected on the we~ght of each shipment, the distance, 
and whether the shipments were destined for a large or a 
small market. Blair et al. had three research goals. 
2.For a detailed review of the constraints placed on the 
regulated intrastate motor carriers in Florida prior to July 
1, 1980 see Ranson and Sheldon, 1980. 
103 
First, they wanted to test the hypothesis that the removal 
of regulatory constraints would reduce the rates charged. 
They hoped to add empirical support to the perceptual and 
case studies which reported that deregulation had lowered 
motor carrier rates. Second; they hoped to test the 
hypothesis that the price differentials between product 
classes would persist, even if regulation were not a factor. 
Third, they wanted to test the hypothesis that with 
deregulation the price decreases in large markets would 
exceed those in the small markets. 
Blair et al. assumed that the,supply of motor carrier 
services would be infinitely price elastic at the market 
rate. Based on this assumption, they developed a model of 
the determinants of the motor carrier supply price which 
included the product and cost related characteristics of the 
shipments. This approach was consistent with previous 
studies done in the period before deregulation occurred 
(Sloss, 1970; Spady & Friedlaender, 1978). 
Blair et a+. expected ~o find motor carrier rates to be 
less after deregulation. They ~easoned that the removal of 
regulatory constraints would lead to increased competition 
between existing carriers, that new carriers would enter the 
market, and that overall operating efficiency would improve. 
They reported that deregulation resulted in an average 
decrease of 14.62 percent in rates. 
They also examined the pricing behavior of the ten 
individual motor carriers and found that their reaction to 
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new pricing freedom varied widely. In the first year three 
firms opted to reduce their rates significantly, four firms 
left rates about the same, and three firms raised rates. By 
the end of the third period only one of the firms that had 
chosen to raise rates had sustained the increase. The rates 
charged by the four firms which chose to maintain their pre-
deregulatory rates were lower at the end of the study 
period. 
Based on the average rate decrease of 14.62 percent and 
the pricing behavior of nine of the ten study subjects Blair 
et al. claimed that their first hypothesis was supported. 
This finding added empirical support to the case studies and 
surveys that had previously reported that freight rates had 
declined as a result of deregulation. 
Blair et al. also found that the rate differentials 
between product classes had narrowed somewhat, but they had 
not completely disappeared. , Higher classified freight 
continued to pay a_premium for transportation services. 
This finding supported their second hypothesis, that the 
differences in rates for different product classes would 
persist under deregulation. The finding does not, however, 
identify which of the product classification factors are 
responsible for the continued class rate differentials. 
Unless it can be shown that different freight classes 
involve different costs, the study findings appear to show 
that price discrimination between higher classified freight 
and lower classified freight continues to exist under 
deregualtion. 
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Under regulation rate differentials between large and 
small market destinations were found to be insignificant. 
After deregulation, the rate differentials were found to be 
about three percent, with the smaller destination markets 
paying the higher freight rates. 
Blair et al. reported that shippers in small markets 
benefited from rate reductions under deregulation, but the 
size of the reductions was less than it was for shippers in 
large markets. This finding partially supported Posner 
(1971), who feels that one of the principal functions of 
regulation was for larger markets to cross-subsidize service 
to smaller markets. Blair et al. pointed out they could not 
be sure cross-subsidization across markets existed before 
deregulation. They lacked information on the volume of 
shipments made to the smaller markets at subsidized rates, 
and without such data, it was not possible to be certain 
cross-subsidization took place. It had been pointed out a 
cross-market subsidy does not exist unless service is 
actually provided to the smaller markets at the reduced 
rates (Breen & Allen, 1980; Allen, 1981). 
The Blair et al. rate model produced results which were 
quite robust. Using a simple natural logarithm model to 
explain motor carrier freight rates, they produced an R2 
value of 0.79. When interaction terms were included, the 
more complex specification added significantly to the 
explanatory power of the model with an R2 value of 0.895. 
The Beilock and Freeman Study. Beilock and Freeman 
also examined the,impact of deregulation on the motor 
carrier industry at the state level. They gathered 
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prederegulation and postderegulation data from Florida, but 
expanded their study to include data from Arizona. The 
regulatory system in Arizona was similar to that which had 
existed in Florida and at the federal level before 1980. 
Rate differentials were sanctioned based on the product's 
handling and transportation charact~ristics. Large 
shipments subsidized small ones, urban shippers subsidized 
those located in rural areas, and high valued products 
subsidized the movement of lower valued products (Allen, 
1981). 
There were significant differences in the two states, 
however. Deregulation in Florida occurred suddenly, but in 
Arizona it was preceded by' an extensive debate. 
Deregulation in Arizona was approved by the voters in 
November of 1980, but did not become effective .until July 1, 
1982. Arizona is largely a rural state with its population 
concentrated in the Tucson and Phoenix areas. Florida has 
several large population centers and the population density 
is much greater. The geography of the two states also 
differs significantly. Florida is long and narrow with very 
few points located far from an interstate highway or the 
Florida Turnpike. Motor carriers serving the most remote 
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locations in Florida can make use of a highly developed 
highway system for at least part of the trip. Arizona has a 
limited interstate highway system and the motor carriers 
operating there are unable to use the interstate highway 
system as extensively as it is used in Florida. 
To measure the impact of deregulation on freight rates, 
Beilock and Freeman gathered data on 49,967 shipments in 
Arizona and 105,500 shipments in Florida. Monthly data were 
collected in Arizona for the period from January, 1980 
through October, 1984. The Florida monthly data covered the 
period from January, 1979 through October, 1984. In 
Florida, the LTL industry was highly concentrated, and data 
were collected only from the four largest motor carriers. 
These carriers accounted for about 75 percent of the Florida 
intrastate shipments. In Arizona data were collected from 
19 large and mid-sized motor carriers, which accounted for 
more than 90 percent of the intrastate shipments. 
In Arizona, data involved twelve traffic lanes. Seven 
of the lanes were classified as urban-rural, and five lanes 
were classified as urban-urban. In Florida, data were 
collected for twenty traffic lanes, nine urban-rural and 
eleven urban-urban. The data collected consisted of the 
rate charged to move a specific commodity class shipment of 
a certain weight between two points. In Arizona the subject 
commodity classes were 60, 70, 85, and 100. In Florida, 
they were 65, 70, 77.5, 100, and 125. Where they existed, 
Beilock and Freeman also collected the corresponding 
interstate rates over all routes, including 16,704 
interstate rate observations for Arizona and 35,000 
interstate rate observations for Florida. 
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In their study of the effect of deregulation, Beilock 
and Freeman tested six hypotheses. First, they felt the 
overall rates would fall becaus'e of incre,ased competition. 
Second, t~ey felt the overall rates per mile would fall 
because of ~mproved load factors. Third, they felt the 
class-based rate differentials would be less. Fourth, they 
felt the rate differentials based on shipment size would 
increase. Fifth, they felt the rate differentials between 
urban and rural shipments would increase. Finally, they 
felt the rates charged would become more variable. 
To test hypotheses two through five, Beilock and 
Freeman used a reduced form regression model of motor 
carrier freight.rates. As precedents for their choice they 
cited the previous works of Binkley and Harrar (1981) as 
well as that of Ferguson and Glorfeld (1981). Their model 
held that the freight rate for a particular shipment would 
be a function of economic conditions, time, carrier, costs, 
freight class, weight, distance, remoteness, and regulation 
or deregulation. 
Demand is affected by economic conditions, and they 
chose to use the monthly state unemployment rate as a demand 
measure. The cost of fuel was selected as a proxy for all 
other operating costs. Other costs were those associated 
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with the transportation of products of varying size and 
density with different handling and shipping 
characteristics. These costs are captured by the weight and 
classification variables. Beilock and Freeman also believed 
that the remoteness of pickup_ or delivery points would have 
an effect on rates because backhauls from remote locations 
might be empty or only partially loaded. They quantified 
this variable by determining the proportion of total 
distance traveled off a four lane highway. 
The Beilock and Freeman freight rate regression model 
also produced results that were robust. In Arizona, the 
model produced an R2 = 0.75 and in Florida the R2 = 0.77. 
The support provided for the individual hypotheses was less 
impressive. In hypothesis two they contended that as the 
result of deregulation, overall freight charges per mile 
traveled would fall. In Arizo~a prederegulation freight 
charges were 1.932 cents per m~le traveled, while after 
deregulation they were 1.226 cents. This was a significant 
difference. In Florida, however, the prederegulation 
freight charges were 1.005 cents per mile traveled, while 
after deregulation they were 0.9983 cents. This difference 
was insignificant. Beilock and Freeman felt that hypothesis 
two was supported by the Arizona data. The failure of the 
Florida data to support the hypothesis, however, led them to 
report the model produced inconclus·ive results. 
Hypothesis three tested the proposition that class-
based rate differentials would be less in a deregulated 
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environment. As expected, the data from both states showed 
there was a considerable regulatory period class 
differential. After deregulation there was a slight 
decrease in the size of these class differentials, but none 
of the changes were significant. Hypothesis three was, 
therefore, disproved in both states. Beil·ock and Freeman 
noted that, although this finding was contrary to 
expectations, it gave support to other studies. These 
studies contend that value-of-service pricin9 structures 
might exist, not b~cause of collective ratemaking, but 
because there are unmeasured elements of service quality 
associated with cargo value (DeVany & Saving, 1977; Salop & 
Stiglitz, 1979). 
This finding is also consistent with a previous study, 
which found strong evidence of value-of-service pricing in a 
never regulated, competitively'structured, motor carrier 
market (Beilock, 1985). Beilock and Freeman also speculated 
that shippers of high valued commodities make a less 
extensive search for transportation alternatives; therefore, 
they operate with imperfect information. 
The model also produced results which were contrary to 
hypothesis four. This hypothesis was based on the 
assumption that the regulated motor carrier rate structure 
contained a large shipment-small shipment cross subsidy. 
There is considerable debate in the literature on the 
subject of cross subidies. Some of the situations where 
this condition is thought to exist are high value-low value 
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products, high class-low class products, urban-rural 
shipments, large shipper-small shipper, etc. It can be 
argued that in each of these different situations different 
price-cost margins might exist. However, when cross subsidy 
is measured as the ,percentage of traffic that is losing 
money and must be subidized by traffic which is making 
money, most motor carriers agree that cross subsidies exist 
(Hoover, 19 8 5 ) . 
This rate bias for small shipments was thought to be 
necessary to protect small shippers from the power of the 
large specialized LTL motor carriers~ Under deregulation 
Beilock and Freeman assumed that the small shipment subsidy 
would disappear and the rate differential between large and 
small shipments would increase. Contrary to expectations, 
it was found in both states after deregulation, the premium 
charged for small shipments actually decreased five to six 
percent. The authors pointed out that although their 
hypothesis was not supported, the results did support 
researchers who argued there were no economies of scale for 
motor carriers specializing in small shipments (Spady & 
Friedlaender, 1978; Sugrue, Ledford & Gl'askowsky, 1982). 
The test of hypothesis five also produced results that 
were contrary to expectations. Opponents of deregulation 
argued that service to small communities would decrease and 
rates would rise. Beilock and Freeman did not address the 
service issue, but they did examine the effect of 
deregulation on rates paid by rural shippers. It had been 
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assumed that urban shippers had been charged higher rates to 
keep rates down for rural shippers. The study results show 
that before deregulation rural shippers in Arizona were 
paying a large rate premium, and after deregulation it was 
sharply reduced. Before deregulation in Florida, shippers 
in rural areas were paying less than shippers in urban 
areas. After deregulation, the rate differential continued 
to exist and the size of the differential was unchanged. 
One can only speculate on the cause of the urban-rural rate 
differential under both regulation and deregulation. In any 
case, the concern about deregulation increasing the motor 
carrier rates to rural areas was unfounded. 
To test hypotheses one and six Beilock and Freeman used 
interstate freight rates as controls. They pointed out that 
interstate and intrastate freight rates were influenced by 
the same economic conditions but interstate rates were still 
subject to some regulation and collective ratemaking. 
Beilock and Freeman reported that their model produced 
inconclusive results on the effect of deregulation on motor 
carrier freight rates. In Arizona the model found the 
effect to be positive and significant. In Florida the model 
found the effect to be negative and insignificant. 
Faced with these inconclusive results Beilock and 
Freeman developed ratios of intrastate to interstate rates. 
In Arizona, they found that the ratio of intrastate to 
interstate rates had declined during the study period. In 
Florida the ratio between these rates also declined. Based 
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on the assumption that interstate rates were still regulated 
and collectively set, Beilock and Freeman cited these 
declining ratios as strong evidence in support of hypothesis 
one. Their conclusion was that under deregulation overall 
rate levels declined. 
Beilock and Freeman also used ratios of intrastate 
rates to interstate rates to test hypothesis six. They 
reporte~ that the size of the difference between rate 
changes in interstate and intrastate rates was less after 
deregulation in both states. In Arizona the frequency of 
rate changes had declined while in Flbrida, they had 
increased. Based on these findings, Beilock and Freeman 
concluded that hypothesis six was not supported in Arizona . 
and that the results were inconclusive or mixed in Florida. 
They reported, however, that the, fears that deregulation 
would lead to instability in the freight rate structure were 
not supported. 
Conclusions. The studies by Blair et al. and Beilock 
and Freeman are extremely important initial steps in 
developing an understanding of the impact of motor carrier 
deregulation on freight rates. They are, however, limited. 
These studies measure the impact of deregulation on 
intrastate freight rates in only two states. They also 
produce results which appear inconsistent. 
For example, Beilock and Freeman reported a 
postderegulation increase of 40.8 percent in the mean 
intrastate motor carrier freight rates in Arizona for class 
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100 commodity shipments weighing under 1000 pounds. For 
Florida, they reported that the mean motor carrier freight 
rate for intrastate shipments of class 125 commodities 
weighing less than 500 pounds only increased by 12.5 
percent. 
Though there is some difference in the class of the 
commodi.ties and the weight of the shipments, there is a 
significant difference in the rate of increase of freight 
rates. The results are even more puzzling, considering only 
four motor carriers in Florida were subjects while 19 
subjects from Arizona were involved. Based on the reported 
results, it is possible to conclude that in an LTL motor 
carrier market, concentrated, unregulated motor carriers 
provide more rate control benefit to shippers than the rate 
control provided by many competitors. It would also appear 
there are economies of scale associated with the less-than-
truckload motor carrier industry. This conclusion would be 
directly opposite that reached by researchers who studied 
the problem of concentration extensively, and reported there 
are nd economies of scale associated with the LTL motor 
carrier industry (Spady & Friedlaender, 1978; Friedlaender & 
Spady, 1981; Sugrue;, Ledford & Glaskowsky, 1982). 
Need for More Empirical Studies 
More empirically based studies are needed to determine 
the impact of deregulation on motor carrier freight rates 
and pricing behavior if this research stream is to progress 
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beyond the anecdotal stage. This point has been made 
repeatedly in the literature (Kriebel & Baumel, 1979; 
Kriebel & Baumel, 1983; Sargious & Tam, 1985; Hoover, 1985; 
Beilock & Freeman, 1987). It is, unlikely that studies based 
on aggregated data will' contribute anything new to the 
understanding of this problem. In the past, many 
researchers have been forced to use aggregated data because 
a suitable disaggregated public use database was not 
available. This has been identified repeatedly as one of 
the major factors hindering motor carrier rate and pricing 
behavior research (Morton, 1971; Samuelson & Lerman, 1977; 
Boyer, 1978; Friedlaender & Simpson, 1978; Casavant, 1979; 
Chiang, Roberts & Ben~Akiva, 1981; Beilock & Shonkwiler, 
1982; Sargious & Tam, 1985). 
It is unlikely that traditional governmental 
information sources will be changed to provide the detailed 
data needed. The United States Census of Transportation is 
the best source of transportation data available; however, 
it is too aggregated in shipment origin, destination, and 
commodity coding to be used in developing a general model of 
motor carrier freight rates (Chiang, Roberts & Ben-Akiva, 
1981). 
In the past two rate bureaus made disaggregated data 
available to selected researchers. These databases have 
been used to produce some very important prederegulation 
rate studies (Morton, 1971; Samuelson & Lerman, 1977; Boyer, 
1978; Bernstein & Darjani, 1979). The Boyer study used a 
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computer tape containing information from "several hundred 
thousand" individual motor carrier freight bills for 1972. 
This tape was provided by the Rocky Mountain Freight Bureau. 
The Morton, Samuelson and Lerman, and Bernstein and Darjani 
studies used an individual shipment database for the year 
1967, gathered from 29 regulated motor carriers belonging to 
the Middle Atlantic Rate Conference. This type of data has 
not been made available to study the deregulated motor 
carrier industry rate structure. If su'ch a database were 
available, it would. undoubtedly have attracted the attention 
'. 
of at least a few researchers interested in measuring 
empirically the impact of deregulation on motor carrier 
freight rates. 
Government Freight Transportation 
Transportation researchers may feel that they are 
hampered by the lack of a·proper database, but there is just 
such a database available. This database contains detailed 
information on the thousands of Department of Defense (DOD) 
shipments made annually. Before deregulation, the rates 
charged to transport government freight were'not considered 
to be typical of those charged to move comparable commercial 
traffic. Samuelson and Lerman (1977, p.390) specifically 
stated they removed the government waybills from their 
database. They justified this action by noting "government 
freight is subject to special government rates" and these 
rates "would probably not conform to a model of more 
ordinary regulated freight rates." 
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Before July 1, 1980 this attitude could be justified 
because government freight rates had always been set by 
negotiations while ordinary freight rates were set by motor 
carrier rate bureaus. The government agency had been free 
to accept or reject the rates tendered. The carrier had 
been. free to withhold the offer of a rate tender. Today, 
every shipper can negotiate with the motor carriers; 
therefore, the distinction between the two types of 
shipments should be less ·pronounced.. A study using 
disaggregated military freight shipment data is very likely 
to produce results which could be generalized, at least in 
some degree, to the commercial s~ipment of freight. 
History of Government 'Freight Transportation 
The federal government is the largest user of 
transportation services in the United States. In fiscal 
year 1983 it was reported that the DOD spent $2.58 billion 
to transport freight, personal property, and passengers 
within the u.s. (Hillen, 1984). The transportation bill for 
freight alone was $526.3 million. 
The federal government has always maintained a special 
relationship with the transportation industries. In the 
decade between 1850-1860, Congress approved the first of 
many land grants to the railroads. Each of these grants 
contained a provision in the enabling legislation which 
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required the railroads to provide free transportation 
service to the federal government. By 1871, the federal 
government had given the railroads more than 132 million 
acres of free land along the railroads rights-of-way. These 
grants or gifts of land were not absolutely free. They were 
justified on the grounds of being a prepayment for future 
transportation services (Jones, 1940). 
In 1879, free transportation was interpreted by the 
courts to mean that the federal government should pay at 
least 50 percent of the commercial rates for traffic moved 
over the land grant portion of the railroads (Jones, 1940). 
In this decision the courts reasoned that the "free use" 
provision of the land grant legislation only applied ·to the 
use of a railroad's roadbed and permanent equipment. These 
two items accounted for only 50 percent of the total assets 
of the railroads. 
Section 22 Rates 
Section 22 of the Act to Regulate Commerce stated that 
railroads "may transport property of the u.s. Government, a 
State, or a municipal government without charge or at 
reduced rates."3 Section 22 was included to give legal 
3.This statement was contained in Section 22 of the original 
Act to Regulate Commerce (Also referred to as the Interstate 
Commerce Act) therefore special gove·rnment rates are often 
called Section 22 rates. When the Interstate Commerce Act 
was revised and codified as Title 49, Subtitle IV, u.s. Code 
in October of 1978 the relevant portions of Section 22 were 
redesignated as Section 10721, Government Traffic. More 
specifically this wording can be found in 49 USC 
10721(b)(1). Many authors in the transportation literature 
use the terms interchangeably (Section 22 rates and Section 
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sanction to the existing agreements between the government 
and the land grant railroads that would have otherwise been 
inconsistent with Section 2 of the Act. Section 2 made it 
illegal for a railroad' to charge one shipper more than 
another for like service under similar circumstances and 
conditions (Lieb, 1985). With the growth of government 
traffic, most non-land grant railroads agreed to charge the 
government the same net rates they received from the land 
grant lines. From 1898 to 1902 some 100 railroads entered 
- ' 
into these rate equalization agreements and, from 1901 to 
1946, these agreements were in force ori most important 
railroads (Department of Defense, 1955). 
When the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was passed, Section 
217(b) made the provisions of Section 22 of the Act to 
Regulate Commerce applicable to the regulated motor carrier 
industry. It is unclear from the legislative history of the 
Motor Carrier Act why this provision was included. One 
source speculated that it was most probably done to put 
motor carriers on an equal competitive footing with 
railroads (ICC, 1979). One could also argue that the motor 
I 
carriers received free use of the highway system developed 
and maintained by government agencies; therefore, 
governmental agencies were entitled to reduced 
transportation rates. 
10721 rates) which causes some confusion to the reader who 
is not familiar with the history of this segment of 
transportation literature. The term Section 22 rates will 
be used throughout the remainder of this paper in the 
interest of consistency. 
120 
The importance of federal government traffic was rather 
minor until the mid-1930's, when several major economic 
recovery programs increased the government's, use of the 
transportation system significantly. During 1938 and 1939, 
the steps taken to incre,ase military preparedness also 
increased the amount of government mate'rial and personnel 
moved. By 1940 it became obvious that the obligation of the 
land-grant railroads to move government traffic at 50 
percent of the normal rate was counter-productive. The 
railroads, partly because of this obligation, found 
themselves in greater financial difficulty. They were 
moving an increasing volume of government freight at rates 
that were often not compensatory. As indirect financial aid 
to the railroads, the Transportation Act of 1940 relieved 
the land-grant railroads of tpe obligation of transporting 
non-military government materials, mail, and personnel at 
reduced rates; however, the obligation to transport military 
related shipments at reduced rates remained in effect until 
October, 1946 (Locklin, 1966). 
During 'World War II the motor carrier industry entered 
into a series of rate equalization agreements with the 
federal government. They agreed to set their rates for 
military shipm~nts at a level equal to the lowest rates 
charged by non-land grant railroads. These agreements also 
remained in effect until 1946. From this point onward each 
carrier was free to charge the government a rate based 
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entirely on negotiations between the two parties 
(Lieb,1981). 
During the 35 years between 1946 and 1980 Congress 
repeatedly declined to repeal or modify the provisions of 
Sections 22. In 1955, the second Hoover Commission had 
recommended its repeal (ICC, 1979). In 1959, the Doyle 
report also recommended repeal (U.S. Congress, 1961). In 
1972, the Department of Transportation joined the call of 
many others for repeal of- Section 22 (Department of 
Transportation, 1972). Others supporting repeal were the 
motor carriers, some shippers, and the ICC itself (ICC, 
1979). The ICC argued that Section 22 rates were often non-
compensatory. This resulted in an additional burden being 
imposed on commercial freight traffic. 
Those favoring the retention of Section 22 rates 
included many government agencies and the railroads (ICC, 
1979). The DOD was particularly strong in its support of 
the retention-of Section 22. It pointed out that: 
The location of many military installations 
does not coincide with comm~rcial traffic patterns 
and this often precludes the use of ,commodity 
rates available to commercial shippers. Often the 
only l~gal rates available are based on 
unreasonably high classification ratings which, 
for the most part, are merely paper rates with 
little or no traffic moving under them (Department 
of Defense, 1955, p.3). 
Supporters of Section 22 rates maintained that it 
provided large savings to the government directly and to the 
taxpayers indirectly. Section 22, supporters argued, 
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allowed the government to make shipments under what were, in 
effect, commodity rates. 
The only legislative action taken on Section 22 rates 
occurred in 1957. Congress passed legislation requiring 
that all subsequent Section 22 rate agreements be filed with 
the ICC. The only exception involved shipments affecting 
national security. This action was believed necessary 
because secrecy had surrounded many of the Section 22 rates. 
Many carriers, because of the secrecy, lacked the knowledge 
to determine where they stood in the competition for 
government traffic (Cover & Cutler, 1959). This legislation 
required that a file of government freight rate tenders be 
maintained in the Public Tariff Room of the ICC. This 
tariff file has been very active. Some 25,000 rate bureau 
and individual carrier tenders were on file at any one time. 
From the above discussion it is possible to conclude 
that under Section 22 government freight rates have been set 
in a deregulated environmen~ (Chagnon, 1980). The total 
repeal of the land-grant obligation in 1946 released rail 
carriers from the duty to transport government freight at 
rates that might not have been compensatory, and it is 
extremely doubtful that any carrier would be willing to 
continue to provide the government free or below cost 
transportation services. It is assumed, therefore, that 
carriers which transport government freight are paid at a 
rate the carrier chooses to accept. The carriers have the 
option of not transporting government freight if they think 
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the rates are non-compensatory (Hillen, 1984). It is clear 
that government traffic pricing was to be decided largely by 
market forces (Lucas, 1979). 
The Comptroller General reported that the government 
would have to pay significpnt1y more to ship its goods if 
Section 22 rates had not been available (Chagnon, 1980). 
The same report stated that Section 22 rates more than 
covered the ~ost to the carriers involved. 
The transportation of government freight is undeniably 
an attractive proposition for motor carriers even if the 
rates are set by negotiations. The average rates paid per 
hundred-weight to transport DOD freight are significantly 
higher than the rates paid to transport civilian traffic 
(Chagnon, 1980). In 197ff, roughly 1500 motoi carriers had 
ICC approved route authority,, and also had approved tenders 
on file for the transportation of government freight (ICC, 
1978). In 1984, this number had, increased to 3881 (Hillen, 
1984). This 160 percent increase in the number of carriers 
is undeniable proof that the rates negotiated by the DOD are 
compensatory. 
DOD Freight Shipments versus Commercial Freight Shipments 
A freight rate model developed using government 
shipment data between 1946 and 1980 would produce 
significantly different results than a model for non-
government regulated shipments. If the government were 
involved in the transportation of exempt commodities, the 
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freight rates paid by the government and the exempt shipper 
would be similar. The government is not, however, a shipper 
of exempt commodities; rather, it is a shipper of processed 
or finished goods. 
The profile of products shipped by government agencies 
more closely resembles the profile of those which, before 
1980, were subject to rate regulation .. Some products 
shipped by an agency like the DOD are unique; however, most 
products shipped are the same as those shipped in regular 
commerce. If, before 1980, there was a significant 
difference between the transportation charges paid by the 
DOD and a commercial shipper to transport the same products, 
it is logical to assume that some of the difference was due 
to regulation. 
A database does not exist which would enable a 
researcher to examine the relationship between freight rates 
for identical unregulated government shipments and regulated 
commercial shipments. It would be possible, however, to 
compare a generalized government freight rate model to 
prederegulatory commercial rate models. Any differences in 
rates could be attributed to regulation in the civil 
transportation sector. The government freight rate model 
could be compared to the prederegulation models developed by 
Samuelson and Lerman (1977), Bernstein and Darjani (1979), 
Morton (1971), Boyer (1978), or Ferguson and Glorfeld 
(1981). This comparison could, depending on the findings, 
add support to either side of the argument that has raged 
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for years concerning costs (or lack of cost) of regulation 
in the transportation industry. It would also give us 
additional empirical evidence about the impact of 
deregulation on the transportation rate structure. 
If the comparison of postderegulatory military and 
commercial rate models produces similar results, an entire 
new field o~ transportation rate research will be opened. 
One of the major limitations of transportation pricing 
research, the lack of a large disaggrega~ed database, will 
have been overcome. If, on the other hand, the results 
produced by the. military shipment rate model are 
significantly different from those produced by a commercial 
shipment rate model, then an additional field of 
transportation research is opened. The research question 
becomes: "Why are rates for similar products shipped under 
similar circumstances different?" 
~ Disaggregated Military Traffic Database 
The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is a 
unified command with headquarters located in Falls Church, 
Virginia. It acts as a single transportation manager for 
all of the uniformed services as well as the Defense 
Logistics Agency. The MTMC also acts as the depository for 
data extracted from every DOD domestic government bill of 
lading. It is estimated that 85 percent of all DOD domestic 
traffic moves under a government bill of lading or under a 
converted commercial bill of lading (Chagnon, 1980). In 
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1979, MTMC processed and stored in a public use database, 
the information contained in 1.2 million bills of lading for 
domestic military freight movements (Fisher, 1980). By 1984 
the number of bills processed and stored had increased to 
1.4 million annually. 
For 75 percent of these bills of lading, the 
transportation charges were less than $200. These small 
shipments, however, represented only 25 percent of the 
transportation dollars paid out by the DOD. There is no 
breakdown on the percentage of these small shipments moved 
under Section 22, commodity, or class rates. It is known, 
however, that 81 percent of the carload and truckload 
tonnage moves under Section 22 rates. An additional 13 
percent of the carload and truckload tonnage moves under 
commodity rates (Chagnon, 1980). 
The MTMC database captures most of the information on a 
large percentage of DOD shipments, and at least in the full 
load transportation segment, Section 22 rates are extremely 
important. If Section 22 rates and commodity rates, often 
described as wholesale rates, ar~ considered together, it 
becomes obvious that only a small portion of DOD full load 
traffic moves at regular commercial rates. From the above 
discussion, it is clear most DOD freight traffic moves under 
a negotiated rate: 
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The Freight Information System 
The government bill of lading information is entered 
into a Freight Information System (FINS) at MTMC. FINS is 
an automated manage~ent information system used by MTMC and 
other DOD agencies to generate, reports, to study 
transportation rates, and to support rate negotiations. 4 
The information entered ,in the FINS database is gathered 
from the services and the Defense Logistics Agency finance 
centers. The finance centers were selected as data 
collection points because all government bills of lading are 
submitted to them for payment. The bill of lading is the 
only document that contains the freight data of interest. 
The finance centers submit information on each 
shipment's origin, destination, government bill of lading 
organization office code, and the Uniform Freight 
Classification or the National Motor Freight Classification 
of the product being shipped. Data ,are also submitted on 
any type of special equipme~t used, the pick-up carrier, the 
delivering carrier, and the weight of the shipment. In 
addition, information is included on the'actual charges 
paid, the shipment pickup date, the delivery date, the 
government bill of lading number, and the voucher number 
used to make payment~ From the above discussion, it can be 
4.Anyone with a need for traffic management data can request 
information from the FINS database. All requests 
originating outside of the Department of Defense, however, 
must be submitted in writing to the Commander, MTMC, Attn: 
MT-INFQ, 5611 Colombia Pike, Falls Church, Virginia, 22041-
5050. The telephone number to call for further information 
is (202)-756-1173. 
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seen that the FINS database would be extremely useful to 
transportation research if the information it contains also 
represents commercial shipments. This database would 
overcome many of the limitations of transportation rate 
research imposed by the aggregated data which is now 
available to transportation researchers. 
Motor Carrier Rate Modeling 
Someone unfamiliar with transportation pricing would 
quickly realize that, of all the factors which have been 
used to study pricing, none are more important than distance 
traveled and weight. These two primary rate determinants 
appear in almost all transportation pricing studies. This 
has been as true in pricing studies done when the 
transportation industry was highly regulated or largely 
unregulated as it is today. There is universal agreement 
that weight and distance would have to be included in any 
research which tried to develop a descriptive or explanatory 
transportation pricing model, but beyond these two 
variables, there is a lack of consensus as to which others 
to include. This lack of consensus concerning which of the 
many additional variables to include in transportation 
pricing behavior studies is one of the major weaknesses of 
transportation pricing research. 
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Distance, Weight and Cost Relationships 
The probable reason that weight and distance have 
endured as variables in transportation pricing studies is 
that they are both directly related to cost. 'A regulated or 
unregulated industry must recover its costs if the industry 
is to survive. Distance of the s'hipment is an especially 
important pricing factor in the motor carrier industry. 
About 90 percent of a motor carrier's costs are 
variable in nature. If the owner of a truck chooses to let 
it sit idle, his expenses drop immediately to near zero. on 
the other hand, if the motor carrier chooses to expand 
services, the distance traveled will increase. Expenses for 
fuel and operating supplies will increase almost directly in 
relation to the increase in services. Distance is also 
directly related to time; the greater the amount of time 
involved, the higher the amount of driver wages. Fuel and 
labor costs have often been identified as the primary costs 
of the motor carrier industry, and they are both variable 
costs. If motor carrier costs increase in relation to 
distance, it is logical to assume that the greater the 
shipment distance, the greater the price for the 
transportation service involved. 
The weight of the shipment and its relationship to the 
costs incurred by motor carriers is not as clearly defined 
as the relationship between distance and costs (Hall, 1985). 
Some motor carriers, especially those moving freight under 
contract, might charge a certain price per mile regardless 
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of the shipment weight. These contract movements usually 
use the entire capacity of the vehicle, so the weight of the 
shipment is unimportant. If a shipment is less than a 
truckload and moves by common rather than contract carrier, 
the weight of the shipment b~comes very important in 
determining the charge for the shipment. · Less-than-
truckload and minimum charge shipments usually share the 
vehicle with other shipments. The portion of the total 
vehicle capacity used by an LTL shipment can usually be 
estimated, directly or indirectly, by the weight of the 
shipment. 
Without other factors, the weight of an LTL shipment 
and the distance involved could be used to determine the 
portion of the vehicle total costs each shipment would pay. 
However, as important as weight and distance are in 
determining the charges levied by motor carriers, there is a 
sizable amount of variation in their pricing behavior beyond 
that which is explained by these two factors alone. Morton 
(1971) found for shipments of equal weight and length of 
haul, one-third paid a rate which was more than 30 percent 
above or below the mean rate. 
Motor Carrier Rate Model:s 
Many motor carrier rate models have tried to replicate 
the actual motor carrier rate structure. This type of 
research has also been undertaken to identify factors which 
might help explain motor carrier pricing behavior. Beyond 
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the almost universal use of shipment weight and distance, 
there is very little agreement about what other variables to 
include to increase the explanatory power of the models. 
Additional variabl'es such as product value (Samuelson & 
Lerman, 1977; Bei'lock & Sh,onkwiler, 1982; Sargious & Tam, 
1985), cube of the shipment (Ferguson & Glorfeld, 1981), 
product density (Samuelson & Lerman, 1977), fuel cost 
' , 
(Beilock & Shonkwiler, 1982; Blair, Kasserman & McClave, 
1986), direc~i'on· of s'hipment (Sa~gious _& ~am, 1985), 
shipment origin and destination (Blair, Kasserman & McClave, 
1986; Beilock & Freeman, 1987), and product class (Blair, 
Kasserman & McClave, 1986; Beilock & Freeman, 1987), among 
others, have been used to develop,,more complex rate models 
than those that only use weight and distance as variables. 
This lack of consistency in the choice of what could be 
called independent variables has led to gaps in our 
understanding of motor carrier pricing behavior. If the 
same variables had been used ~n·every model, our 
understanding of motor carr.ier pricing behavior would be 
more complete. Differences between studies could be 
. ,'. 
attributed to situations rather than to the variables chosen 
for the models. 
There has also been considerable variation in the form 
the dependent variable has taken in the.various motor 
carrier rate model studies. Ferguson and Glorfeld (1981) 
and Beilock and Shonkwiler (1982) used the total charge paid 
by the shipper, while McMullen and Schary (1986) and Morton 
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(1971) used average revenue per ton~mile. Fuller, Makus and 
Lamkin (1983) used the linear form of cents per ton-mile 
while Blair, Kasserman and McClave (1986) used the 
logarithmic form of this.variable. Sargious and Tam (1985) 
and Samuelson and Lerman (1977) used the logarithmic form of 
cents per kilogram and cents per hundred-weight 
respectively. Beilock and Freeman (1986) used the linear 
form of cents per hundred-weight ·as the dependent variable. 
This inconsistency in the choice of dependent 
variables, like the inconsistency in the choice of 
independent variables, has made it difficult to assimilate 
the various study findings into a stream of research leading 
to a general theory of motor carrier 'pricing behavior. 
Problems Caused Qy Inconsistent Variable Selection 
The choice of independe?t and dependent variables by 
researchers involved in the study of transportation pricing 
behavior has undoubtedly been influenced by the objectives 
of these studies. The choice of variables has also been 
influenced.by data avai~abil~ty. It is extremely difficult 
to get transportation data from individual firms because 
they usually treat ~t as proprietary information. Data from 
most government sources 'has been aggregated to the degree 
that significant differences between situations are hidden 
within the data. Difficulty in getting appropriate data 
forces researchers to design their models to fit the data 
rather than using data to test a model. 
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The lack of standardization in variable selection makes 
it extremely hard to transform individual study findings 
into a general theory of transportation pricing behavior. 
For example, it is not known with a bigh degree of certainty 
what factors, other than weight and distance, underlie the 
motor carrier rate structure. Only two postderegulation 
motor carrier rate studies based on disaggregated data have 
been reported in the literature to date 'and the variables, 
both independent and dependent, vary between the studies. 
Deregulation and Motor Carrier Rates 
The construction of motor carrier freight rate models 
and the measurement of the significance of the factors which 
underlie these models has become more difficult to 
accomplish. Deregulation of the,motor carrier industry has 
fragmented the pricing process. While the motor carrier 
industry was regulated, pricing was centralized. The 
various rate bureaus assigned rates to particular 
transportation moves for certain classes of products. The 
rate bureaus did not have to_ reveal the specific factors 
they considered in assigning 'a rate to a product, but if a 
shipper disagreed with the rate assigned, the rate could be 
challenged. The rate bureau would have to defend its 
decision at a public hearing before a regulatory body, and 
the factors underlying the pricing decision would become 
public knowledge. 
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Under deregulation centralized pricing has diminished 
and more often the pricing decisions are .made' by individual 
motor carriers. The rate bureaus continue to function, but 
individual motor carrie'rs can and frequently do choose not 
to accept the rate set·. by the rate bureau~ In this case 
pricing becomes an individual motor carrier function, and 
the factors underlying these pricing decisions become even 
more obscur~. 
Under regulation motor carrier freight rates were 
stable. Common carriers collectively fixed rates through 
rate bureaus and federal regulators limited competition by 
restricting industry entry. This meant that the 
collectively set rates dominated motor carrier pricing. A 
shipper, if he knew his product's class rating, could 
determine exactly how much it would cost to move a product 
weighing a certain amount between two geographic points. 
The shipper had no concern about the factors used by rate 
bureaus to set the rate or the factors used by the 
classification committee when assigning a product to a 
particular class. Everyone shipping exactly the same 
' . ' 
product paid exactly the same rate to transport that product 
between the two same points. With deregulation, however, 
uncertainty prevails about what factors are considered when 
freight rates are set. Almost all transportation 
researchers feel that deregulated motor carrier will set 
rates that are more closely associated with their costs. 
The uncertainty about rates is, therefore, directly 





In studies of the regulated motor carrier industry, two 
factors accounted for more than 50 percent of the variation 
in motor carrier rates. These factors are the distance a 
shipment travels and its weight. In the current deregulated 
motor carrier industry environment, it is thought that a 
myriad of other factors ,hc;tve becpme increasingly important 
as determinants of motor carrier pricing behavior. These 
factors reflect, among others, the motor carrier's 
orientation to service, geographic positioning, sensitivity 
to competition, and opportunities for sharing cost between 
shipments. This chapter addresses the methodological 
foundation for a study to examine these competitive 
environmental issues. 
In addition to weight and distance, variation in the 
price charged by deregulated motor carriers is thought tb be 
related to the attributes of the product, geographic 
factors, motor carrier-specific factors, and service 
factors. Four research propositions associated with product 
attributes, two with geographic factors, two with carrier-
specific attributes, and one with service levels provided by 
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the carrier are formulated and discussed. The database 
containing the primary information for analysis is 
described, the measures employed are. discussed, and the 
empirical tests for stat,istical s'ignificance are specified. 
Product Attributes 
When interstate motor carriers operat.ed under' the 
regulatory control of the ICC,~ product attributes were of 
little concern t9'the individual shipper or motor carrier. 
Organizations such as the National Freight Classification 
Committee, regional rate bureaus, and the ICC considered 
product attributes when classifying products, establishing 
specific rates, or during classif~cation and rate appeals. 
The shipper and motor carrier were more concerned with the 
class to which a product was assigned, and not the product 
attributes used to determine the class. 
Product class has frequently been used as a predictor 
variable in both pre-deregulation and post-deregulation 
motor carrier pricing studies. Product class is, however, a 
composite or gross measure of all product attributes 
considered in assigning a product to a class. If one could 
determine the product at'tributes used by the classification 
agencies, it would be better to use those attributes as 
predictor variables rather than product class. 
Unfortunately, no data exists which specifically identifies 
the product attributes considered by classification bodies 
in product classification cases. Some of the product 
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classification attributes in individual shipment situations 
can, however, be determined. Using these attributes as 
predictor variables in motor carrier pricing studies should 
produce more sensitive motor carrier rate models. These 
models could lead, in turn, to a deeper understanding of 
motor carrier pricing behavior. 
When products are assigned to classes, a ranking system 
among the groups of products is established. This ranking 
system has, at the minimum, the properties of an ordinal 
scale. For example, a product placed in Class 75 would 
always pay less per ton-mile than a comparable shipment of a 
product placed in Class 100. This rate differential would 
be for basically the same transportation services performed 
under similar circumstances. Although there are variations 
in the difference paid between product classes, a Class 75 
product does not always pay three-quarters of what a Class 
100 product pays. This characteristic of product class 
numbers keeps the class values assigned to individual 
products from being ratio scaled data. 
The relationships discussed above lead to two 
transportation pricing research questions: First, how much 
of the variation in pricing behavior of a diverse group of 
motor carriers can be explained by the class of the product 
being shipped? Second, how much of this product class 
variation can be explained by individual product attributes 
used to assign a product to a specific class? The measures 
and tests used to operationalize the above research 
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questions are discussed fully in a later section of this 
dissertation, but the basic research questions, as contained 
in the following hypotheses, are stated in the alternative 
forms: 
Hypothesis ,l. As the class ,of a product increases, the 
rate per ton-mile charged by the motor carrier increases. 
Product class had a significant impact on the pricing 
behavior of the. motor carriers in a regulated environment. 
Product class is also thought to hav'e a major impact on the 
pricing behavior of motor carriers in the present 
unregulated environment. The probable reason for the 
product class/price relationship is that individual, 
unregulated motor carriers have not developed the expertise 
necessary to set prices on their own. If the null 
hypothesis is accepted, it supports the argument that 
product class is no longer considered when motor carrier 
rates are established. 
Hypothesis 2. As the density of the product deviates 
from the ideal ,product density, ~he rate per ton~mile 
charged by the motor carrier increases. 
The variation from the ideal density will have a direct 
relationship to the ,rat'e charged. The probable reason for 
this relationship is that the shipment of non-ideal density 
products led to the under-utilization of vehicle capacity. 
Vehicles used in the motor carrier industry to transport 
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shipments have two capacity constraints, weight and volume. 
Every transportation vehicle has characteristics which make 
products with a certain density ideal for that particular 
vehicle. The trailer can only lqad a certain weight or 
volume before it reaches one of the two capacity 
constraints. Ideally, a shipment or combination of 
shipments should reach both vehicle constraints at the exact 
same time during the loading process. Under utilization of 
the vehicle capacity, either weight or volume, leads to 
higher costs, hence higher prices. 
The density of a product, expressed as product weight 
per cubic foot, is one of the attributes used to assign a 
product to a class. Product density~ therefore, can be 
thought of as a finer measure of a specific product 
attribute than that provided by the product class 
designation alone. If the n~ll hypothesis is accepted it 
will indicate that product density is no longer a valid 
motor carrier pricing variable. 
Hypothesis J. As the dollar value per ton of the 
product increases, the rat~ per ton-mile 'ch~rged by the 
motor carrier increases. 
The probable reason for this relationship is that a 
product with a high value increases the risk motor carriers 
incur when the product is accepted for shipment. Without a 
specific agreement indicating otherwise, the motor carrier, 
under common law, is responsible for damage that occurs 
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during a shipment. For this reason the transportation rate 
paid for higher valued products prices will be higher then 
the rates paid for products of lower value. Like density, 
the value of a product is a product attribute used to assign 
a class rating to a particular product. ·Also like product 
density, product value i~ a more refined pricing variable 
then product class. 
If the alternative hypothesis is accepted, it could be 
considered as support for the argument that motor carriers 
practice value-of-service pricing. If the>null hypothesis 
is accepted, it will support the argument that greater 
perceived risks are ~o longer associated with the movement 
of high value products. 
Hypothesis !· As the need for special handling of a 
product increases, the rate per ton-mile charged by the 
motor carrier increases. 
The probable reason for this relationship is that it is 
more expensive for the motor carrier to provide special 
handling services. The need for special handling is one of 
. ' 
the factors considered ln assigning a class rating to a 
product. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to use 
this product attribute as a predictor variable in a motor 
carrier pricing study than to use product class. If the 
null hypothesis is accepted, it is likely that special 




If freight shipment origins are studied, differences in 
motor carrier pricing behavior might be discovered which are 
not accounted for by the distance and weight involved, or 
the product transported. A shipment origination point is 
associated with a specific city, state, and region. Each of 
these individual s~ipment locations is, in turn, associated 
with a certain population size, level of economic activity, 
and many other geographic factors. Hundreds of differences 
in individual motor carrier pricing behavior can logically 
be associated with geographic factors. It is unlikely, 
however, that a suitable database can be identified which 
would allow the study of each of these differences 
individually. It is possible, however, to identify 
instances where regional differences exist and to measure 
the extent of the differences in terms of motor carrier 
pricing behavior. It is also possible to measure the extent 
of the differences in motor carrier pricing behavior 
associated with shipment origin population density. The 
following hypotheses, based on shipment geographic factors, 
will be tested: 
Hypothesis 2· As the region of product shipment origin 
varies, the rate per ton-mile charged by motor carriers will 
vary. 
One reason for regional motor carrier pricing 
differences is that the levels of economic activity within 
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each of the regions is different. Economic activity in some 
regions might be depressed while in others it might be 
robust. Some regions might export raw materials and import 
manufactured and consumer goods while other regions might 
import raw materials and export manufactured and consumer 
goods. This type of economic activity imbalance leads to an 
imbalance in freight value and tonnage between regions. 
This in turn leads to less than optimum usage of the motor 
carrier capability between the regions. 
There could .any number of reasons for regional 
differences in motor carrier pricing behavior other than an 
imbalance in economic activity. The intent of this 
hypothesis is, however, to determine whether differences 
exist between regions, not to determine which specific 
geographic descriptors underlie these differences. Distance 
from the origin to the destination is a geographic factor 
and would clearly affect the total transportation charges 
paid for a shipment. The use of rate per ton-mile as the 
independent variable, however, offsets the difficulties 
encountered because of regional distance differ~nces. 
If the null hypothesis is accepted, it will support the 
view that geographical aspects of the shipment do not affect 
motor carrier pricing behavior. 
Hypothesis ~. As the size of the origin city 
increases, the rate per ton-mile charged by the motor 
carrier decreases. 
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The most probable reason for this inverse relationship 
is that different city sizes affect the opportunity for the 
motor carrier to combine partial loads. This practice 
allows the spreading of fixed costs associated with vehicle 
" 
operation over several shipments. Combining shipments is 
also practiced because the operational co~ts of motor 
carriers do not increase at a linear r.ate. It is reasonable 
to assume that the larger the origin city, the greater the 
opportunity for the motor carrier to combine shipments. 
Many have argued that under regulation, the rates charged 
per ton-mile for shipments to or from metropolitan areas 
subsidized shipments made to or from small towns and rural 
areas. 
If the null hypothesis is accepted, it will support the 
argument that a large city and small,city cross-subsidy does 
not presently exist. It would also support the contention 
of some researchers that it did not exist under regulation. 
Carrier Attributes 
Before deregulatio~, the number of firms operating in 
the industry declined steadily and the size of the firms 
increased. The period following deregulation of the motor 
carrier industry has been characterized by bankruptcies and 
mergers. The total number of motor carriers in the industry 
has, however, increased significantly. Most of these new 
firms entering the industry would be classified as small 
when the number of vehicles operated and the areas served 
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are examined. The size of the firm becomes an important 
research variable if it affects the pricing behavior of the 
deregulated motor carrier. 
Under regulation, a very small carrier with limited 
operating rights charged the same price per ton-mile for its 
service as that charged by a large carrier with nationwide 
operating rights. If there were economies of scale present 
in the regulated motor carrier industry, they were obscured 
by collective ratemaking. Under deregulation, it is 
possible to examine the issue of the relationship between 
motor carrier size and motor carrier pricing behavior. Size 
can be defined many ways, but to determine whether it has an 
impact on motor carrier pricing behavior, variables 
involving interline shipments and motor carrier sales are 
used. 
Hypothesis 2· If multiple carriers are involved in a 
shipment, the rate per ton-mile charged will be higher than 
the rate per ton-mile charged by a single carrier. 
If the shipment involves more than one motor carrier, 
it is known as an interline shipment. It is assumed in this 
hypothesis that the total freight charges per ton-mile for 
an interline shipment will be greater than the freight 
charges per ton-mile for a single carrier. The probable 
reason for this relationship is that the handling and 
administrative expenses for two motor carriers would be 
greater than those of a single motor carrier. These greater 
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expenses would have to be reflected in the pricing behavior 
of motor carriers involved in interline shipments. If the 
null hypothesis is accepted it supports the argument that 
interline costs do not affect motor carrier pricing 
behavior. 
Hypothesis ~. As the size of the individual motor 
carrier increases, the rate per ton-mile charged for 
transportation services decreases. 
The probable reason for this relationship is that 
economies of scale are involved in the motor carrier 
industry, as they are in many other industries. Larger 
motor carriers enjoy economies of scale while the smaller 
motor carriers do not. If the null hypothesis is accepted 
it will support the many transportation scholars who argue 
that economies of scale are not reflected in motor carrier 
industry pricing. 
Service Factors 
In a regulated motor carrier environment most of the 
pricing activities, as well as other competitive actions a 
motor carrier might engage in, were controlled centrally. 
This power to control pricing was invested in a regulatory 
body or a trade association. Regulated motor carriers could 
only compete in the area of service. If a motor carrier 
offered superior service, it was rarely allowed to recoup 
the additional costs incurred. The motor carrier might 
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attract more traffic by offering better service but the 
increased cost per shipment of providing the better service 
might offset any revenue gains made. Under these conditions 
it can be argued that there was no incentive for a regulated 
motor carrier to offer customers superior service. The 
question of interest is to determine whether the unregulated 
motor carriers continue to provide superior service at no 
charge. Alternatively, do they now set their rate per ton-
mile at a higher level to recover the extra costs associated 
with providing superior service? 
Hypothesis i· As the level of customer service 
increases, the rate per ton-mile charged by the motor 
carrier increases. 
The most probable reason for this relationship is that 
the costs involved in providing superior service are greater 
than the costs of providing a lesser level of service and 
are reflected in the price charged. If the null hypothesis 
is accepted, it will support the argument that the service 
provided by the motor carrier has no influence on the 
pricing behavior. 
Research Database 
An ideal database for the study of motor carrier 
industry, in either a regulated or deregulated environment, 
would be one that utilized the individual shipment as its 
basic unit of observation. Transportation researchers, 
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without exception, would agree that such a database could 
advance the level of transportation research. The same 
transportation researchers might disagree, however, on 
exactly what information should be included in each database 
record. The desired database record content would be 
influenced by each individual researcher's objectives. 
Generally, each record or observation in the database should 
give the researcher information on the product shipped, the 
weight of the shipment, and the distance the shipment 
travels. The database should contain information on the 
shipment origin and destination, the individual motor 
carrier involved, and the service level. The database 
should cover a wide variety of products, origins, 
destinations, shippers, and carriers. 
No known database meets the needs of all transportation 
researchers. There is, however, an under-utilized public 
use database that would be useful in advancing most areas of 
transportation research in today's deregulated 
transportation environment. This public use database, 
supplemented by other public use information, will be used 
to test the hypotheses described previously. 
Database Selection Criteria 
The basic data for this study comes from a database 
maintained by the MTMC located at Falls Church, Virginia. 
The active portion of the database contains information on 
approximately six million individual military shipments 
149 
which have taken place during the preceding five years. The 
portion of the database selected for this research contains 
information on 15,059 motor carrier shipments to Tinker Air 
Force Base (TAFS), located just outside Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma. The selec.ted shipments were made during the one 
year period between July 1, 1983 and June 31, 1984. 
The period covered by this database was selected after 
careful consideration. It was desirable to have a database 
that was stable over time, with regard to pricing strategy, 
because the study covers a one year period. The period 
selected was judged to offer more stability than those 
preceding and following it. The double digit inflation 
rates, which characterized the late 1970's and the early 
1980's had moderated.- The country was emerging from the 
recession of the early 1980's, and increases in defense 
spending had declined from the high levels attained during 
the first years of the Reagan Administration. The study 
period was also chosen becaus·e· it represented the first full 
year of motor carrier pricing freedom under the provisions 
of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. It is also the first full 
year in which the ICC cost-based, freight clas~ification 
criteria were in effect. The period immediately following 
the selected study period was characterized by extensive 
turbulence in the motor carrier industry wit~ many well 
established firms failing. 
This period was also selected because it is similar to 
the last year of the Blair, Kasserman and McClave (1986) and 
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the Beilock and Freeman (1987) motor carrier pricing 
studies. These studies were discussed in detail in Chapter 
IV. As noted, they are the definitive studies of 
postderegulation motor carrier pricing behavior. It is 
possible that the validity of the two studies and the 
current research effort can be cross-checked because they 
cover the same time period. 
It might be argued that the pricing decision process 
captured in the database under consideration would be 
different than that process captured in the~ data studied by 
Blair, Kasserman and McClave and Beilock and Freeman, since 
it involves military shipments. Prior to deregulation, this 
might have been true. However, following the passage of the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, both military and nonmilitary 
transportation rates have been set though negotiation. For 
this reason the decision proces~es involved in setting 
' ' 
prices are thought to be similar. 
Any of the thousands of military installations in the 
country or any combination of them could have been selected 
for study. However, the specific shipment destination·, 
TAFB, was selected because of its location in the central 
part of the United States. A single destination was judged 
to be necessary to control for service differences between 
destinations. TAFB was also selected because of the 
economic implications this study might have for firms 
located in the Oklahoma City area. The Air Logistics Center 
at TAFB is the largest employer in the central Oklahoma 
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area. It spends millions of dollars each year for a diverse 
mixture of goods and services. As one of the six Air 
Logistics Centers in the country, what TAFB purchases and 
from whom it purchases has a significant impact on the local 
economy. A much larger sample of randomly selected 
shipments with multiple destinations could have been chosen 
for this study. However, the funding and manpower required 
to conduct a national study was not available. 
,, 
Database Content 
The database contains individual shipment information 
on the city and state of origin, the product involved, and 
the type of vehicle used. In addition, the identity of the 
motor carrier making the shipment pickup and delivery to 
TAFB is specified. The database also contains information 
on the actual weight of the shipment, charges paid, shipment 
pick-up date, and shipment delivery date. The original 
15,059 records in the database contained numerous records in 
which one or more data elements were missing. The database 
also contained records which were judged to be beyond the 
scope of this study. Al·l incomplete records were removed 
from the database. All records c;>f shipments delivered by 
Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and freight 
forwarders were also removed. Shipments delivered by the 
latter three carriers involved very small weights. It is 
assumed, therefore, that the pricing behavior of these 
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carriers would differ significantly from the behavior of 
conventional motor carriers. 
Using the above described decision rules, the original 
records in the database were reduced to 5745. An additional 
83 records were judged to contain incorrectly recorded 
information and were removed from the database. These 
records were identified through outlier analysis. The 
revised database contained a total of 5662 usable shipment 
records. 
Supplemental Database Information 
The information contained in the 5662 usable shipment 
records was supplemented by data from the Rand McNally 
Commercial Atlas, 1 the Disaggregated File of Commodity 
Attributes (DFCA) developed by the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology's Center for Transportation Studies, 2 and the 
National Motor Freight Classification Manual (NMFCM) 
developed by the American Trucking Associations.3 
!.The Rand McNally & Company offices are located in Chicago, 
Illinois, 60680. The company publishes, on a regular basis, 
the Rand McNally Commercial Atlas which is available in most 
university and larger public libraries. 
2.A Disaggregate File of Commodity Attributes was prepared 
for the United States Department of Transportation, Office 
of the Secretary of Transportation under contract DOT-OS-
70006. The preparing organization was the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), Center for Transportation 
Studies. The MIT report number is CTS 79-12, dated August, 
1979. The author is Williams. Kuttner. The report is 
based on previous work done in this area by Professors Ralph 
D. Samuelson and Paul o. Roberts also of MIT. 
3.The National Motor Freight Classification Manual (ICC NMF 
100-N), is issued on an as needed basis by the National 
Motor Freight Traffic Association, Inc., 2200 Mill Road, 
Alexandria, VA 22314. This organization acts as an agent 
for the American Trucking Associations, Inc. The edition 
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Each product commonly involved in commerce in the 
United States has an assigned code number. An attempt was 
made to locate the product code for individual shipments in 
the NMFCM. When a shipment product code was located in the 
NMFCM, the LTL class number, TL class number, and weight 
break points between LTL and TL shipments were extracted. 
This information was added to the basic TAFB shipment 
information obtained from the MTMC. Using this search 
strategy the LTL class numbers, TL class numbers and the 
weight break points were determined for 2474 of the records 
in the database. Of the remaining 2988 database records, 
2944 of them had a product code listed as 999912.0. This 
product code indicated that they were freight-of-all-kinds 
(FAK) shipments. The specific LTL class numbers, TL class 
numbers, and weight break points could not be determined for 
these shipments. An FAK shipment is one in which two or 
more products are mixed. With this mixing, it is not 
possible to identify a single product code for the shipment. 
The product code for 44 of the records in the MTMC 
database could not be matched with those listed in the 
NMFCM. The lack of total correspondence between the product 
codes in the MTMC database and those in the NMFCM could be 
due to product code entry errors. Thirty-one of the 44 
individual shipments with unmatched product codes involved 
only one shipment. This strongly supports the assumption 
used to develop information for this database was issued 
April 3, 1987. 
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that unmatched product codes in the MTMC database were due 
to initial data entry errors. 
The Rand McNally Commercial Atlas was used to gather 
information necessary to make two data inputs into the 
database. First, it was used to determine the distance from 
the point of shipment origin-to Oklahoma City. Individual 
shipments originated in 46 of the 48 contiguous states and 
from 479 different points, mostly cities, within those 
states. 
In determining individual shipment mileage, the Rand 
McNally United States Mileage Chart was used when possible. 
This chart, however, only gives the interstate highway 
mileage information between major cities. For this reason 
it could not be used in every case. When a particular 
shipment origin point was not located on the mileage chart, 
that point was identified on the Rand McNally state map. If 
the shipment origin point was located on the interstate 
highway system, the most dire.ct interstate highway distance 
between the origin point and Oklahoma City was computed. If 
the origin point was not l?cated on the interstate highway 
system, the most logical route to the interstate system was 
determined with no backtracking allowed. The direction of 
travel to intercept the interstate system had to be in the 
same general direction the shipment would travel en route to 
Oklahoma City. The shipment distance-was computed by adding 
the distance to interstate intercept and the most direct 
interstate route distance from the point of intercept to 
Oklahoma City. 
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The second data element extracted from the Rand McNally 
Commercial Atlas was information on population size of the 
shipment origin point area. This information was added to 
the database to examine the impact of the size of the origin 
point on freight rates. The distance from origin to 
destination and the size of the origin point were determined 
for all of the 479 unique origin points in the database. 
The DFCA was used to determine, where possible, the 
weight of the product in pounds per cubic foot and its value 
per pound. The DFCA uses the Standard Transport Commodity 
Code (STCC) for its primary product identifier and the 
National Motor Freight Classification Code (NMFC) as a 
secondary product identifier. 
The DFCA is not a complete file containing information 
on all possible products, but rather a limited one 
containing information on the most commonly shipped 
products. The file contains data on only 1,200 of the more 
than 15,000 products identified in the STCC. For this 
reason, the product density and product value information on 
all shipments in the database could not be determined. It 
was possible, however, to determine the product value and 
product density information for a~proximately 1,200 of the 
individual shipments contained in the database. 
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Measures 
Nine different measures used to test the nine 
hypotheses previously discussed were taken either directly 
from the database or derived from information in the 
database. The development of these measures is discussed in 
detail in the following pages. 
Commodity Attribute Measures 
The NMFCM assigns all products .to one of 23 classes 
ranging in value from class 35 to class 500. These class 
numbers represent a relationship between the 23 classes of 
freight with class 100 serving as the base class. The rate 
for products in freight class 35, for example, would be 
approximately 35 percent of the rate for products in freight 
class 100. The rate for products· in freight class 200 would 
be approximately twice those of products in freight class 
100. 
In assigning an individual product to a freight class, 
numerous factors are considered. Therefore, an individual 
product's classifica.tion number, used extensively to 
determine line haul rates for LTL and TL shipments, is a 
gross measure of a product's attributes rather than a 
specific measure. Before 1983, a product was assigned to a 
classification using both cost and demand oriented 
attributes associated with the product. From 1983 onward 
only cost oriented commodity attributes were considered. 
These attributes included the density of the product, its 
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stowability, its handling characteristics, and the liability 
incurred by the motor carrier in accepting the product for 
shipment. The demand oriented commodity attributes, no 
longer considered in product classification actions, were 
trade conditions, value of the service, and commodity 
competition. A complete listing of these attributes appear 
in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA 
Product Attribute 
Cost-Oriented 1. Density 
2. Stowability 
3. Handling 
a. Excessive length and width 
b. Excessive weight 
c. Special care 
4. Liability 
a. Value per pound 
b. susceptibility to damage 
c. Susceptibility to damage other 
freight 
d. Susceptibility to theft 
e. Susceptibility to explosion of 
combustion 
f. Perishability 
Demand-Oriented 5. Trade conditionsa 
6. Value of the Servicea 
7. Commodity competitiona 
a Indicates product attributes removed from the commodity 
classification process in 1983 by the ICC. 
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If exact measures of all currently used commodity 
attributes could be obtained, it would be highly desirable 
to use them as independent variables in this study. 
Although product class captures the cost attributes as a 
group, it is not possible to determine their impact 
individually on motor carrier pricing behavior. It has been 
possible to determine exact measures for value of the 
product and density of the product, two of the eleven 
commodity cost attributes, for a significant number of 
individual shipments in the database. By matching shipment 
NMFC codes with NMFC codes contained in the Commodity 
Attribute File, it was possible to determine the product 
value per pound and density per cubic foot. In situations 
where these exact measures are available, it is possible to 
explore more precisely deregulated motor carrier pricing 
behavior. Product value a~d density information was 
developed for approximately 1200 of the 5662 individual 
shipment observations contained in the database. This 
represents about 21 percent of the total usable database. 
For each of the 1200 identified shipments, product 
value is measured as dollars and cents per product pound. 
Product density was measured by the weight of the product 
per cubic foot of space occupied. 
If a motor carrier must furnish special equipment for a 
particular shipment, it follows logically that this 
requirement would have an impact on the rate charged. For 
LTL shipments, the motor carrier would have less opportunity 
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to enhance his total revenue by combining shipments to 
utilize the capacity of the vehicle. Only certain 
commodities, for example, are suitable for transportation on 
a flat-bed trailer, unprotected from the elements and the 
possibility of theft. If a shipment does not utilize the 
capacity of a flat-bed trailer, the ·motor carrier is limited 
in its choice of other shipments to complete the load. 
There is also the probability that specialized equipment, 
used for either LTL or TL shipments, would be delayed at the 
destination point for an extended period awaiting suitable 
traffic for the backhaul. Data with~n the database are 
available to determine if a speci'fic.shipment required the 
use of specialized equipment. This data was transformed 
' 
into a 0 - 1 variable. The value 0 represents shipments 
made in ordinary closed vans which are suitable for the 
movement of most freight. The value 1 represents shipments 
made with special equipment. 
Geographic Measures 
Each shipment in the database was assigned a numeric 
code which identified the region, state, and city of 
shipment origin. The states were assigned to regions and 
given a code number to reflect their region of assignment. 
These regional code numbers ranged from one to nine. The 
states assigned to each region are listed in Table 2. 
The regional classification scheme for this study 
conforms exactly to that used by the ICC to assign motor 
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carriers to regions. This regional classification scheme 
will be used to determine the impact of region of origin on 
motor carrier pricing behavior. 
TABLE 2 
STATE REGIONAL ASSIGNMENTS 
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Each state and each shipment origin city within a state 
were also assigned a unique numeric code number. For 
example, a shipment which originated at Dover, Delaware was 
coded 07 for the state and 01 :for the city. Delaware was 
the sevent~ state alphabetically and Dov~r was the first 
origin point within the state. 
This code number could be used to identify all shipments 
that originated from a particular location. Coding enables 
' ' 
researchers to study the motor carrier rate structure from a 
particular city, state, or region to pkl,homa City to see if 
it differs significantly from other freight rate structures. 
Each of the 479 shipment origin.points was also 
assigned a scale value from 1 to 6. This value measured the 
approximate economi~ importance, of the origin point area. A 
scale value of 1 indicated a high level of economic activity 
at the shipment origin. A scale value of 6 indicated that 
an origin point had a low level of economic activity. 
In assigning economic activity scale values to origin 
~ l ' 
points, it was assumed that ·areas with large populations had 
high levels of economic activity. It was also assumed that 
areas with less population had lesser levels of economic 
activity. Using this rationale,· each of the shipment origin 
points was assigned a scale value which represented one of 
six economic activity levels. The popul~tion in an area, 
and not the population of a particular city, was used to 
assign economic activity scale values. If a shipment 
originated in a small city, located close to a much larger 
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city, the population of the smaller city would not be a true 
indicator of the level of economic activity in the area. 
Ranally Metro Areas (RMA) were used to define shipment 
origin areas. The size of the largest city within the RMA 
was used to assign an economic activity scale value to the 
shipment origin point. The RMA is Rand McNally's definition 
of the developed areas around each important city with at 
least 50,000 population. The RMA's include one or more 
central cities, satellite communities, and suburbs. Their 
boundaries do not follow county lines as the more familiar 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA's) do. For this reason 
it is believed that RMA's provide a better portrayal of the 
extent of urban and suburban development than that provided 
by MSA's. 
The MSA around Atlanta, for example, follows county 
lines and includes more than 2000 square miles. Some of 
this area is quite sparsely populated but is included in the 
MSA because of political factors only. The level of 
economic activity in the outlying areas is probably quite 
low. The RMA around Atlanta, on the other hand, only 
includes about 750 square miles. The parameters which 
define the RMA's are based on population density and 
employment patterns rather than on political divisions. 
If a shipment originated within an RMA and the largest 
city in the RMA had a population of over one million, the 
shipment was assigned a scale value of 1. If a shipment 
originated in a rural area, it was assigned a scale value of 
6. The complete coding schema for assigning economic 
activity code values to all shipment origin points is 
contained in Table 3. 
TABLE 3· 
SIZE OF SHIPMENT ORIGIN POINT 
RMA Central City Size: Value Assigned 
1,000,000 and over ....... , .................... l 
2501000-9991999 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 
1001000-2491999 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3 
25,000-99,999 ........................... 4 
2 4 , 9 9 9 and under . ......................... 5 
Rural. . ................... · ................... 6 
Motor Carrier Attribute Measures 
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Some motor carriers represented in the database have 
operational area spans less than the entire United States. 
In this instance, the motor carrier which picks up freight 
turns the shipment over to a second motor carrier for final 
delivery. This is known as an interline shipment. It would 
be reasonable to assume that an interchange of freight would 
involve additional cost to the motor carriers taking part in 
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an interline shipment. This increased expense would be due, 
in part, to additional freight handling and administrative 
expenses. To cover these additional costs the motor 
carriers involved have to charge a higher rate for the 
shipment. 
From available data it was possible to determine 
whether motor carrier who picked up a particular shipment 
was the same carrier who delivered the shipment. Using this 
information, a 0 - 1 variable was created to measure the 
impact of shipment interlining on motor carrier freight 
rates. For all shipments with the same pickup and delivery 
motor carrier a scale value of 0 was assigned. For all 
shipments involving more than a single motor carrier a scale 
value of 1 was assigned. 
As discussed in the literature review there has been 
considerable debate on the issue of the existence of 
economies of scale in the motor carrier industry. The 
general consensus has been that economies of scale are not 
present when shipments are made in truckload quantities. 
This is because shipments are picked up at the origin and 
delivered to the destination without using the services of 
the motor carrier's freight terminals. The size of the 
motor carrier would have no impact on freight rates. For 
shipments involving LTL quantities there is a higher 
likelihood that economies of scale exist, with larger 
carriers enjoying significant advantages over smaller ones. 
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Shipme~ts involving LTL quantities almost always use 
terminal facilities to combine shipments. This is done to 
reduce the line haul costs for the motor carrier. 
Maintaining these terminal facilities undoubtedly increases 
motor carriers' fixed costs, but the, larger carriers have 
more of an opportunity to spread these fixed costs over more 
shipments. The spreading of fixed costs over more shipments 
reduces the terminal costs per individual shipment. 
To measure the impact of motor carrier size on pricing 
behavior, the individual motor carriers in the database were 
assigned a scale value of 1 through 4 based on their 1984 
sales. The break points selected were chosen because the 
1984 motor carrier sales data shows a clear division between 
sales classes at these points. The specific carriers 
assigned to sales size classes 2, 3, and 4 are shown in 
Table 4. All other non-listed carriers are assigned to size 
class 1 by default. 
Service Measures 
The number of days shipments are en route between 
origin and destination is believed to be an indicator of the 
level of service provided by motor carriers. The distance 
shipments travel would h~ve a direct impact on en route 
times, but shipment times can be adjusted to account for 
these distance differences. If all en route times were 
adjusted for distance, long en route times could be 
associated with low levels of service. Short en route times 
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could be associated with a higher level of service. If the 
motor carrier expends additional resources to achieve a high 
level of service, it is likely that the price asked by the 
motor carrier would be higher. If this high level of 
service has any value to the shipper, it is likely that the 
shipper will pay the higher price asked by the carrier. 
TABLE 4 
MOTOR CARRIER SIZE BY SALES (1984) 
Carrier 
Consolidated Freightways 
Roadway Motor Freight 
Yellow Freight System 
Ryder Freight 
McClean Trucking 
Arkansas Best Freight 
RIC Corporation 
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Size Code 3 = Sales of $250,000,000 to $499,999,999 (1984) 
Size Code 2 = Sales of $100,000,000 to $249,999,999 (1984) 
Size Code 1 = Sales under $100,000,000 (1984) 
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The number of days between the pick-up and delivery of 
each shipment in the database is known. The distance 
involved is also known. The actual number of days a 
shipment is en route, adjusted for the distance the shipment 
travels, can be compared to a motor carrier industry service 
'' 
standard. The result can be used as a measure of the level 
of motor carrier service. The. motor carrier industry does 
not count the day of shipment pick-up as a service day. The 
day of delivery is included, however, when the number of 
service days is calculated. 
A motor carrier service standard was developed using 
known physical and safety limitations. A shipment cannot, 
for example,_ travel 2000 miles ip one day via motor carrier, 
because drivers of interstate motor carriers are restricted 
to 12 hours of total duty per day. This duty period 
includes time spent in rest stops and eating. The speed of 
travel, as shown in the driver's log book, cannot exceed 50-
52 miles per hour during the period he is on duty. Based on 
this information, it was determined that one driver could 
travel 500 miles during one duty period. The driver is 
required, by safety regulations, to stop for an extended 
period of rest after 12 hours of duty. Using the above 
information a set of service measures were developed for 
both LTL and TL shipments. A complete list of these 
standards is contained in Table 5. 
A three point scale was used to measure service levels 
provided by the motor carriers. If an individual shipment 
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met the delivery time standard listed in Table 5, service 
for that shipment was assigned a scale value of 2, which 
indicated average service. If an individual shipment was 
delivered in less than the time standard listed in Table 5, 
it was assigned a scale value of 1 to indicate superior 
service. If an individual shipment exceeded the time 
standard listed in Table 5, it was assigned a scale value of 
3 to indicate less than standard service. 
TABLE 5 
SERVICE STANDARDS IN DAYS 
Truck Load Less-Than-Truckload 
Distance P/Ua E/Db STDc P/Ua COMd E/Db STDc 
0-500 miles 1 + 1 = 2 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 
501-1000 miles 1 + 2 = 3 1 + 1 + 2 = 4 
1001-1500 miles 1 + 3 = 4 1 + 1 + 3 = 5 
1501-2000 miles 1 + 4 = 5 1 + 1 + 4 = 6 
2001-2500 miles 1 + 5 = 6 1 + 1 + 5 = 7 
ap;u = Pickup day 
bE/D = En route and delivery day(s) 
CSTD = Service standard for distance block 
de oM = Combining with other LTL Shipments 
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The service days for an LTL shipment were computed by 
allowing one day for pickup and one day for combining the 
shipment with other LTL freight. The distance the shipment 
travels was divided by 500 to arrive at an en route time in 
days. Fractional results from the division were rounded up 
to full days. The resulting sum of these three values, 
pick-up, combining, and en route days, represented the 
service standard against which actual shipment times were 
judged. The same general approach was used for TL 
shipments, but no extra day was allowed to combine freight 
with other shipments. 
Distance, Weight and Charge Measures 
The measures which represent these variables are 
straightforward, as discussed in the database description 
section of this paper. Di~tance, defined as the road miles 
from each shipment origin point to TAFB, was determined for 
each shipment and entered into the database. The distance 
variable represents mileage via the interstate highway 
system between the shipment origin and destination, but the 
exact route followed by a shipment was unknown. The mileage 
of the actual route taken by an individual shipment was 
judged not to be significantly different from the shipment 
distance measure used. The difference, if any, should have 
very little impact on a motor carrier's pricing. Shipment 
size was defined as the total pounds of freight involved in 
each shipment. The charge for a shipment was the actual 
amount paid by the Air Force for the services involved in 
moving a shipment to TAFB from one of the 479 shipment 
origin points. 
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Most previous motor carrier pricing research involved 
rate modeling. The rate charged, in one of several forms, 
served as the dependent variable in many models. The 
distance and size of the shipment, along with some 
combination of numerous other factors, served as the 
independent variables in the models. If the primary 
research objective of this paper were to develop a motor 
carrier rate model, this convention would be followed. 
However, the primary objective of this paper is to examine 
the impact of selected variables other than weight and 
distance on motor carrier pricing in a deregulated 
environment. With this objective in mind the actual 
shipment charge, distance, and weight are combined into a 
single dependent variable, rate per ton-mile (RTM). The 
created dependent variable, RTM, is used to test the nine 
research propositions of this paper. RTM is computed as 
follows: RTM =charge I ((weight/2000) *distance). 
Hypothesis Tests 
This section specifies the statistical tests used to 
determine whether the nine hypotheses previously listed and 
discussed are supported by the data. Each hypothesis is 
subjected to at least one statistical test and in some 
cases, more than one test is performed. The statistical 
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procedures associated with the t-test, one-way analysis of 
variance, correlation, and linear regression will be used. 
Hypothesis 1 Test. 
Hypothesis 1 examines the'effect of freight class on 
the RTM charged by motor carriers making deliveries to TAFB 
during the study period. The database section of- this 
chapter pointed out that the product' freight class could be 
determined for about 40% of the individual shipments. For 
the other 60% of the individual shipments, the FAK product 
code assigned could not be associated with any single 
freight class. 
For FAK shipments, the products, and therefore the 
product classes, are unimportant in determining the rate for 
the shipment. Products from multiple freight classes might 
be mixed and moved under ~ single FAK rate. When this is 
done, the product class numbers of the individual shipments 
become meaningless. The single FAK rate charged to move 
multiple class products is usually associated with the 
weight of the shipment. To test hypothesis 1 the FAK 
shipments in the database are ignored. 
Regression analysis will be used·to specify the 
relationship between the two variables, RTM {the dependent 
variable) and shipment product class (the independent 
variable). Only shipments for which the product class 
numbers are known have been analyzed. 
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Hypothesis 1 Test 
Hypothesis 2 examines the concept that there is an 
ideal shipping density for products. As the density of the 
product under study varys from that ideal density, the RTM 
will increase. An ideal product would utilize both the 
weight carrying capability of a vehicle and the total cubic 
area available. 
If a product is lighter than the ideal density of 16.67 
pounds per cubic foot, the RTM will increase, because the 
vehicle is filled before its weight limit is reached. If a 
product is heavier than this ideal density, the RTM also 
increases; in this case the van reaches its weight limit 
before its cubic capacity is filled. Due to the above 
relationships, it is possible to argue that the more a 
product varies from this ideal density, the higher the RTM 
will be. If the under-utilization of vehicle space is as 
costly as the under-utilization of vehicle weight carrying 
capacity, a line fitted to a plot of RTM and Density data 
points would be shaped like the letter V or u. The global 
optimum, or ideal product density point, would be at the 
lowest point of this V or U shaped line. The most dense and 
the least dense products would be located at the two highest 
points of the V of U shaped line. 
To examine hypothesis 2, regression analysis will be 
used to fit a line to the data points of the more than 1200 
shipments for which product RTM and Density data are 
available. These shipments will have to be examined as two 
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different databases. One database should contain the 
shipments with a density of less than 16.67 pounds per cubic 
foot, while the other contains those with a density greater 
than 16.67 pounds per cubic foot. If this procedure is not 
followed, the variation in one side of the distribution is 
likely to cancel out the variation in the other side of the 
distribution. This cancellation of variation would give 
meaningless results. 
If the regression model, RTM = f(product weight per 
cubic foot), produces a significantly high R2 in both 
analyses, this supports the alternative hypothesis 
completely. If an insignificant R2 is produced by the model 
in both cases this supports the null hypothesis completely. 
If the analyses produces mixed results, this indicates that 
product density has an impact on motor carrier rates under 
one set of conditions but not'the other. 
Hypothesis J Test 
Hypothesis 3 explores the idea that the value of a 
product is directly related to the RTM. As the product 
value per pound increases, the RTM increases. This 
hypothesis can be tested by examining the relationship 
between RTM and the value of the product per pound. If the 
alternative hypothesis is supported, the two variables, RTM 
and Value, should be highly correlated and regression 
analysis should produce an R2 value which is statistically 
significant. Simple linear regression analysis can be used 
to examine the relationship proposed. The computed 
coefficient of determination can describe the strength of 
the relationship. 
Hypothesis i Test 
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Hypothesis 4 examines the issue of whether the type of 
equipment used to transport a shipment has any impact on the 
pricing behavior of motor carriers. The database indicates 
the type of trailer used to transport each shipment. Using 
this information, a 0 - 1 variable was created. Shipments 
coded 0 were those made in closed, general purpose vans. 
Shipments coded 1 were those made in any other type of 
trailer. To examine the issue of pricing differences, a t-
test of the RTM means of the two groups should identify any 
significance variation between the types of shipments. 
Hypothesis 2 Test 
Hypothesis 5 examines the impact of the region of 
origin on motor carrier pricing behavior. The RTM for 
shipments originating in the same region of the country are 
more likely to be similar. The RTM for shipments 
originating in different regions of the country are more 
likely to be different. This same relationship could be 
tested on the state level and the city level, but to do so 
would require extensive data manipulation. For that reason 
it has not be attempted. 
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The individual shipments in the database come from one 
of nine regions. To test the hypothesis that the region of 
origin makes a difference in the RTM, a one-way analysis of 
variance should be performed. This analysis also determines 
the regional RTM variation in the data and the variation 
between the total RTM mean and the regional RTM means, using 
a Tukey's Studentized Range Test. 
Hypothesis Q Test 
Hypothesis 6 examines the relationship between the 
population of an area where a shipment originates and the 
RTM. Population concentration is assumed to be a proxy 
measure of the economic activity within a particular area. 
The specific relationship to be tested is that as the 
population in a shipment origin area increases, the RTM will 
decrease. For individual shipments associated with a 
Ranally Metro Area (RMA), the population of the largest city 
within the RMA is known. For shipments not associated with 
RMA's, the population of the origin city itself is known. 
Based on this information each of the individual shipments 
in the database has been assigned to one of six population 
categories, specified in Table 3. 
Using this data, the relationship between origin point 
population and RTM can be determined and tested for 
statistical significance with regression analysis. If the 
two variables, RTM and population, are highly correlated 
this supports the alternate hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1 Test 
Hypothesis 7 tests the idea that the total expenses for 
shipments involving more than one motor carrier will be 
greater than those of a single motor carrier. If this 
hypothesis is true, the RTM for those shipments involving 
more than one motor carrier will be higher than the RTM f 1or 
a single motor carrier. The database contains information 
necessary to determine whether a motor carrier which picked 
up a shipment is the same carrier that delivered it. 
A 0 - 1 variable was created to differentiate between single 
motor carrier shipments and those involving more than one 
motor carriers. If the pick-up and delivery motor carriers 
were not the same, a value of 1 was assigned to the 
variable. If the pick-up and delivery carriers were the 
same, a value of 0 was assigned to the variable. 
This procedure divided the motor carriers into two 
different groups. The t-test statistic, calculated using 
the RTM means of the two groups and the difference in their 
standard deviation, is compared with the critical t value to 
determine whether the means of the two groups are 
significantly different. 
Hypothesis ~ Test 
Hypothesis 8 addresses the issue of economies of scale 
in the motor carrier industry. If the alternate hypothesis 
is supported, the larger the motor carrier, the less the RTM 
will be. All motor carriers in the database were assigned a 
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scale value from 1 to 4 based on their reported sales. A 
scale value 1 represents the lowest sales level while a 
scale value of 4 represents the highest sales level. The 
test used to investigate the effect of motor carrier size on 
the RTM is correlation and regre~sion analysis. 
Hypothesis i Test 
Hypothesis 9 examines the proposition that a high level 
of service is associated with a high RTM, while a low level 
of service is associated with a low RTM. The reasoning 
behind this hypothesis is that it is more expensive for the 
motor carrier to provide superior service. The increased 
costs to the motor carrier will, in turn, lead to the 
charging of higher rates to recover the costs. All 
shipments in the database w~re assigned a scale value from 1 
to 3 indicating the level of service they had received. 
Service was judged to be superior if the number of days 
between pick-up and delivery were less than the standard 
service days described in the measurement section of this 
chapter. In such cases the shipment was assigned a service 
variable scale "value of. 1 to indicate that the shipment had 
received superior service. Following the same convention, 
shipments which were judged to have received average service 
were assigned a service scale value of 2. Those which 
received poor service were assigned a service scale value of 
3. The impact of the level of service on the RTM can be 
tested by using correlation and regression analysis. This 
178 
type of test can allow us to determine if the service 
received explains a significant amount of the variation in 




The data used to formulate the independent variables 
described in hypotheses one, two, three, six, eight, and 
nine are at a minimum interval-scaled, which means that the 
scaling level assumptions of all general linear models are 
satisfied. This indicates that a first step in a data 
analysis would be to construct a correlation matrix. A 
correlation matrix is useful in describing the relationships 
of the independent variables among themselves as well as the 
relationships of the independent variables with the 
dependent variables. 
Prior to statistical testing of the individual 
hypotheses, the database was analyzed to determine whether 
it contained both minimum charge and full charge shipments. 
Samuelson and Lerman (1977) in their classic study of 
freight rates discovered that some shipments are too small 
to be shipped under the standard rate structure. Samuelson 
and Lerman reported that small shipments are often 
transported under a flat rate or minimum charge rate 
structure. Ferguson and Glorfeld (1981) confirmed this 
finding and validated this approach to motor carrier freight 
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rate modeling. The analysis of a database containing both 
minimum charge and conventionally priced shipments would not 
be a true test of motor carrier pricing behavior. 
The minimum charges for shipments are most likely 
' ' 
determined by a combination of we'ight and distance criteria. 
The charges for conventional types of shipments are probably 
influenced by several other factors as well. It is these 
other factors which are the major subject of this study. 
Based on this line of reasoning it was decided that minimum 
charge shipments, if they were present in the· database, 
would be removed prior to the tests of the individual 
hypotheses. 
An extensive analysis of the database determined that 
shipments of less than 250 pounds generally moved under a 
flat rate or minimum charge rate structure. This pricing 
break point was identified by removing shipments from the 
database in SO pound increments. The removal of shipments 
of weighing less than 50 pounds, those weighing less than 
100 pounds, those weighing less than 150 pounds, and those 
weighing less than 200 pounds did not improve. the 
explanatory power of a simple rate model~ When shipments 
weighing less than 250 pounds were removed from the database 
the explanatory power of the model increased considerably. 
To test the validity of this weight break point in the 
motor carrier pricing structure, two correlation matrices 
were constructed. The magnitudes of the correlation 
coefficients for the dependent and independent variables 
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were compared. In all cases they were significantly larger 
for the data s·et with shipments of less than 250 pounds 
removed. This indicated that the full data set did contain 
minimum charge shipments which shouldbe removed prior to 
hypothesis testing.· Table 6 contai.ns a summary of the 
correlation matrix developed from a smaller database created 
by removing shipments of less than 250 pounds. This 
database contains 3833 observations. 
Table 6 reports the Pearson Product Moment Correlation 
Coefficients for each of the independent variable pairs. 
They are also reported for the dependent and independent 
variable pairs. The probabilities that the correlations are 
statistically significapt, and the number of observations 
used to determine correlation, are also reported. 
In the full database correlation matrix, it should be 
noted that the dependent variable, rate per ton-mile (RTM), 
is not correlated at a meaningful level with the independent 
variables truckload class (TLC)I less-than-truckload class 
(LTLC), or product value (Value). In the reduced database 
the dependent variable, RTM, is significantly correlated 
with all of the independent variables in the database. 
The magnitudes of the correlations.for Density and TLC 
as well as Density and LTLC are greater than for many of the 
other independent variable pairs. ~he relationship is 
consistent in the full and reduced databases. This 
relationship is expected because product density, as pointed 
out in Table 1, Chapter V, is one of the attributes used by 
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TABLE 6 
CORRELATION MATRIX, REDUCED DATABASE 
Vari&bl•·--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. DiataDce 
2. W.i'lht a -.222 
:b 01* 
a 3833 
3. nc a . 079 - 133 
:b 01* 01* 
0 1645 1645 
4 Lnc a 074 - 137 891 
b .01* 01* .01* 
a 1613 1613 1613 
5. Dena1ty a - 238 345 - 558 - 553 
:b 01* .01* .01* 01* 
c 700 700 700 668 
6. Value a - 010 - 082 667 .573 - 236 
:b .80 05 .01* .01* 01* 
0 700 1240 700 668 700 
7. Citysize a -.030 194 -.022 -.047 250 -.089 
b .10 .01* . 40 .10 .01* .05 
a 3833 3833 1645 1613 700 700 
8 CarrSize a 338 -.165 
- 141 -.172 -.094 - 004 - 066 
:b .01* 01* 01* 01* 01* .95 01* 
c 3833 3833 1645 1613 700 700 3833 
9 Serv1ce a .388 - 269 - 111 -.094 -.234 .059 - 035 410 
:b 01* 01* 01* .01* .01* .15 35 .01* 
c 3833 3833 1645 1613 700 700 3833 3833 
10.R!I.M a- 428 -.125 -.155 -.201 -217 .306 - 029 - 139 -.095 
:b .01* 01* 01* 01* .01* .01* .10 .01* .01* 
a 3833 3833 1645 1613 700 700 3833. 3833 3833 
ll.Charqe a 091 316 .200 248 .148 - 028 .059 - 288 -.263 -.128 
:b OS 01* .01* .01* 01* .50 .01* .01* .01* .01* 
a 3833 3383 1645 1613 700 700 3833 3833 3833 3833 
a • oorrelatiOD coefficient; b • signifiaanc:e 1....,.1; o • saz~Ple size; * • p. < .01. 
freight classification authorities to assign products to 
classes. 
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It has been reported that a large degree of correlation 
among independent variables damages the efficiency of 
regression models developed using the correlated variables. 
In cases where the correlation is very strong, it may render 
the regression models useless. Strong correlation between 
independent variables makes it difficult to identify 
significant relationships and it may make a regression model 
unstable. 
The correlation between Density and TLC and Density and 
LTLC could be a serious problem if the correlations among 
the variables were large. The term large is, however, a 
relative rather than an absolute term. Most statistical 
texts define large correlations as those whose value is .7 
or greater. The correlation which represents the 
relationship between Density and LTLC is -.ss. The 
correlation which represents the relationship between 
Density and TLC is -.56. In both cases, the value of these 
correlations is well below the value commonly considered to 
be large. 
As expected, the independent variable, Value, is also 
significantly correlated with the independent variables, 
LTLC and TLC, in Table 6. The value of the product, like 
the product density, is one of the product attributes used 
by product classification authorities to assign a product to 
a class. The correlations for Value and LTLC and Value and 
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TLC are, as they are in the case of Density, below the level 
considered to be large. The correlation between Value and 
LTLC is .57. The correlation between Value and TLC is .67. 
The charge for~ shipment (Charge), the distance the 
shipment travels (Distance), and 1;:-tte .weight of the shipment 
(Weight) are included in the correlation matrix reported in 
. . 
Table 6. These three shipment elements are.not used to 
formulate any of the hypothese~ tested, but they are used to 
compute the depend~nt variable, RTM. ·Their relationships 
with the other study variables are, the~efore, useful in 
certain cases. In m~ny transportation rate studies 
employing a modeling approach, Charge is used as the 
dependent variable in the model while Distance and Weig~t 
are frequently included as independent variables. Including 
these variables in the correlation matrix can be justified 
on the basis of the ~eneralizability of the research 
results. 
The signs of the correlations for Charge, Distance, and 
Weight are stable between t~e full and the reduced 
databases~ The magnitude of the correlations does not 
increase significantly. between the two, as. in the ·-case of 
RTM. In both the full and the reduced data sets, Charge and 
Distance are not significantly correlated with Value 
(p. = .10) whereas Weigh~ is significantly correlated with 
Value (p. = .05). 
In addition to discussing the correlations between 
dependent and independent variables in hypotheses one, two, 
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three, six, eight, and nine, the results of a simple linear 
regression procedure are also reported. This might appear 
to be redundant, because the coefficient of correlation 
reported in Table 6 can be used to compute the coefficient 
of determination produced by the linear regression 
procedure. The reason for reporting'both of these 
statistics lies in their interpretation. 
The value of the coefficient of correlation'can fall at 
or between the values -1 and, +1. A plus or minus sign is 
attached to the 'coefficient of correlation, indicating 
whether the slope of the fitted regression line is positive 
or negative. The coefficient of determination, however, can 
only have a value which falls at or between 0 and 1. It 
indicates the proportional reduction in the variabil~ty of 
the dependent variable attained by using information about 
the independent variable. Except for the va'lues of 0 and 1, 
the value of the coefficient of 'correlation will always be 
larger than the value of t~e coefficient of determination. 
This relationship 'causes p~oblems with the operational 
interpretation of the coeffi9ient·of correlation. For 
example, the coefficient of correlat,ion value of . 32 and the 
coefficient of determination v~lue of .10' might represent 
the same relationsh~p between two variables. The value of 
.32, however, gives the impression of'a stronger linear 
association between the two variables. 
Regression analysis is one of the best known and widely 
use types of statistical analysis. Linear regression is 
easily the most commonly employed form of analysis in 
transportation rate studies, and has one of the strongest 
theoretical bases of all of the statistical procedures 
available. For the above reasons regression analysis 
results are also reporte~ for hypotheses one, two, three, 
six, eight and nine. 
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Simple linear regression is based on two assumptions. 
First, the relationship between two variables can be 
represented by a straight line. Second, the data being 
analyzed is normally distributed. If the analysis of a 
database determined that either of these assumptions are 
violated, the researcher is faced with one of two options. 
First, regression analysis can be abandoned and a search 
conducted for a more appropriate and usually more complex 
model. Second, some type of transformation can be used to 
make the data more appropriate for use with the regression 
model. 
Transformations can, however, cause problems. The 
first approach may entail the development of a more complex 
model which yields better insights into ~he nature of the 
data. It may also lead to difficulties in estimating and 
interpreting the model parameters. Transformations may make 
the data more suitable for analysis with a simpler model, 
but there is the chance that fundamental relationships 
between variables might be obscured. 
On the other hand, data transformations have benefits 
which sometimes outweigh their drawbacks. Transformations 
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might enhance the nature of important relationships which 
were not evident in the original data set. Based on the 
level of theoretic~! support, the frequency of usage of the 
technique, and p~rsc;mal . judgment. about t.he nature of the 
-
database under study_, the second approach is taken when 
variable relationships in the data set afe suspected of 
being unduly influe'nced by nonlinearity 'or nonnormality. 
When the decision-is made to transform data, the 
' 
researcher is faced with a number of cho.ices which could 
affect the research results, such as selecting the variables 
to transform and the type of transformation to use. 
A case can be made for the transformation of the 
dependent variable, the' independent variable, or both the 
dependent and the independent variables. When the dependent 
variable .alone is trans~ormed, the model· results might be 
improved, but care must be used in the interpretation of the 
result. For example, if the natural logarithm of the 
dependent variable is chosen as.the method of 
transformation, the antilogarithm of the dependent variable 
I 
logarithm must be determined to estimate the value of the 
dependent variable for a given value of the independent 
variable. 
When both dependent and independent variables are 
transformed into their natural logarithmic forms, the 
coefficient for the independent variable estimates-the 
percentage change in the independent variable per one 
percent change in the dependent variable. 
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Three experimental transformations were performed on 
the data set for the dependent variable, the independent 
variable, and both the dependent and independent variables. 
The data was transformed to its natural logarithmic, 
polynomial, and reciprocal forms and tested in a simple 
regression model for explanatory power. In almost every 
case the regression model containing the natural logarithmic 
forms of both the dependent and independent.variables 
explained the most variation·in the database. The 
regression model with only the independent variable 
transformed, however, produced results which are only 
marginally smaller.. Because the. interpretation of results 
is more straight forward, the latter transformation is 
reported, when appropriate, throughout the remainder of this 
research. 
The data used to test hypotheses four and seven are 
binary in nature. In these hypotheses, the research arep of 
interest is· the RTM mean differences of the two groups 
defined by the binary vari~bles. To determine whether the 
mean of the dependent variable, RTM, is significantly 
different for each of the two groups, t-tests are performed 
to test both hypotheses. The results of these tests are 
reported in 
the sections in which the hypotheses are discussed in 
detail. For the general information of the reader, the 
results achieved when Charge. is specified as the dependent 
variable are also reported. 
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Hypothesis five examines the differences in the 
dependent variable, RTM, for nine different regions of the 
country. The data used to test hypothesis five is nominal 
for the independent variable, Region, and interval for the 
dependent variable, RTM. The appropriate statistical 
technique in this case is to examine the variance in the 
dependent variable betwee~ the regions using a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) proced~re. The results of this 
one-way ANOVA procedure are reported in the section which 
discusses hypothesis five in detail. The results achieved 
when Charge is specified as the dependent variable are also 
reported. 
Product Attributes 
The first four hypotheses to be tested involve the 
attributes of products. The effect of these attributes on 
the rate per ton-mile charged by motor carriers is the major 
relationship of interest. The specific product attributes 
tested are product class, product density, product value, 
and product special handling requirements. The data 
analysis for each of the four hypotheses, developed to 
determine the significance of the four product attributes, 
is reported in the following paragraphs. 
Hypothesis 1 Findings 
The first product attribute examined for its impact on 
RTM is product class. The full database has 5655 
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observations. When shipments of less than 250 pounds are 
removed from the database, its size is reduced to 3833 
observations. Within this reduced database, the TLC numbers 
are known for 1645 of the shipments and the LTLC numbers are 
known for 1613 of the shipments. 
For analysis, each shipment in ,the reduced database is 
assigned a single product class numb~r (Class). The product 
class number assigned (either the LTLC number or the TLC 
number) depends on the weight of the shipment. When the 
weight of a shipment is greater than or equal to the weight 
break point between TLC and LTLC, that shipment is assigned 
the TLC class number. When the weight of a shipment is less 
than the weight break point, that shipment is assigned the 
LTLC number. 
The removal of the minimum charge shipments from the 
database greatly improves the correlation between RTM and 
TLC and RTM and LTLC. The relationships between variables 
in the reduced database are reported in Table 6. When a 
simple regression model is. constructed using RTM as the 
dependent variable and Class (either the LTLC or the TLC 
number but not both) as the independent variable, the 
results also improve dramatically for the reduced data set. 
The results of the simple regression model procedure for the 
reduced database of 1614 observations are reported in Table 
7 below. Although the value of R2 produced by the reduced 
database model is not large, it is statistically 
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significant. The natural logarithmic form of Class (LClass) 




REGRESSION ANALYSIS, HYPOTHESIS 1 













It should be noted that a value of R2 = .219 is 
0.062 
0.089 
produced by transforming both the dependent and independent 
variables to their natural logarithmic forms. This large 
increase in the value of th.e R2' statistlc suggests that the 
relationships between RTM and Class and RTM and LClass are 
not fully captured by the restricted models·, probably 
because the relationship is nonlinear or the data is not 
normally distributed. 
When Charge is specified as the dependent variable, the 
simple regression model procedure·produces an insignificant 
R2 value for the full database. When the reduced data set 
is used, a value of R2 = .014 is produced. Although this R2 
value is statistically significant, it might be considered 
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trivial because the magnitude of the statistic is small. 
Transforming the dependent variable, Charge, and the 
independent variable, Class, fails to improve the predictive 
power of the simple regression model. These findings 
support the contention that the relationship between Charge 
and Class is weak and linear. 
Hypothesis 1 Findings 
This hypothesis examines the impact of the product 
attribute, Density, on the rate per ton-mile charged by the 
motor carrier. An examination of the correlation matrix in 
Table 6 indicates that Density is significantly related to 
the RTM charged by motor carriers. The reduced data set 
correlation coefficient is more than twice as large as that 
produced by the full data set. 
The signs of the correlations in both the full and 
reduced databases are negative. This consistency in the 
sign of the correlation supports the argument that the 
database is basically stable. It also indicates that as 
product density increases, RTM decreases. 
The magnitude of the correlation coefficient is 
somewhat surprising. If the original hypothesis is 
supported, one side of the data distribution would be offset 
by the other side of the distribution. The magnitude of the 
correlation coefficient would, in this case, be near zero. 
This is not the case, and the possible reasons for this 
relationship are considered later in this section. 
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The full database has 1240 observations for which 
product density information is available. A simple linear 
regression model procedure applied to this database produces 
a value of R2 = .009, (p. = .01). Although this R2 value 
is significant, the usetulness of the model is questionable. 
The magnitude of the R2 value ~ight cause the model results 
to be consiqered trivial because ~t explains less than one 
percent of the total variation. 
When the shipments of less than 250,pounds are removed 
from the databa~e, its size is ·reduced to 700 observations. 
The simple line~r regression model procedure for this 
reduced data set_produces the results _which are reported in 
Table 8. While the results'produced by both of the models 
are statistically significant, it is obvious by the 
magnitude of the R2' val~es that the reduced database model 
fits the data better. The natural logarithmic form of the 
independent variable Density (LDensity) is also reported in 
Table 8. This data transformation more than doubles the 
size of the R2 value. 
The value of R2 can be· increased dramatically by 
normalizing both' the dependent· ~nd independent variables. 
When LogRTM and LDensity are used, the simple regression 
model for the full database produces a value of R2 = .091. 
For the ·reduced-database the transformed variables produce a 
2 ' value of R = .127. This finding would indicate that the 
relationship between Density and RTM is nonlineat in nature 
or that the assumption of data normality is violated. 
TABLE 8 
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In the hypothesis formulation stage of this research it 
was thought that.the relationship between Density and RTM 
might be best described as being U or V shaped. To test 
this proposed relationship the database is split into two 
different groups of shipments. One group contains those 
products that have a product .density which is less than the 
ideal product of 16.67 pounds per cubic foot. The second 
group contains those pro.ducts which have a product density 
that is greater than or equal to the ideal product density. 
When th~ shipments of products with greater than ideal 
densities are ~nalyzed using the simple linear regression 
model procedure, there is no significant relationship 
between product density and RTM. This finding is consistent 
within both normalized and untransformed databases. It is 
also consistent between the full and the reduced data sets. 
When the shipment of products with lighter than ideal 
densities are analyzed using the simple linear regression 
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model procedure, there is a small but significant 
relationship between the normalized variables in the full 
database. In the reduced data set untransformed variables 
explain a small but significant amount of variation in the 
database. 
The above results leadto the conclusion that product 
densities greater then the ideal product density of 16.67 
pounds per cubic foot have no relationship to the rate 
charged by motor carriers. The shape of the curve which 
describes the relationship between.RTM and Density is not, 
' ' 
therefore, U or V shaped. It is more likely that only one 
arm of the U or V is captured in the data. 
When Charge is specified ~s the dependent variable, a 
simple linear regre'ssion model procedure with Density as the 
independent variable produces values of R2 = .027 for the 
full database and R2 = .022 for the reduced database. When 
the dependent variable, Charge, and the independent 
variable, Density, are transformed into their natural 
logarithmic forms, the simple linear regression model for 
the full database produ~es a value of R2 = .023. For the 
reduced data set the transformed variables produce a value 
of R2 = .009. 
Charge, as a d~pendent variable, does a significantly 
' 
better job of explaining variation when the database is 
split into light and heavy halves. This is true for both 
the full and the reduced databases. It is also true when 
normalized and untransformed data are used in the simple 
linear regression model. 
Hypothesis J Findings 
196 
Hypothesis three examines the impact of the product 
attribute Value on the rate per. ton-mile charged by the 
motor carrier. The correlation'matrix for the full database 
(n = 1240) indicates that the value of a product is not 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable, RTM. 
When the minimum weight shipments are removed from the data 
set (n = 700), the correlation coefficient for RTM and Value 
becomes highly significant (r = .306, p < .01) as reported 
in Table 6. The sign of the correlation for product RTM and 
Value is positive in both the full and the reduced data set. 
This-indicates that the databaie is stable. A positive, 
significant correlation between Value and RTM in the reduced 
data set indicates-as Value increases, the RTM charged by 
the motor carriers increases. 
When a simple linear regression model procedure is 
applied to the full database, the model, as expected, 
produces insignificant results. When the reduced dataset is 
used, the simple linear regression model produces highly 
significant results. These results are reported in Table 9. 
It should be noted that the value of R2 can be 
increased by normalizing both the dependent and independent 
variables. When the regression model LogRTM = LValue is 
used, the full database produces a value of R2 = .091. For 
the reduced data set the transformed variables model 
produces a value of R2 = .162. In both cases the results 
are highly significant. _ 
TABLE 9 
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When Charge is designated as the dependent variable, 
the simple linear regression model procedure produces 
insignificant results for the full and reduced data sets. 
When Charge and Value a,re normalized by converting them to 
their natural logarithmic forms, the simple linear 
regression model for the full and reduced da~abases produces 
significant R2 values. The magnitude of the values produced 
is, however, much less than those produced when LogRTM and 
LValue are used in a simple linear regression model. 
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Hypothesis ! Findings 
The last of the product attribute variables examined 
for statistical significance involves the need of the 
product to be transported by special equipment. The nature 
of the product often has an imp~ct on the type of vehicle 
used. For example, products with odd. shapes, bulk liquids, 
or those which need refrigeration c~nnot b~ transported in a 
standard closed van·. 
A 0 - 1 yariable (EqDummy) is used ·to study the impact 
special equipment usage on th~ RTM charged by motor 
carriers. When ~h~ product is transported in a standard 
closed van, an EqDummy value of 0 is assigned. When special 
' ' 
equipment is used to transport the product, an EqDummy value 
of 1 is assigned. To test the_hypothesis that the means of 
the RTM's for the two classes of shipments defined by 
EqDummy are equal, a t-test.is used. The results of this 
analysis are reported in Table 10. The results achieved 
when the mean of Charge is tested for significant 
differences are also reported. 
In the interest of consistency, the full data set and a 
reduced data set are examined. In both cases the computed 
t-test statistic supports the· alternate hypothesis; the RTM 
means of the two groups are not -equal. The RTM mean for 
shipments made in standard closed vans is significantly 
different than the RTM mean for shipments made with special 
equipment. This difference in the RTM mean for the two 
groups of shipments indicates that the use of special 
equipment does have a significant impact on motor carrier 
pricing behavior. 
TABLE 10 
T-TEST SUMMARY, HYPOTHESIS 4 
mean 
(s.d.) 
STD VAN .398 
( 0. 40) 
SPEC EQ .305 
(0.29) 
Reduced Database, n=3833 
Dependent variable 
RTM Charge 
t-value mean ·· t-value 
(p-value) (S.d.) (p-value) 
8.440 276.86 -17.560 
(.001) (362.43) (.001) 
599.64 
(662.82) 
Note: STD VAN, n=2263; SPL EQUIP, n=1570 
Although the RTM charged is affected by the use of 
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special equipment, the direction of the effect is 
unexpected. When the original hypothesis was formulated.it 
was reasoned that the use of special equipment would be more 
costly to the motor carrier. The RTM charged by the motor 
carrier would, therefore, have to be higher to recover the 
increased cost. 
The data analysis indicates that the reverse of the 
hypothesis is true. The RTM for shipments made with special 
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equipment is lower than the RTM for shipments made with 
standard equipment. There could be several reasons for this 
reversed relationship. It could be that low class, low 
value, and high density products are more likely to be 
shipped by special equipment. Another possible reason is 
that shipments requiring special equipment are more likely 
to move in larger lots or over longer. distances. 
Also reported in Tabre 10 are the results of t-tests 
used to determine whether the usage "Of special equipment has 
any effect when Charge is used in the data analysis. For 
both data sets ·the t-tests strongly support the alternate 
hypothesis. The mean of Charge for'shipments made in 
standard closed vans is different from the means for 
shipments m~de with special equipment. The directions of 
the differences in these cases are in the direction proposed 
in the hypothesis .. 
~eographic Attributes 
Hypotheses five and six were formulated to determine 
whether there are geographic factors underlying the rate 
structure of the motor carriers re~resented in the database. 
Hypothesis· five examines the RTM differences for nine 
different regions (Region) in the United States. By using 
RTM as the dependent variable, the effect of differences in 
shipment distances and weight are neutralized. Under these 
conditions, any differences in the RTM between regions must 
occur for reasons other than the distance from the 
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destination and the weight of the shipment. Hypothesis six 
examines the RTM differences for six different sized origin 
points (CitySize). Does the size of the origin point make 
any difference in the RTM charged? 
Hypothesis 5 Findings 
To determine whether the region of shipment origin has 
an impact on the RTM charged by motor carriers, a one-way 
ANOVA procedure is used. The null'hypothesis tested is that 
there is no s·t;.a~istically significB:n~ dif'ference in the 
RTM's for the nine identified regions .(Region). In the 
interest of consistency, both the full and reduced data sets 
are examined. Res~lts for the reduced database are reported 
in Table 11 on the following page. Both analyses produce 
results which are statistically significant at the .01 
level. The results· achieved when Charge is utilized as a 
dependent variable are also included in Table 11. 
In both data sets the'RTM for at least one of the 
regions is significantly different from the other regions. 
Judging by the increases in,the magnitudes of the F-
statistics, the regional differences in RTM means are much 
more pronounced for the reduced database·. When· Charge is 
specified as the dependent variable, the one-way ANOVA 
procedure produces results·which are much less robust. The 
F-statistics indicate that there are significant differences 
between regional charges made by motor carriers. The F-
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statistics are, however, much smaller in absolute value than 
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The above results indicate that at least one of the 
regions has an RTM which is different from that of the other 
regions. The results do not, however, identify the region 
or regions which are diffe~~nt. To identify the region or 
regions which have different or similar rate structures, a 
Tukey's Student'ized Range Test is performed on both the full 
and reduced databases. The complete results of these tests 
are reported in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In the full database 
Tukey's results, there is considerable overlap between 
regions with similar rate structures. This overlap makes 
analysis of regional differences of means difficult. 
Depea~eot Yarta~le = RTI 
RT 12 IS 14 It 
len (1.3S) (LOt) (O.U) (8.11) (O.U) (0.6!) (0.57) (O.U) (0.3%) 
Rert01 D (S44) (1124) (1017) (291) · (805,) (14'3) . (385) . (1251) (231) 
Depea4eat Yarlable = c•arre 
15 14 It 13. R8 IT 
len (5U) (!15) (3U) (3U) (Ut) . (2t2) (211) (258) (212) 
Rect01 I (1U) (385) (US) (1251) (1081) (344) (UI) (11%4) (805) 
Figure 2. Tukey's Studentized Range Test, Regional 
Differences, Full Database. 
Depea•eat Yarlable' = RTI 
u IT 15 R3 Ra 14 12 11 It 
------
leu ( 0. 15) (0. 5$) (0. 40) (O.U) (O.tl) (O.U) (O.U) (O.U) (O.U) 
Rectoaal a (%35) (UO) (105)' (IT4) (%11) (2U) (415) (141) (Til) 
Depea~eat Yarlable = c•arce 
R5 14 u R3 Rt u u IT 12 
leaa (881) .(4T%) (4T1) (455) (431) (408) (385) (31S) (31T) 
Rectoa 1 (105) (28S) ·lT9S) (8T4) (141) (%35) (%11) (*80) (485) 
Figure 3. Tukey's Studentized Range Test, Regional 
Differences, Reduced Database. 
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When shipments of less than 250 pounds are removed from 
the database, four clear, significantly different groups 
emerge. The RTM for regions five (MI, ND, so, WI, and the 
MI Upper Peninsula), six (IA, KS, MO, and NE), and seven 
(AR, LA, OK, and TX) are all different from each other and 
from the remainder of t;.he regions. ,-, The remaining six 
regions form a fourth group in which the· RTM does not vary 
significantly. The RTM·mean for the. fourth group is, 
however, significantly different from the RT~ for each of 
the other three regions. 
The Tukey's test of the regional mean of Charge also 
produces results which are mixed. There are basically no 
differences between any of the regions except region 5, 
which stands alone. The reason for this regional difference 
in Charge is not clear:, but fewer shipments come from this 
region than any other. 
Discovering the factors which underlie the regional RTM 
differences would require extensive additional analysis. 
Such an effort is beyond the scope of the current research. 
' ' \ l 
At this point it is sufficient to say that significant 
regional differences exist in the RTM charged py motor· 
carriers. 
Hypothesis Q Findings 
Hypothesis six examines the impact ·of the independent 
variable, city size (CitySize), on the rate per ton-mile 
charged by the motor carrier. The correlation matrix for 
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the full data set indicates that the size of the city from 
which a shipment originates is significantly correlated with 
the dependentvariable, RTM (r = .038, p < .01). When the 
reduced data set is used, the correlation for CitySize and 
RTM becomes insignificant (r = -.029, p. < .10), as reported 
in Table 6. The sign of the correla.tion between Ci tySize 
. . 
and RTM is positive in the full, but neg.ative .in the reduced 
database. 
. 
When coding city sizes, a value of one.is assigned to 
• 
the largest city and a value af six is assign~d to the 
smallest city. Because of this coding scheme, a positive 
correlation indicates that as city size ~ncreases, the RTM 
goes down. This relationship supports hypothesis six, but 
the reversal of the~ign between the full and reduced 
databases appears to be inconsistent. 
One possible reason for this sign reversal can be 
discovered by looking at t~e correlation coefficients for 
CitySize and Weight. In both the full and reduced 
databases, CitySize and Weight are significantly correlated 
and the sign of the correlation is positive. This would 
indicate t~at the weight of'the shipments' from smaller 
cities is greater than the weight of those from larger 
cities. Weight is one of tpe three elements used to compute 
RTM. Therefore, the removal of the less than 250 pound 
shipments from the'database gives more importance to the 
shipments from smaller cities. This could be the reason for 
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the sign reversal between CitySize and RTM in the full and 
reduced databases. 
For the full database, regression analysis results 
indicate that the size of the shipment origin point has a 
small, but significant, impact on the dependent variable, 
RTM. The simple linear regressi·on model results for the 
reduced database are,reported in Tabl~ 12. In this case the 
size of the city has no significant impact, at the .OS 
percent level, on.the RTM charged by'motor carriers. The 
value of R2 has not increased significantly by normalizing 
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RTM AND CITYSIZE (n=3833) 
a value b value, F value Pr>F 
0.382 -0.008 3.14 0.077 
0.393 -0.035 9.16 0.003 
0.001 
0.002 
When Charge is designated as the dependent variable, 
the simple linear regression model procedure for the full 
database produces an F value of 3.90. This value is 
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significant at the .05 percent level, but, based on the size 
of the R2 value, .001, the result is probably trivial. 
When Charge and CitySize are normalized by converting 
them to their natural logarithmic fOrms, the simple linear 
· regression model for the full data set produces 
' -insignifica~t results. Using the.r~duced data set, the 
simple linear regression model procedure produces 
significant ·results for both the natural and·the normalized 
variables. The F value computed using the natural variable 
values is 13.17, while the F value c<;>mputed ·using normalized 
variable values is 15.26. Although both of these F values 
are significant at the .01 percent level, the magnitude of 
the R2 statistic' indicates that· .the results might be 
trivial. 
Carrier. Attributes 
Hypotheses seven and eight are formulated to determine 
whether any geographic restrictions the motor carrier might 
face or size of the motor carrier make a significant 
difference in the rates charged. Hypothesis seven examines 
the differences·in RTM means for two different groups~of 
shipments. The first group of shipments consists of those 
shipments for which only one. motor carrier is involved with 
the shipment from pick-up at origin to delivery at 
destination. The second group of shipments consists of 
those shipments which are or~ginated by one motor carrier 
and delivered by a second motor carrier. It should be noted 
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that single motor carrier shipments are not restricted to 
the larger motor carriers. A small regional motor carrier 
often makes both pick-up and delivery of shipments. 
Hypothesis eight examines the RTM differences for four 
different sizes pf motor carriers. Total annual sales 
figures are used 'to assign individual motor carriers to size 
classes. Does the size ~f the motor carrier make any 
difference in the RTM charged? 
Hypothesis 1 Findings 
The first motor carrier attribute variable examined for 
statistical significance involves interline shipments. A 
0 - 1 variable (Interline) ·is used to study the relationship 
between RTM and multiple carrier involvement in a single 
shipment. If the shipment is picked up and delivered by the 
same motor carrier, the variable value is set at zero. When 
at least two motor carriers are involved in a single 
shipment, the value of the variable is set at one. A t-test 
is used for the proposition that the means of the RTM's for 
the two classes of shipments defined by the 0 - 1 variable 
' ' 
are equal. The results of this analysis are repo~ted in 
Table 13. 
In the interest of consistency both the full database 
and a reduced database are examined. In ·the case of the 
full database, the computed t-test statistic supports the 
null hypothesis. It cannot be stated with any reasonable 
degree of certainty that the RTM of the two groups are 
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different. The RTM for shipments made by two or more motor 
carriers is not significantly different from the RTM for 
shipments made by a single motor carrier. This lack of 
difference in the RTM for the two groups of shipments could 
indicate that motor carriers involved in interline shipments 
are willing to absorb any extra cost associated with their 
operation. When the reduced data set is analyzed, the 
difference in RTM for the two groups becomes statistically 
significant at. the .01 level. 
TABLE 13 
T-TEST SUMMARY, HYPOTHESIS 7 
Reduced Database, n=3833 
Dependent Variable 
RTM Charge 
mean t-value mean t-value 
(S.d.) (p-value) (S.d.) (p-value) 
SINGLE .355 -2.749 406.97 -0.769 
CARRIER (0.36) (.006) (535.90) ( .442) 
MULTIPLE .408 427.30 
CARRIERS (0.37) (493.05) 
Note: Single Carrier,n-3438; Multiple Carriers, n=395 
Table 13 also reports the results of a reduced data set 
t-test using Charge to determine whether interline 
operations have any effect on motor carrier pricing 
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behavior. The t-test fails to support the alternate 
hypothesis at a meaningful level of significance. The 
charge imposed by motor carriers for shipments involving 
interline operations is not different than the charge 
imposed fo~ single carrier shipme,nts. This rel.ationship is 
also present _in the_ 'full data set. 
' ' 
' ' Normalizin'g ·the dependent variables/ RTM' and Charge, in 
both data sets, produces results which support the alternate 
hypothesis at the .05 level. 
Hypothesis ~ Findings 
Hypoth·esis ei9ht examines the impact of the motor 
carrier attribute size on the 'rat'e per ton mile charged by 
the motor carrier. ·To examine this relationship, all of the 
motor carriers represented in the database are assigned to 
one of four classes. Class assignments are made on the 
basis of yearly sales, with carriers having the most sales 
assigned a class value of four. The specific carriers 
assigned to each carrier s:ize class are listed in Table 4. 
The correlation coefficients for the full d~taba~e 
indicate that the size of a·motor carrier (CarrSi-ze) is 
significantly correlated with the dependent var~able, RTM, 
at the .05 percent level (r = .03+, p ,< .05). In the 
reduced data set the correlation 'for CarrSize and RTM, as 
reported in Table 6, is s_ignific;:ant at the • 01 percent level 
(r = -.139, p < .01). 
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The sign of the correlation for CarrSize and RTM is 
positive in the full database and negative in the reduced 
database. The negative sign in the reduced database 
indicates that as the size of the motor carrier increases, 
the RTM/charged by the motor ca~rier decreases. This may 
indicate that there are economl~s of scale for the larger 
motor carriers which enable them to charge.a lower RTM. 
When a simple linear regression model procedure is 
applied to the full database o~ 5655'shipments, the results 
produced are not significant at the .01 percent level. The 
magnitude of the R2 statistic propuced.by this analysis is 
so small that it is meaningless. The above results indicate 
carrier size prob~bly has no significant impact on the 
dependent variable, RTM, when minimum charge shipments are 
included in the database. 
The reduced data set of 3833 observations is analyzed, 
using simple linear regression; the results produced 
indicate that there is a significant relationship between 
motor carrier size and the RTM. The results of the linear 
regression procedure are reported in Table 14. 
In the case of the full database it ·should be noted 
that the value of R2 can be incr~ased· only·' s·lightly by 
normalizing the dependent and independent variables. For 
the reduced database, transformation of dependent and 
independent variables produces no significant change in the 
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An examination of the correlation coefficients for the 
full database indicates that the' size of a motor carrier is 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable, 
Charge, at the .01 percent level (r = -.271, p < .01). The 
correlation for CarrSize and Charge, as reported in Table 6, 
is also significant at the .p1 percent level (r = -.288, p < 
.01). The signs of the correlations for CarrSize and Charge 
in both databases are negative, which supports the 
contention that economies of £cale might exist for larger 
motor carriers. 
When a simple linear r~gression model procedure is 
applied to the full database, with Charge specified as the 
dependent variable, an R2 value of .073 .results. When a 
simple linear regression model procedure is applied to the 
reduced data set, the R2 value equals .081. When the values 
for Charge and CarrSize are normalized by converting them to 
their natural logarithmic forms, the simple linear 
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regression model for the full database produces no change in 
the R2 value. Using the reduced database, the simple linear 
regression model procedure for the transformed variables 
produced a value of R2 = .093. 
The above results indicate that for the study of the 
impact of carrier size on rates, Charge rather than RTM 
might be selected as a dependent variable. More of the 
\ 
variation in motor carrier rates can be explained by motor 
carrier size if total charges are specified as the dependent 
variable. 
Service Attributes 
Hypothesis 9 is design to measure the impact of the 
service level provided by a motor carrier on the rates 
charged by that carrier. Service is assumed to be a 
function of the number of days a shipment is en route and 
the distance involved. There are two possible reasons the 
RTM charged by motor carriers who provide superior service 
might be higher than average. First, motor carriers 
providing superior service levels will more than likely 
incur increased costs. They will have to adjust their rates 
upward to recover these increased costs Second, superior 
service might have a value to the shipper. The shipper 
might be willing to pay higher rates if fast service is 
beneficial to them. Knowing of this willingness of the 
shipper to pay higher rates for superior service, the motor 
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carrier who provides superior service will set the RTM at a 
higher leve~. 
Hypothesis i Findings 
To determine whether the s~rvice level has an impact on 
the RTM charged, the correlation coefficients are examined 
as a first step. The correlations between Service and RTM 
are statistically significant in both the large (r = .036, p 
< .01) and the reduced data sets (r = -.095, 'p < .01). The 
reversal of the.cbrrelation coefficient sign between the two 
databases is somewhat bothersome. One possible explanation 
for this sign re~ersal would be that w~en shipments were 
assigned to one of three service levels, the minimum charge 
shipments all ended up in the poor service category. This 
is an intuitively appealing explanation because it is almost 
certain that small (under 250 pound shipments) will have to 
be combined with many others before they are dispatched. 
The magnitude of the correlation.increases significantly in 
the reduced database. 
When a simple linear regression model procedure is 
applied to the full database, th,~ resulting R2 equals .001. 
Service has a small but significant impact on the dependent 
variable, RTM, at the .01 percent level. The results of 
analyzing the reduced data set of 3833 shipments using the 
simple linear regression model procegure are reported in 
Table 15. 
TABLE 15 
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RTM AND SERVICE (n=3833) 














In the full database, the value of R2 can be increased 
only slightly by normalizing the dependent and independent 
variables. When the dependent variable, RTM, and the 
independent variable, Service, are transformed into their 
natural logarithmic forms, the simple linear regression 
model for the full database produces a value of R2 = .008. 
For the reduced database the transformed variables produce a 
value of R2 = .001. For the full database transformation 
the value of R2 is small but significant at the .01 percent 
level. For the reduced database transformation the value of 
R2 is also small, but significant at the .05 percent level. 
When the dependent variable is specified as Charge 
rather than RTM, much more of the variation in rates can be 
explained by the service level offered by the motor carrier. 
By examining the correlation coefficients it can be seen 
that the correlations for Charge and Service in both the 
full (r = -.288, p < .01) and reduced (r = -.263, p < .01) 
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databases are significant. The magnitude of the 
correlations indicate that the relationships between Charge 
and Service are important in both databases. 
The signs of the correlations are consistently negative 
in both databases. This inverse relationship is as 
expected. Because service'levels were coded, with one being 
"· good service and ~hree being poor service, ah inverse 
relationship indicates that shippers pay more for better 
service. 
When a simple linear regression model procedure is 
applied to the full database, the model with Charge 
specified as the dependent variable has an R2 = .083. The 
above model results indicate that for the full database, 
Service has a significant impact on the dependent variable, 
Charge, at the .01 percent level. The simple linear 
regression model procedure for t·he reduced data set of 3833 
shipments with Charge specified as the dependent variable 
produces an R2 value of .069. 
In the case of the full database it should be noted 
that the value of R2 can be increased by normalizing the 
dependent and independent variables. When the dependent 
variable, Charge, and the independent variable, Service, are 
transformed into their natural logarithmic forms, the simple 
linear regression model .for the full database produces an 
value of R2 = .100. For the reduced da:tabase the 
transformed variables produce a value of R2 = .088. For the 
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full and reduced database transformations, the values of R2 
are significant at the .01 percent level. 
Data Analysis Summary 
The preceding pages of this chapter are concerned with 
the testing of individu~l hypot~eses formulated through 
speculation about relatiqnships between dependent and 
independent. variables. In almost every case the independent 
,, 
variables have ,a significant'relationship with the dependent 
variables. When such rela~ionships, exist, a~y change in the 
value of an independent variable has an impact on the value 
of the dependent variable. When all of the ind~pendent 
variables are considered individually, some· of them 
contribute more th~n others in explaining the variation in 
the dependent variable. This'leads to the conclusion that 
some of the independent variables are more important than 
others in explaining motor carrier pricing behavior. The 
question in this case-becomes which of the independent 
variables are the ~ost impor.,tant. 
The independent variables not only have relationships 
with t~e dependent variables~ they ~lso have relationships 
with each other. When two independent variables ,are closely 
related, it is obvious that it woulp' not be necessary to use 
both of them to explain motor carrier pricing behavior. 
Which one of the two closely related.variables to.use, 
however, is not easily determined. The issue of which 
combination of independent variables best explains the 
pricing behavior of motor carriers in an unregulated 
environment is addressed below. 
Motor Carrier Rate Models 
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When all of the independent variables are considered as 
candidates for inclusion in a motor carrier rate model, 
which of them contribute most and which least to explaining 
the variation in the dependen~ variable? Which of the 
independent variables 'can be omitted from a motor carrier 
rate model wi t,hout· harming the power' of the model to' explain 
motor carrier rates? Which form of the dependent variable 
should be used in a motor carrier rate model? To answer 
these questions, two motor carrier.rate models ate 
formulated using regression analys'is procedures. The data 
set used to build these model~ is the reduced data set with 
shipments of under 250 pounds removed. 
Two different dependent variables, RTM and Charge, are 
specified for use in rate model formulation. Fourteen 
independent variables are considered for inclusion in the 
motor carrier rate models. Six of these independent 
variables are Class, Density, Value, CitySize, CarrSize, and 
Service. An additional six independent variables are 
created by computing the natural logarithmic forms of the 
six variables previously listed. The reasons for this 
particular form of data transformation and justification for 
data transformation have been discussed previously. 
Transformed data often increases the explanatory power of 
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models when the relationships between dependent and 
independent variables are non-linear in nature or when the 
data or the residuals are not normally distributed. These 
12 independent variables were previously used to test six of 
the individual research hypotheses. 
Two of the 14 independent variables considered for 
inclusion in the model are dummy variables. These variables 
identify shipments made with special equipment (EqDummy) and 
interline shipments (Interline)~ For these variables the 
database is divided into two groups and the observations in 
each of the groups are assigned values of 1 or 0. Due to 
the nature of the data, the independent variable, Region, 
was not considered for inclusion in the motor carrier rate 
model. 
Reduced Database Analysis 
A first step in the construction of motor carrier rate 
models is to examine the correlation matrix for the two 
dependent variables and the 14 independent variables. When 
RTM is designated as the dependent variable, the correlation 
matrix shows that the relationships between RTM and nine of 
the 14 independent variables are significant at the p.>.Ol 
level. In addition, three of the independent variables have 
relationships with RTM which are significant at the p.>.OS 
level. The only two variables which do not have significant 
relationships with RTM are Service and LService. This makes 
it unlikely that these two variables would be included in a 
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rate model developed to explain motor carrier pricing 
behavior. The remaining 12 independent variables appear to 
be candidates for inclusion in a motor carrier rate model 
with RTM designated as the dependent variable. 
When Charge is designated as the dependent variable, 
the correlation matrix shows, that the relationships between 
Charge and 8 of the 14 independent variables are significant 
at the p.>.01 level. The relationship between RTM and 
LDensity is significant at the p.>.05 level. The 
relationships which are non-significant at the p.>.10 level 
are LClass, CitySize, LCitySize, Value, and Interline. The 
lack of correlation between Charge and the independent 
variables in these five cases would seem to excludes these 
variables as likely candidates for further consideration in 
the model building process. 
The second step in the development of a motor carrier 
rate models involved a t test examination of the means of 
the 14 independent variables. The General Linear Model 
Procedure of the SAS Statistical Analysis System was used to 
test the means of the independent variables for statistical 
significance. RTM and Charge were both used as dependent 
variables in the models and the results of both analyses are 
reported in Table 16 and Table 17. In this step of the 
model building process only 669 of the 3833 observations in 
the reduced dataset could be used. The SAS General Linear 
Model Procedure automatically eliminated observations with 
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missing values for any of the 14 independent variables in 
the model. 
TABLE 16 
GENERAL LINEAR MODEL REGRE,SSION RESULTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE, RTM 
Parameter Estimate t value Probability 
Intercept -1.464 ...,3.19 0.001* 
Class 0.000 0.02 0.982 
LClass 0.345 2.70 0.007* 
Density 0.002 1.37 0.170 
LDensity -0.025 -0.68 0.494 
Value -0.001 -1.52 0.129 
LValue -0.011 -1.08 0.281 
CitySize 0.176 4.88 o.oo1* 
LCitySi£e -0.507 -4.97 o.oo1* 
Carrsize 0.250 4.22 0.001* 
LCarrsize -0.535 -4.24 0.001* 
Service 0.098 0.76 0.447 
LService :....o.178 -0.75 0.4!$6 
EqDummy -0.076 ' -3.26 0.001* 
Interline 0.073 1.89. o.o59** 
R2 = 0.269 
n = 669; 
* significant at p.>.01 
** significant at p.>.10 
R2 
TABLE 17 
GENERAL LINEAR MODEL REGREOSSION RESULTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE, CHARGE 
Parameter Estimate t value Probability 
Intercept 3945.131 4.49 0.001* 
Class 3.914 1.37 0.170 
" 
LClass -691.181 :...2.83 o.oo5* 
Density 6.951 3. 02. 0.003* 
LDensity -228.961 -3.27 . 0. 001 * 
Value -1.345 1.42 0.157 
LValue 39.907 1.98 0.048** 
CitySize -210.175 -3 .• 04 0.003* 
LCitySize 459.079 2.35 0.019** 
Carrsize 126.482 1.12 0.264 
LCarrsize -520.169 -2.16 0.032** 
Service -32.107 -0.13 0.896 
LService -196~019 -0.43 0.668 
EqDummy 178.151 4.01 0.001* 
Interline -179.919 -2.45 0.015** 
= 0.347 
n = 669; 
* significant.at p ~->. 01 
** significant at p.>.10 
The parameter estimates, t values, and probabilities 
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reported in Tables 16 and 17 indicate that not all of the 14 
independent variables are equally good candidates for 
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inclusion in a motor carrier rate model. In the interest of 
statistical efficiency a model should contain as few 
independent variables as possible without compromising the 
power of t~e model to explain changes in the dependent 
variable. The non-significant .. variables can, in both cases, 
be omitteq without harming·the power of the mod~! to explain 
motor carrier rates. 
The next step in the model ~uilding proces~ involves 
the use of the Stepwise Regression Procedure of the SAS 
System. Models with RTM and Charge specitied as dependent 
variables and Class, tclass, riensity, LDens1ty, Value, 
LValue, CitySize, LCitySize, CarrSize, LCarrSize, Service, 
LService, EqDummy, and Interl~ne specified as independent 
variables are analyzed using the Stepwise Regression 
Procedure. The significance level for independent variable 
entry into the model is set at the program default value of 
0.15 percent. Using this procedure, the independent 
variables which contribute little to the explanatory power 
of the model are rejected. The results produced by these 
models are summarized in Table 18. 
A second analysis is perroimed with Class and LClass 
eliminated from consideration as independent variables. The 
justification for this analysis is that Class and LClass are 
composite measures and their inclusion in a model restricts 
. ' 
several other independent variables from being considered 
for entry into the model. The results of this analysis are 
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In closing this chapter. it should be reported that the 
values of the R2 statistic for the models can be improved 
substantially by including other variables in the analysis. 
For example, the value of the R2 statistic for the model 
with Charge reported above can be more than doubled if 
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weight and distance variables are included in the model. A 
model which includes the natural logarithmic forms for the 
dependent as well as the independent variables also 
increases the e~~lanatory power of the modeling process. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCL.USIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter cqnsists of four major sections. The 
first section ~ummarizes the rese~rch findings.. The second 
section examines the limitations of the study. .The third 
section discusses the implications of these research 
findings. The final section suggests areas where further 
research effort might be useful in expanding the body of 
knowledge in the field. 
The major purpose.of this study was to determine the 
factors, other than distance and shipment weight, that 
influence motor carrier pricing in an unregulated 
environment. A review of the' literature revealed that 
distance and shipment weight were used as the principal 
independent variables in almost all motor carrier pricing 
studies. A mix of secondary independent variables were also 
included in those studies. However, the lack of consistency 
in secondary variable selection made· it difficult to draw 
any general conclusions about the contribu~ion these 
secondary variables made to the understanding of motor 
carrier pricing behavior. To examine the explanatory power 
of the secondary variables, shipment weight and distance 
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were excluded from the current research effort. This 
research shows that, within the limits of the study, motor 
carrier pricing behavior was significantly influenced by 
several factors other than weight and distance. 
Research Findings Summary 
The attributes of the product being shipped were found 
to have an important impact on motor carrier pricing. 
Product class, a composite m~asure which contains many 
commodity attributes, significantly influenced motor carrier 
pricing behavior-when a reduced database was examined. As 
the product class number increased, the RTM charged by the 
motor carrier also increased. 
The density of the product, another product attribute 
measure, was found to be significantly related to the RTM 
charged under some conditions examined in the study. If the 
product was less dense than the· ideal product density, 
higher transportation RTM's were paid for the shipment. If, 
however, the product was more dense than the ideal product 
density, there was no relationship present between 
transportation RTM's and product density. 
Product value is also a product attribute measure. 
This variable produced the least consistent results in the 
study. Product value was significantly related to the RTM 
charged in only half of the situations studied. As the 
value of the product increased in the reduced dataset, the 
transportation RTM paid to the motor carrier also increased. 
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When a particular shipment had characteristics which 
required the use of special equipment, the RTM charged by 
the motor carrier was different from that char.ged when 
standard equipment was used. This relationship was more 
pronounced when minimum weight shipments.were removed from 
the dataset. 
The removal of the mini,mum weight shipments from the 
dataset allowed the shipments which req~ired the use of 
special equipment to have more influence on motor carrier 
pricing behavior. ' Special equipment shipments tend to be 
made in larger quantities. Therefore, th~ special equipment 
shipments make up a larger percentage of the reduced dataset 
and they would explain more of the.motor carrier pricing 
behavior than they do in the f.ull dataset. 
Two geographic·factors, region of origin and size of 
the origin city, were identified and their impact on motor 
carrier pricing behavior was evaluated. The region in which 
the shipment originated was found to have a significant 
influence on motor carrier pricing behavior. Six of the 
nine regions fell into a single pricing group. The prices 
charged by motor carriers for.their services did not vary 
within this group of'six regions~ Pricing behavior of the 
motor carriers in the remaining three regions, the 
Northwest, Midwest, and Southwest, were found to be 
significantly different than that of the other pricing 
groups. 
230 
The size of the city in which the shipment originated 
had a mixed influence on motor carrier pricing behavior. 
Only in some cases did.the city size have a small but 
significant impact on motor carrier pricing behavior. Under 
other conditions, s·hipments originating in cities of 
different ,sizes.did not have significantly different pricing 
structures. 
Two motor carrier attributes were examined to determine 
whether they.had an impact on motor carrier pricing 
behavior. When the RTM's charge~ for'shipments made by a 
'· . 
' ,• 
single motor carrier were contrasted with the RTM's charged 
for shipments made by two'or more motor carriers, the 
results produced were mixed in both the full and the reduced 
databases. The RTM's charged for shipments made by multiple 
carriers was generally ~igher, but the difference in means 
of the two groups was not statistically significant. 
The size of the motor carrier was found to have a small 
but significant impact on the pricing behavior of the motor 
carriers. This was especially true in the reduced database. 
The larger the motor carrier, the lower its RTM. This 
supports the idea that there might be some economies of 
scale involved in larger motor carrier operations. 
The final area investigated for its impact on motor 
carrier pricing behavior was the level of service offered by 
the motor carrier. The level of service had a direct, 
significant impact on the RTM charged in almost every case. 
The higher the level of service, the higher the RTM charged. 
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Limitations of the Study 
The major limitation of the study was that all of the 
shipments have a single destination. Although the shipments 
used in the study originated in 46 different states and 
hundreds of different cities, the single destination for all 
shipments was Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. The possibility exists 
that shipments destined for this.single destination might 
have a unique pricing structure. If this were true, it 
would be unlikely that the study results could be 
generalized. Oklahoma generally imports finished goods and 
exports raw materials. The flow of freight into Tinker AFB 
would certainly be considered finished goods. Lack of a 
corresponding flow of raw materials in the opposite 
direction could cause an adverse effect on motor carrier 
prices. An imbalance in the flow of raw materials and 
finished goods would be reflected in the motor carrier 
rates. 
A second limitation of the study was that it was not 
possible to gather data on numerous independent variables 
~ 
which had been used in past motor carrier pricing research. 
Although weight and distance were commonly used a~ 
independent variables in almost all studies, the selection 
of what might be classified as secondary independent 
variables usually depended on data availability. Data 
available also controlled the secondary independent 
variables selected for the current study. It appears that 
this was also true in many other previous motor carrier 
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pricing studies. This lack of independent variable 
commonalty between studies makes it difficult to compare the 
results reported for one study with those reported for 
others. Without a common use database it is unlikely that a 
general theory of motor carrier'pricing behavior can ever be 
developed. 
A third limitation of the study was caused by missing 
data. The original dataset contained ·information on over 
15,000 motor carrier shipments inbound to Tinker'AFB. When 
all of the observations with missing data were removed, the 
number of usable observations was reduced to just over 5600. 
In some cases the database was further reduced because data 
was missing on variables added to the original database. 
For example, product density information was only available 
for 1200 of the shipments. The possibility exists that the 
observations studied do not represent the true population 
under consideration. 
The fourth limitation' of this study was that it 
involved military shipments only. The only disaggregated 
database readily available for public use was the database 
maintained by the Military Traffic Management Command. 
Information from this database was easily acquired under the 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Motor carrier 
pricing information from non-public sources proved 
impossible to acquire. The possibility exists that the 
pricing behavior of motor carriers might be different when 
dealing with the government than it is when dealing with a 
private sector company. If this is the case, the study 
might not be applicable to the civilian sector. 
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A final limitation of the research involves the time 
period selected for study. The year of motor carrier 
shipments studied was carefully selected to allow initial 
deregulation pricing effects to diminish and to coincide 
with the only two other empirical studies done in the area. 
It is quite possible that as the motor carriers gained 
experience in'the ~ervices pricing'area the factors they 
consider in setting their prices have changed. 
Implications of the Study 
This research effort helps ov~rcome some of the 
limitations of motor carrier pricing studies done using the 
case study and the survey approach. As pointed out earlier 
in this paper, there is alw~ys a chance that the group 
surveyed or the subject of the case study do not truly 
represent the feelings of the population of interest. For 
example, it has been widely.reported in the motor carrier 
industry literature that a group of surveys and case studies 
show motor carrier service to small communities had declined 
in the decade following the deregulation the of the motor 
carrier industry. There is a second.group of surveys and 
case studies, however, which show that motor carrier service 
levels to small communities have improved or, at a minimum, 
are no lower than they were before July of 1980. There are 
also conflicting case study and survey results in the areas 
of large and small shippers, overall service levels, and 
motor carrier pricing. 
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As long as there is a lack of unanimity in the results 
produced by case studies and surveys in the area of motor 
carrier pricing behavior, it is unlikely that a general 
theory of motor carrier pJ:'icing' behavior can be formulated 
and tested. A large scale empirical study will always be 
necessary to resolve conflicts produced by the,case studies 
and surveys and to conf'irm the conclusions reached by 
research efforts based on these techniques. This study 
serves as a che.ck' on survey and· case study findings in the 
nine areas where motor carrier pricin,g behavior was tested. 
The research also gives those researchers interested in 
the area of motor carrier pricing a dee~er understanding of 
the nature of motor carrier :pricing in an unregulated 
environment. Since deregulation of the motor carrier 
industry in 1980, this 'is only the third major pricing study 
done which is based on'a large disaggregated dataset. The 
lack of empirical studies has. been a major shortcoming· in 
the area of motor carrier rate research. Although a single 
research effort fails to co~pletely overcome the serious 
deficiency caused by the lack of empirical studies in motor 
carrier pricing behavior, it does add a great deal to the 
pool of knowledge about the subject. 
By excluding shipment weight and distance as possible 
independent variables considered for inclusion in a motor 
carrier rate model, other independent variables are given 
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the opportunity to explain more of the pricing behavior of 
motor carriers. This research identifies the most important 
of these secondary independent variables and defines the 
conditions unde_r w}J.ich they are important. By focusing on 
these secondary variables, the cur~ent research enriches the 
understanding of motor carrier pricing'behavior. Although 
the amount of motor' carrier pricing behavior 'explained by 
many of these secondary variables is small, it is in almost 
all cases significant: This study widens the·field of 
independent variables which future motor carrier pricing 
researchers will be able to cqnsider for. inclusion in motor 
' ' 
carrier rate models. 
By examining the actual motor carrier pricing structure 
of the major industry in central Oklahoma, a motor carrier 
pricing benchmark is set for all other firms located in the 
area. Local firms can compare their transportation rates to 
those paid by Tinker AFB. This will give these local firms 
a good idea if the rates they are paying are reasonable. 
The motor carrier pricing information will also be useful to 
governmental and non-governmental agencies in their attempts 
to attract industries to the:local area. A great deal of 
effort is expended by economic development agencies to 
gather information about. their area for prospective 
industrial relocation candidates. It can only make the 
informational packet more impressive if a complete analysis 
of inbound motor carrier rates can be included. 
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Finally, this study of motor carrier pricing behavior 
identifies a public use database that has been completely 
neglected in the past. The research shows that the database 
can be used successfully to investigate the area of motor 
carrier pricing behavior. This might be the most important 
aspect of the study. In the, past motor carrier rate 
research has been s·everely hampe+ed by the lack of a large, 
' ' public use database containing disaggregated data. This 
deficiency has been identified repeatedly in the motor 
carrier pricing literature. 
Future Research Efforts 
The study ne~ds to be expanded to other Air Force 
Logistical Centers located throughout the United States. 
There are centers located in California, Utah, Texas, Ohio, 
and Georgia. Motor carrier shipment data for these 
destinations are in the public domain and easily accessible. 
It also needs to be expand~d to ,examine shipments made by 
other branches of the armed services. Are the motor carrier 
price structures for other destinations comparable to Tinker 
AFB and are they comparable to'each other? ·This expansion 
from a single destination stud~ to one involving multiple 
destinations would overcome the limitations of a single 
destination study and validate the current research. If the 
study is expanded into a multiple destination study, than 
sampling of the available data should be considered. 
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An additional study needs to be done using Tinker AFB 
data from a later time period. Data from the 1988 - 1989 
time period is readily available and complete at this time. 
A study which replicates the current study and uses a 
different time period data~ase would assure that the 
findings of' the first study are stable over time. 
j .-. ) 
The f:i,.nal ''area where additional research, needs to be 
conducted is in the area of non-governmental motor carrier 
traffic. A study needs to be conducted using civilian 
traffic, disaggreg,ated data, and the same variables used in 
the current research. This type of_research project would 
answer the questions which are sure to arise about the 
similarity of gover~ental and civilian motor carrier 
shipments. 
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